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PREFACE
The requirements documented in this technical note were generated in support of NASA contract
NAS 1-18586, Design and Validation of Digital Flight Control Systems Suitable for Fly-By-Wire
Applications, Task Assignment 2. These requirements are for an Advanced Subsonic Civil
Transport (ASCT) flight control system and were generated using structured techniques. The
requirement definition started with performing a mission analysis of a typical transport aircraft to
identify the high-level control system requirements and control functions necessary to control the
mission flight. The functional requirements were then decomposed using structured method
techniques. Finally, detailed performance requirements obtained from the Federal Aviation
Requirements (FAR), FAR Special Conditions, and Military Specifications (MIL-SPEC) were
allocated to the funcitonal requirements. The result is an example set of control system
requirements that can provide a research focus for studying structured design methodologies and in
particular design-for-validation philosophies. This set is a collection of requirements from
different sources (FAR and MIL-SPECs) and as such does not represent the design requirements
for any actual airplane.
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1.0 Introduction
This technical note documents a set of structured flight control system requirements and the
methodology used to generate these. Functional requirements were generated for an ad-
vanced flight control system for an Advanced Subsonic Commercial Transport (ASCT) of
the mid-1990s. These requirements have been generated and organized using a structured
approach in a manner to support structured design methodologies. }-I.igh level flight control
functional requirements for the ASCT were defined based on a mission analysis. These
requirements were then decomposed in a structured manner using the Extended System
Modeling Language (ESMZL) to obtain the flight control detailed functional requirements.
Detailed performance, safety and availability requirements were then added to the func-
tional model. Finally, the requirements were entered and stored in a database using the
Excelerator/RTS software package which supports structured modeling and in particular the
ESMI.. for structured requirements generation. The result is an example set of control sys-
tem requirements to provide a research focus for studying structured design methodologies
and candidate system architectures for future aircraft.

2.0 Requirements Generation
The functional requirements were developed using a structured approach to system design
(Appendix A) which makes use of the Extended System Modeling Language (ESML) de-
scribed in Appendix B. The use of ESML requires starting with a high level function to be
performed rather than immediately addressing a particular system or subsystem. Using this
approach allows one to take a top down approach and consider the complete function to be
performed independent of the implementation (system design). This allows for considering
all functions to be performed and for allocating those functions to systems in a logical
manner such that the implementation is based on sound engineering judgment and is not
overly biased by previous designs.
Once the overall high level function is defined, it is decomposed into several levels of func-
tional requirements. Detailed performance, availability and safety requirements are added
to the functional requirements. Subsequently, several candidate architectural models (Ap-
pendix C) are developed. The low level functional requirements are then allocated to the
architecture which best meets the detailed performance requirements.
This effort involved the generation of requirements for a flight control system (FCS). The
FCS is used together with the airframe, propulsion system, sensor system, crew and operat-
ing environment to fly a mission. Thus, the highest level functional requirement is to Fly
Mission. Starting at such a high level allows for setting performance requirements on the
complete system rather than solely on the subsystem of interest (FCS). Thus, for example
one can include handling qualities requirements which the airframe, sensor system, flight
control system and operating environment must meet as a whole. The functional require-
ments and the associated performance requirements are then decomposed to levels where
all low level functions can be allocated to entities on the architectural model. If the perform-
ance requirements are properly decomposed and if each lower level function meets its re-
quirements, then the high level requirements will be satisfied. And correspondingly, if each
architectural entity satisfies the performance requirements of the functions assigned to it,
then the complete architecture will satisfy the high level requirement.
Decomposition of the Fly Mission function results in many functions which certainly will not
be allocated to the flight control system. An example is the Navigate function on the Fly
Mission transform graph, which would be performed by the crew or a flight management
computer. For this exercise, only those functions which may be performed in whole or in
part by the FCS were further decomposed and assigned detailed performance requirements.
Functions which clearly will not be performed by the FCS appear on a transform graph but
are not defined in detail. The following details the functional decomposition, detailed
requirements specification and allocation of functions to the flight control system.
The functional requirements were developed by starting with a functional requirement to
Fly Mission. This function involves the generation of a target flight path by some kind of
Navigation function based on the mission and the generation of the actual flight path by the
Control Mission Flight function based on the desired flight path. The decomposition of a
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high level function (Fly Mission) into lower level functions (Navigate and Control Mission
Flight) illustrates the process of functional decomposition and is shovcn pictorially with a
transform graph (see Fly Mission transform graph on page 12). (Note that the blocks used
to represent functional requirements on a transform graph are referred to as the transform
graph processes.) The Navigation and Control Mission Flight functions and data flows on
the Fly Mission transform graph are defined and entered into the project data base. A
mission analysis was performed to define the control system requirements necessary to
control the mission flight. These are then grouped into control functions which form the
functional requirements for the Control Mission Flight transform graph (see pages 16 and
87). Detailed performance and availability requirements were then generated for the Con-
trol Mission Flight function. The detailed performance requirements include handling
qualities requirements, flight envelope requirements and dynamic maneuver response
requirements. Many of the detailed requirements were obtained from Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) (Ref. 1), FAR Special Conditions (Ref. 2) and Military Specifications
MIL-F-8785C (Ref. 3) and MIL-F-9490D (Ref. 4) and these have been crossreferenced to
the appropriate document. Availabilit-y requirements are expressed as a probability of loss
of the function per flight hour.
Functional requirements (transform graphs) and detailed performance requirements were
then generated for each of the functions on the Control Mission Flight which pertained to the
flight control system (i.e. Control Aerodynamic Braking, Control Lift Configuration, Con-
trol Pitch, Control Roll and Control Yaw). This process of breaking down a function into
lower level functional requirements and generating detailed performance requirements was
continued to a level of detaJ] at which Jt was unambiguous as to whether or not the function
should be assigned to the FCS. Context diagrams were then generated for the Control Pitch,
Control Roll and Control Yaw functions to show which functions will be performed by the
FCS and to identify an)' necessary interface functions to the non FCS functions. Those
functions not to be performed by the FCS are allocated to other entities on a preliminary
version of the architecture model. The remaining functions are to be performed by the FCS.
Context diagrams (i.e. Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Context) capture this information by showing
all the FCS functions grouped into one function (i.e. Flight Control System Pitch Functions),
surrounded by the external architectural entities (i.e. the Pilot, Copilot, and Auto-Flight
System) which have been assigned the non FCS functions under the Control Pitch function.
The transform graph for the Flight Control System Pitch Functions will then contain all the
FCS pitch axis functions previously identified, but will also include any additional functions
required as a result of the assignment of non FCS functions to architectural entities. For the
pitch axis example, the following additional functional requirements were generated: Pro-
vide Pilot Pitch Interface, Provide Copilot Pitch Interface, and Resolve Pitch Control Conten-
tion. These three functional requirements were all generated as a result of assigning the
function, Generate Flight Path Command Manual, to both the pilot and copilot. The use of
the context diagram allows for quickly identifying additional functional requirements gener-
ated as a result of the architectural assignment and thus provides a degree of feedback to the
architecture design process and allows for earl)" evaluation of candidate architectures.
An architectural model was generated starting with The System which is composed of the
Flight Environment and the Aircraft. The Aircraft is then decomposed into major subsys-
tems including the Flight Control System, Airframe Systems, Propulsion System, Sensor
System, Auto-Flight System and the Crew. Finally the Flight Control System is broken into
subsystems including crew controllers, flight control computers, and actuation systems. The
flight control system functions were then allocated to the architectural model as appropriate.
The architectural entities then assume the detailed performance and availability require-
ments of the functions assigned to them. Subsequently design trade studies are conducted to
determine a design which best satisfies the detailed requirements. The result of the trade
studies are design requirements for the architectural entities. In this study some preliminary
design requirements have been included to demonstrate the nature of the design require-
ments.
, _ _ r_._ ¸_
3.0 Excelerator/RTS Overview
Excelerator/RTS (Reference 5) is a set of automated tools for real time system modeling,
analysis and design. These tools allow for depicting systems with time-critical control
and processing such as avionics systems. They support the techniques presented by key
theoreticians and used by many real time systems practitioners. In particular the system
supports the Extended System Modeling Language (ESML) described in Appendix A and
Appendix B.
Automated tools make analysis and design more efficient and reliable. Design can be
quickly and easily modified to incorporate test results and user feedback. Project work
can be shared among many engineers, while controlling updates and data integrity. A
variety of analysis and reporting tools allow for evaluation of completeness and correct-
ness. Together these tools allow for iterative systems design.
The Excelerator/RTS tools are grouped into the following capabilities:
* A graphics facility which allows for visual representation of systems that handle timing
control and monitoring functions. The transform graph feature of this facility was used to
document the functional requirements decomposition. This illustrated both functions to
be performed and the data flows associated with these functions.
* A data dictionary wherein the information describing the system is stored. Descrip-
tions of the functional requirements, associated data flows and associated detailed per-
formance requirements were stored in the data base for subsequent report generation and
analysis.
* Analysis reports to help evaluate the consistency and methodological accuracy of the
system model. An example is graph balancing which checks for data and control flow
consistency between parent and child transform graphs.
* Prototyping facilities to design screens and reports customized for the particular pro-
ject. Screens were designed for each of the entities on transform graphs to allow for
defining such entities and assigning performance requirements to each. The reports gen-
erated for the transform graphs were all generated using this feature.
* A documentation facility that allows for producing system documents. The final re-
quirements document was generated by linking all the necessary graphics, reports and
analysis for the complete functional requirements model using this feature.
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4.0 Advanced Flight Control System Requirements
This section contains the example set of structured requirements for an advanced flight
control system for an Advanced Subsonic Civil Transport (ASCT) of the mid-1990s. The
requirements are not representative of an)' actual airplane design but rather shall provide a
research focus for studying structured design methodologies. These requirements were gen-
erated as described in section 2.0 and are organized as follows.
The transform graphs representing the functional requirements decomposition are shown in
Figure 1. The top level, Fly Mission, is decomposed into two functions Navigate and Control
Mission Flight (see page 12). The Navigate function is outside the Hight Control System
(FCS) context and thus is not functionally decomposed in this document. The Control
Mission Flight is within the FCS context and is functionally decomposed as shown on page
87 (Control Mission Flight transform graph). Those functions within the FCS context are
further decomposed and are shown on Figure 1. Note that the Control Thrust, Control
Braking on Ground, Control Heading on Ground and the Update Aircraft State functions
were not considered to be pan of the primary flight control system and thus were not decom-
posed. Figure 1 shows how the functional requirements have been organized in this chapter.
Start at the top level (Control Mission Flight) and move down the tree from left to right going
down to the lowest level possible on each branch. Figure 2 shows the reports generated for
each transform graph. These consist of the transform graph figure followed be a set of
reports describing the elements on the transform graphs. These are shown on page 13 for
the Fly Mission transform graph. If performance requirements are levied on a function on a
transform graph, a report detailing the associated requirements files and the actual require-
ments files are included. These are shown on pages 17 thru 86 for the Control Mission Flight
function on the Fly Mission transform graph (page 12). Referring to Figure 1, the Control
Aerodynamic Braking requirements (transform graph, reports and requirements) follow the
Control Mission Flight requirements. The Control Aerodynamic Braking transform graph is
shown on page 105 and associated reports and requirements are on pages 106 thru 111.
The architectural model is organized in a hierarchical fashion starting at The System level
composed of the Flight Environment and Aircraft which is decomposed into several levels
down to the elements of the Flight Control System. Each level in the decomposition consists
of an architecture diagram, and architecture requirements report and the associated require-
ments.
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Process Descriptions
Fly Mission
Description Expl name
........................... . ..........................................................................
This function receives a target flight path (generated by navigation) Control Mission Flight
and generates control signals for the actuation systems which
generate the forces and moments to control the aircraft attitudes to
generate a flight path which matches the target flight path.
This function generates the target flight path based on the Mavigate
particular mission requirements and, anticipated and sensed
environmental condAtions.
Data Flow Description
Fly Mission
Description Nmae
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requireaants.
Aircraft pitch, roll and heading attitudes. Aircraft Attitudes
Definition of particular flight mission from which the target flight Mission Definition
path can be generated.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by Target Flight Path
some navigation function.
Process Requirements Links
Ply Mission
Exp] name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Control Mission Flight Mission. Analysis
Cntrl.Mission. Plight.Req. List
Navigate
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MISSION
SEGMENT
TAXI-OUT &
TAXI-IN
TAKEOFF
CLIMBOUT &
CLIMB
CRUISE
DESCENT &
APPROACH
LANDING
MISSED
APPROACH
TABLE 1. Analysis of Mission Segments
I i
DRIVERCONTROL ACTION
I
MOVE FROM PASSENGER
TERMINAL TO RUNWAY.
ACCELERATE TO TAKEOFF
SPEED & DEPART RUNWAY.
TERRAIN AND OBSTACLE
AVOIDANCE.
CONTROL SYSTEM
REQUIREMENT
ASCEND TO CRUISE
ALTITUDE AND SPEED
CRUISE
DESCEND FROM CRUISE
TO APPROACH ALTITUDE
AND SLOW TO
LANDING SPEED
FLARE, TOUCHDOWN &
DECCELERATE TO TAXI
SPEED
RAPID THRUST CHANGE
QUICK, HARD MANEUVERS
RUNWAY LENGTH
THRUST LIMITS
CROSSWIND CONDITIONS.
TIME CONSTRAINT
FUEL CONSUMPTION
EASE PILOT WORKLOAD
RIDE QUALITY
AIRSPACE CONTROL
TURBULENCE
EASE PILOT WORKLOAD
FUEL CONSUMPTION
MINIMIZE DRAG
RIDE QUALITY
EASE PILOT WORKLOAD
RIDE QUALITY
CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
ALL WEATHER APPROACHES
TIGHT PATH FOLLOWING
RUNWAY LENGTH
CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
RAPID SPEED CHANGE
TIGHT PATH FOLLOWING
ALL WEATHER LANDINGS
EASE PILOT WORKLOAD
TERRAIN AND OBSTACLE
AVOIDANCE.
WIND SHEARS
RIDE QUALITY
SPEED CONTROL
NOSEWHEEL STEERING.
SET HIGH LIFT
SET TAKEOFF TRIM
THRUST SETTING
NOSEWHEEL STEERING
ENGINE OUT AUGMENTATION
ON GROUND BRAKING
STALL ANGLE OF ATTACK
WARNING
MANUAL TRAJECTORY
CONTROL
THRUST SETTING
MANUAL TRAJECTORY CONTROL :
AUTO TRAJECTORY CONTROL
MAN'{.JAL & AUTO TRIM
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
AUTO CONTROL LIMITING
LIFT CONTROL
SPEED CONTROL
MANUAL TRAJECTORY CONTROL
AUTO TRAJECTORY CONTROL
MANUAL & AUTO TPUM
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
AUTO CONTROL LIMITING
LIFT CONTROL
SPEED CONTROL
MANUAL TRAJECTORY CONTROL
AUTO TRAJECTORY CONTROL
MANUAL & AUTO TRIM
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
AUTO CONTROL LIMITING
LIFT CONTROL
SPEED CONTROL
MANUAL TRAJECTORY CONTROL
AUTO TRAJECTORY CONTROL
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
AUTO CONTROL LIMITING
LIFT CONTROL
STALL ANGLE OF ATTACK
WARNING
ON GROUND BRAKING
THRUST CONTROL
MANUAL TRAJECTORY CONTROL
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
LIFT CONTROL
ENGINE OUT AUGMENTATION
STALL ANGLE OF ATTACK
WARNING
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TABLE 2
Control System Requirements
Assignment of Control Requirements to Functions
Control Functions
MANUAL TRAJECTORY
CONTROL
AUTOMATIC TRAJECTORY
CON'I"ROL
MANUAL & AUTO TRIM
ENVELOPE PROTECTION
SPEED CONTROL
Longitudinal
Lateral
Directional
Longitudinal
Lateral
Directional
Pitch Trim
Roll Trim
Sideslip Trim
Stall
Load Factor
Overspeed
Pitch Attitude
Bank Angle
Sideslip Angle
Propulsive Thrust
Aerodynamic Braking
Ground Force Braking
Increase Lift
Spoil Lift
LIFT CONTROL
NOSEWHEEL STEERING Ground Track
AUTOMATIC CONTROL LIMITING Longitudinal
Lateral
Directional
Altitude
THRUST SETTING Speed
STALL ANGLE OF ATTACK Alpha
WARNING
Lateral
ENGINE OUT AUGMENTATION Directional
ON GROUND BRAKING Speed
Control Pitch
Control Roll
Control Yaw
Control Pitch
Control Roll
Control Yaw
Control Pitch
Control Roll
Control Yaw
Control Pitch
Control Pitch.
Control Pitch
Control Pitch
Control Roll
Control Yaw
Control Thrust
Control Aerodynamic Braking
Control Braking on Ground
Control Lift Configuration
Control Aerodynamic Brakin_
Control Heading on Ground
Control Pitch
Control Roll
Control Yaw
Control Thrust
Control Pitch
Control Yaw
Control Braking on Ground
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Control Mission Flight Performance Requirement List
(This is the list performance requirements imposed on the Control Mission Flight function.
The requirements are defined on the following pages.)
C.M.F.1 General Control Requirements
C.M.F.2 Handling Qualities
C.M.F.3 Operational Flight Envelope
C.M.F.4 Manual and Automatic Trim Functions
C.M.F.5 Envelope Protection
C.M.F.6 Autopilot Limiting and Actuation
C.M.F.7 Maneuver Control Lags
C.M.F.8 Requirements in Icing Conditions
C.M.F.9 Control System Stabilit 3' Requirement
C.M.F.10 Residual Oscillations
C.M.F.11
C.M.F.12
C.M.F.13
C.M.F.14
C.M.F.15
C.M.F.16
C.M.F.I 7
C.M.F.18
C.M.F.19
C.M.F.20
C.M.F.21
C.M.F.22
C.M.F.23
C.M.F.24
C.M.F.25
C.M.F.26
Longitudinal Control Power Requirements
Longitudinal Trim Authorit3'
Enhanced Longitudinal Control Maneuver Response
Roll Mode Time Constant
Pilot - Induced Oscillations
Stall Characteristics
Lateral Control Power Requirements
Roll Response Linearity
Roll Control Cross Coupling
Lateral Trim Authorit?,
Enhanced Roll Maneuver Control
Dynamic Stabilit3'
Turn Coordination
Directional Control Power Requirements
Directional Trim Authorit3'
Flutter Prevention Requirements
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GENERAL CONTROL REQUIREMENTS (C.M.F. 1)
Two modes of manual aircraft control shall be provided: core control and enhanced con-
trol.
The core control mode provides the minimum level of augmentation (e.g. yaw
damper, Mach trim, etc.) required for FAA certification at all failure levels not ex-
tremely improbable (probability < 1.0E-9). Core control satisfies normal handling quali-
fies criteria with all probable failures. With improbable failures (probability of failure
between 1.0E-5 and 1.0E-9), core control shall satisfy the minimum acceptable
handling qualities requirements.
The enhanced control mode provides a reduction in pilot workload and increased control
precision. It provides handling qualities equivalent to those for core control and includes
envelope protection features and aircraft state hold modes.
Transfer between core and enhanced control shall be automatic or crew selectable. Mode
transition transients shall not result in a normal acceleration greater than 0.5 g, a lateral
acceleration greater than 0.2 g or result in an unsafe condition during normal airline
operation.
Figure C.M.F.I-1 indicates the affect of handling qualities on the ability of the aircraft to
carry out its mission. Normal handling qualities criteria guarantee that the aircraft can
complete its scheduled flight. When handling qualities are degraded to the minimum
acceptable level, continued safe flight and landing is possible but the scheduled mission
may be affected. Detailed criteria for normal and minimum acceptable handling qualities
are presented later in this document.
An autoflight system will also generate maneuver control commands. The minimum level
of augmentation provided by core control shall be available for the autoflight system.
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H4\rDLING OUALITY CRITERIA AND AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL STATE
NORMAL
No significant flying qualities degradation
The re fo re:
No change in operational procedures required.
No change in flight plan
Failure effects not apparent to the passengers
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE
The aircraft shall be capable of continued safe flight and landing without
requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength.
As a result one or more of the followin_ will apply:
Changes in operating procedures required
Changes in flight plan may be required
Flight envelope limitations may be imposed
Significant reduction in the ability of the crew
to cope with adverse condition
Significant crew workload
FIGURE C.M.F.I-1
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HANDLING QUALITIES (C.M.F.2)
Handling qualities shall be evaluated in piloted simulations. The following pilot ratings (as
defined below) shall be satisfied in the normal flight envelope (shown in Figure C.M.F.3-1 -
page 49) with light atmospheric turbulence.
Core Control (Normal)
Core Control (Minimum Acceptable)
Enhanced Control
,V.ilm_,Bali 
Satisfactory
Adequate
Satisfactory
C.M.F.2.1 Handling Qualities Tasks and Aircraft System States
(Ref. 3 - MIL-F-8785C 3.8 & Ref. 6 - FAA Handling Qualities Assessment)
a) A series of task-related maneuvers is defined which allows overall flying qualities to be
evaluated in piloted simulations. These task related maneuvers are designed to allow for
qualitative evaluation of the handling qualities for a given system failure state, flight
envelope (figure C.M.F.3-2) and atmospheric disturbance environment. The basic premise
is that the acceptable failure probability interval must be based on an inverse relationship
bet_'een the probability of the failure condition and the severity of its effect on the
aircraft. (FAR AC 25.1309-1) The qualitative degrees of suitability of flying qualities are
categorized as follows:
Satisfactory Full performance criteria met with routine pilot effort and attention.
Adequate Adequate for continued safe flight and landing; full or specified reduced
performance met, but with heightened pilot effort and attention.
Controllable Inadequate for continued safe flight and landing, but controllable for
return to safe flight condition, a safe flight envelope and/or
reconfiguration so that handling qualities are at least adequate.
This three-level category system can be used by a pilot to grade the overall aircraft perform-
ance in a given control system failure state, portion of the flight envelope and atmospheric
disturbance environment.
b) Figure C.M.F.2-1 classifies control system failure states into two groups, A and B, as a
function of failure probability interval.
c) Figure C.M.F.2-2 defines qualitative flying qualities required for each combination of
atmospheric disturbance environment, flight envelope and control system failure state.
2o
These requirements shall be evaluated in piloted simulations of the task-related maneu-
vers described in Paragraph C.M.F.2.4 with the appropriate control system failure states
and the atmospheric disturbance environment.
d) Figure C.M.F.2-3 defines the atmospheric disturbance levels as a function of the
probability of exceedance. The atmospheric disturbance models to be used in the simula-
tions are defined in paragraph C.M.F.2.3 and are a function of the probability of ex-
ceedance and altitude of the evaluation maneuver. The models of wind shear and random
turbulence shall be used to assess:
1) The effects of certain environmental conditions on the flying qualities of the
airplane;
2) The ability of the pilot to recover from upsets caused by environmental
conditions.
3) Flight path control precision during landing.
C.M.F.2.2 Multiple Failures
For multiple control system failure states that are not extremely improbable including
stability augmentation system failures, the airplane shall be capable of the safe
completion of a flight segment and landing. (FAR 25.671, FAR 25.672) This
requirement shall also apply to operation in the backup control mode.
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AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FAILURE STATE
AIRCRAFT CONTROL
SYSTEM FAILURE STATE
PROBABILITY OF
FAILURE STATE
A
PROBABLE
(Probable failure conditions are those
anticipated to occur one or more times
during the entire operational life of each
airplane.)
B
IMPROBABLE
(Improbable failure conditions are those not
anticipated to occur during the entire
operational lift of a single random airplane.
However, they may occur occasionally during
the entire operational life of all airplanes of
one type.)
EXAMPLES: PROBABLE FAILURES (STATE A):
Loss of one hydraulic system
Partial loss of high lift control capability
IMPROBABLE FAILURES (STATE B)"
Loss of two hydraulic systems
Loss of two pairs of spoilers or one pair of spoilers and ailerons
Any jam not shown to be extremely improbable
Any single failure which is not considered a probable failure
Loss of control and stability augmentation systems
FIGURE CT.M.F.2-1
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Atmospheric
Disturbance
Environment
Light
Moderate
Normal
Operational
Flisht Envelope
Satisfactory
A
Aircraft System State
Permissible
Flight Envelope
Acceptable
B
Normal
Operational
Flight Envelope
Acceptable
Permissible
Flight Envelope
Controllable
Acceptable Controllable Controllable Controllable
Severe Controllable Controllable
Figure C.M.F.2-2
Minimum Qualitative Handling Qualities Requirements
Atmospheric Disturbance Probability of Exceedance
Light 10-1< P
-3 -1
Moderate 10 < P_< 10
-5 -3
Severe 10 <_ P <_.10
Figure C.M.F.2-3
Atmospheric Disturbance Levels Definition
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C.M.F.2.3 Atmospheric Environment
Safe controllability shall be ensured in atmospheric turbulence. The following mean
wind, turbulence and wind-shear models will be used for flight control system design but
will be limited to acceleration levels which do not exceed the structural limits. Mean
wind and turbulence levels are defined by a probability of exceedance and altitude.
For the low altitude models (below about 3000 feet), the probability of exceedance
defines a mean wind profile to be used for cross wind takeoff and landing evaluation.
This wind level then defines the turbulence levels. For high altitude operation (above
about 3000 feet), mean winds are not important for handling qualities so ex-
ceedance probabilities directly define turbulence levels and a mean wind model is not
used.
C.M.F.2.3.1 Mean Wind (Low Altitudes)
a) The probability of exceeding a wind level at a given altitude is dependent upon
surface roughness conditions. For average airport conditions, the level of total wind
occurring from any direction at 20 feet above the surface is determined from Figure
C.M.F.2-4 for a specified exceedance probability.
b) The wind level at any other altitude h is determined from the extrapolation formula:
h+z_m In z where z = .15 ft
W = zW_0 for average airpon
conditions
In E20 + z_
Z
The mean wind profiles for average airport
on Figure C.M.F.2-5 for reference.
C.M.F.2.3.2 Turbulence Levels
a) Low Altitude Turbulence (h < 3,000 feet)
The root mean square level of the
earth, ow, is derived from the mean
surface roughness conditions is shown
turbulence component acting perpendicular to the
wind speed at 20 feet above the surface from:
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RMS levels of horizontal components of turbulence are found from using Figure
C.M.F.2-6
b) High Altitude Turbulence (h > 3,000 feet)
For high
equals:
altitudes, the levels of turbulence components oriented in any direction are
OH= OVw. OW.
The levels of high altitude turbulence (including storm turbulence) are determined
from exceedance probabilities using Figure C.M.F.2-7.
C.M.F.2.3.3 Integral Scale Lengths for Turbulence, Lu, Lv, Lw Integral scales for
turbulence at all altitudes are determined from Figure C.M.F.2-8 and altitude.
C.M.F.2.3.4 Spectra Shapes for Turbulence
The distribution of turbulence power with frequency for all altitudes is given by the power
spectra:
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The spectra filters, when combined with normalized random noise, yield time varying u, v, w
gust components. For low altitude, the ow component refers to the component perpendicu-
lar to the earth while the u and v components are aligned parallel and perpendicular (respec-
tively) to the airplane's relative velocity vector projected onto the plane of the earth. For
high altitudes, the components are aligned to the airplane's relative velocity vector.
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C.M.F.2.3.5 Transformation to Body Axes Components
The transformations required to obtain body axes components of turbulence for low
altitudes follow:
u T
v T
m
m
cos A _ cos e sin A $ COS e -sine
( cos _
= +sin tx ,
(cos z_ ,
+sin A
Body Axes
Gust Components
where
_,_ =
sin e sin _, (sin zx "4, sin o sin 6 cose sin ,1,
sin e sin _) +cos,x , cos,l,)
sin e cos ,1, ( sin zx _ sin o cos _ cos_ cos ,_
sin e) -cosA , sin _)
Low-Altitude Turbulence
Transformation Matrix
angle from projection of airspeed vector on plane of
earth to X body axis projection on plane of earth
= -tan UAp = - 13
[v l
|
Earth-Oriented
Gust Componen
uAp
vAp
= Ecos_, cos 13 cos e + sin p sin e sin ,I, + sin _ cos 13
sin e cos _3 VA
= Esin p cos # -sin o, cos 13 sin _3 VA
For the high-altitude model a transformation is required to bring the turbulence
components from relative wind orientation to body axes orientation:
-1-UB cos a sin t3VB = sin p
w B sin _, cos p
m , J
Body Axes
Gust Components
where
e = Euler pitch angle
,I, = Euler roll angle
c, = tan-1 wa
ua
- cos _ sin p
cos P
- sin Q, sin p
High-Altitude Turbulence
Transformation Matrix
al I u R_'VI
- sin
I q
0 RWI
cos I WRwl
Relative Earth-Oriented
Gust Components
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= sin-1 VA
v T
UA--U- (UTURB)
VA= v - (v TURB )
WA_= w - (wTuRB)
u, v, w = inertial components of velocity in body axes
u TLrRB, VTURB, WTURB = components of turbulence and mean winds in
body axes
C.M.F.2.3.6 Mean Wind and Turbulence Models for Automatic Landing Certification
Limited application models in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular 20-57A and
British Civil Air Regulation (BCAR) Paper 575 shall be used for automatic landing
performance evaluation.
C.M.F.2.3.7 Wind Shear
The wind shear model for the severe atmospheric condition to be used for airplane
controllability evaluation is shown on Figure C.M.F.2-9. For the light and moderate
atmospheric conditions the magnitudes of the wind shear model of C.M.F.2-9 should be
scaled appropriately.
33
U
u2
C_
LL
I
r_
z
,.J
<
u
F-
10
I.-
k..
<
0
-10:
-2o.-
-30,
30.
"_ z
_ 20.
Z <
=
<
t-
Z lO.
0
N
0
U'I
_ 0
_ -
GROUND DISTANCE FROM
, , , / _ END OF ,RUNWAY- FEET
\
ALTITUDE ABOVE _ _/
RUNWAY THRESHOLD - FEET \
ALTITUDE ABOVE
RUNWAY THRESHOLD - FEET
b-
ul
u.
!
a
,..t
O
"v
c_
LII
:Z:
t-
<
Z
0
<
ea
F.
M
800
<
4000
600
400
200
-12000 -10000 -8000 -6000 -4000 -2000
GROUND DISTANCE FROM END OF RUNWAY - FEET
0 I0.
V W CROSS\\'IND - KTS
0 2000
FIGURE C.M.F. 2-9 \_,TND SHEAR MODEL
34
C.M.F.2.4 Handling Qualities Evaluation Task-Related Maneuvers
This section presents task-related maneuvers to be evaluated in piloted simulations with
the appropriate aircraft system states, operational envelope and atmospheric conditions
to verify compliance with the qualitative handling qualities requirements of Figure
C.M.F.2-2. General categories and candidate tasks presented in Reference 6 are shown
verbatim in Figure C.M.F.2-10. (This is representative of current FAA thinking but has
not yet been adopted.) Specific task-related maneuvers are described in the following
paragraphs. Within these requirements are some which apply only for conventional con-
trol and others which apply only for maneuver demand type control, which have been
marked as Conventional and Maneuver Demand respectively. For these particular re-
quirements the designer need only meet those applicable to the particular control law
design. The requirements on control forces are a mix of control forces for wheel control-
lers, center stick and sidestick controllers as the FAR and MIL-Specs requirements have
been included verbatim. The designer shall modify these as appropriate for the particular
control system design.
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A. TRIM & UNATTENDED OPERATION
Characteristicsof the airplane to stay at or depart from an initial "trim" or unaccelerated
condition.
Dynamic and flight-path responseto pulse (3 axes)
Dynamic and flight-path responseto atmospheric disturbance
Spiral stability (e.g., releaseat 40 deg bank)
B. LARGE AMPLJTUDE MANEUVERING
Generally, theseare open-loop maneuversin which the pilot attempts a significant change
in airplane path, speedor attitude. Maneuversmay be initiated outside the normal flight
envelopeand transition flight envelopes. Many of thesemaneuversare representativeof
engineeringairworthiness and control tests.
1) Pitch/Longitudinal - Wind-up-turn or symmetric pull-up/push-over
- Slow-down-turn at fixed g or on AOA or G-limiter
- Stall or AOA-limiter approach
- Push/pull off trim speed
2) Roll - Rapid bank-to-bank roll
3) Yaw - Sudden heading change
- Constant heading sideslip
4) Operational - Pitch/roll upset recovery
- Emergency descent
- Climbing/diving turn
- Takeoff/land wind shear escape maneuver
- Go around/power application from low speed
- Arrest of high sink rate, at touchdown/level-off altitude
- Collision avoidance roll/pull
- Takeoff and landing flare with abuse or high crosswind
C. CLOSED-LOOP PRECISION REGULATION OF FLIGHT PATH
Generally, these are tightly-bounded, pilot closed-loop tasks performed in routine com-
mercial flight. These controlling tasks are almost exclusively associated with the normal
flight envelope, or certainly not far outside the normal flight envelope boundary.
lI.S and precision touchdown, various atmospheric disturbance and initial offset
Formation flying (as simulator for maneuver tracking)
Compound SPD/ALT/HDG tracking, high gain flight phase, in various
atmospheric disturbance and cockpit display status
Figure C.M.F.2-10 General Handling Qualities Task Categories
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C.M.F.2.4.1 Stall Characteristics and Recovery (FAR 25.201)
a) Stalls must be shown in straight flight and in 30 degreebanked turns with-
1) Power off; and
2) The power necessaryto maintain level flight at 1.6 VSl
b) In either condition required by paragraph (a), it must be possible to meet the applica-
ble stall characteristicsand recovery requirements of FAR 25.203 with-
1) Flaps and landing gear in any likely combination of positions;
2) Representativeweights within the range for which certification is requested:
3) The most adverse center of gravity for recovery.
c) The following procedure must be used to show compliance with FAR 25.203;
1) With the airplane trimmed for straight flight at the speedprescribed in FAR
25.103(b)(1), reduce the speedwith the elevator control until it is steadyat
slightly above stalling speed. Apply elevator control so that the speed
reduction does not exceed one knot per second until
i) The airplane is stalled or
ii) The control reaches the stop
2) As soon as the airplane is stalled, recover by normal recover)' techniques.
C.M.F.2.4.2 Engine-Out
a) Ground Minimum Control Speed (VMCG) (FAR 25.149(e)):
VMCG is the calibrated airspeed during the takeoff run, at which, when the critical engine
is suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to recover control of the airplane with the use
of primary aerodynamic controls alone to enable the takeoff to be safely continued using
normal piloting skill and rudder control forces not exceeding 150 lbs. Assuming that the
path of the airplane accelerating with all engines operating is along the centerline of the
runway, its path from the point at which the critical engine is failed to the point at which
recovery to a direction parallel to the centerline is completed may not deviate more than
30 feet laterally from the centerline at any point. VMCG must be established with-
1) The most critical takeoff configuration;
2) Maximum available takeoff power or thrust on the operating engines;
3) The most unfavorable center of gravity;
4) The airplane trimmed for takeoff;
5) The most unfavorable weight in the range of takeoff weights.
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b) Minimum Control Speed(VMC) (FAR 25.149(b)-(d)):
VMC is the calibrated airspeed,at which, when the critical engine is suddenly made inop-
erative, it is possible to recover control of the airplane with that engine still inoperative,
and maintain straight flight either with zero yaw or with an angle of bank of not more
than 5 degrees.
VMC may not exceed 1.2 VS with-
1) Maximum available takeoff power or thrust on the engines;
2) The most unfavorable center of gravity;
3) The airplane trimmed for takeoff;
4) The maximum sea level takeoff weight
5) The airplane in the most critical takeoff configuration existing along the
flight path after the airplane becomes airborne, except with the landing gear
retracted; and
6) The airplane airborne and the ground effect negligible.
The rudder forces required to maintain control at VMC may not exceed 150 lbs nor may it
be necessary to reduce power or thrust of the operative engines. During recovery, the
airplane may not assume any dangerous attitude or require exceptional piloting skill,
alenness, or strength to prevent a heading change of more than 20 degrees.
c) Asymmetric Thrust - Yaw Controls Free (MIL-F-8785C 4.1 & 3.3.9.4):
Verify the static directional stability is such that at all speeds above 1.4Vs, with asymmet-
ric loss of thrust from the most critical engine while the other engine(s) develops normal
rated thrust, the airplane with yaw control pedals free (no rudder control) may be
balanced directionally in steady straight flight with less than 30 pounds of center stick
roll-control force :
1) All speeds above 1.4Vs
2) All altitudes
3) Aircraft trimmed for wings-level straight flight prior to the failure
C.M.F.2.4.3 Go-Around:
The airplane shall have sufficient pitch control to perform a go-around. (FAR 25.145(c))
The following maneuver will be used to evaluate compliance with this requirement:
It must be possible, without exceptional piloting skill, to prevent loss of altitude when
complete retraction of the high lift devices from an), position is begun during steady,
straight level flight at 1.2 VSl with-
]) Simultaneous application of not more than takeoff po_ver taking into account
the critical engine operating condition;
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2) The landing gear extended;
3) The critical combination of landing weights and altitudes.
If gated high-lift device control positions are provided, retraction must be shown from
any position from the maximum landing position to the first gated position, between gated
positions, and from the last gated position to the full retraction position. In addition, the
first gated control position from the landing position must correspond with the high-lift
devices configuration used to establish the go-around procedure form the landing
configuration.
C.M.F.2.4.4 Approach & Landing
Verify that acceptable landing characteristics are available via compliance with the follow-
ing requirements :
a) Approach (static longitudinal stability (FAR 25.175) - Conventional Control) - The
stick force curve must have a stable slope at speeds between 1.1 VSl and 1.8 VSl, with-
1) Wing flaps in the approach position;
2) Landing gear retracted;
3) Maximum landing weight; and
4) The airplane trimmed at 1.4 VS1 with enough power to maintain level flight
at this speed.
b) Landing (static longitudinal stability (FAR 25.175) - Conventional Control)- The stick
force curve must have a stable slope and the stick force may not exceed 80 pounds (wheel
controller), at speeds between 1.1 Vso and 1.8 VSo with-
1) Wing flaps in the landing position;
2) Landing gear extended;
3) Maximum landing weight;
4) Power or thrust off on the engines; and
5) The airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSo with power off.
c) Longitudinal Stability (Maneuver Demand Control) In lieu of compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs 25.17I, 25.173, 25.175, and 25.181(a) of the FAR, the air-
plane must be shown to have suitable dynamic and static longitudinal stability in an),
condition normally encountered in service, including the effects of atmospheric distur-
bance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special Conditions)
d) Approach (directional control (FAR 25.147)) - It must be possible, while holding the
wings approximately level, to safely make reasonably sudden changes in heading in both
directions. This must be shown at 1.4 VS1 for heading changes up to 15 degrees with-
I) The critical engine inoperative in the minimum drag position;
2) The power required for level flight at 1.4VS1, but not more than maximum
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continuous power;
3) The most unfavorable center of gravity;
4) Landing gear retracted;
5) Flaps in the approach position; and
5) Maximum landing weight.
e) Longitudinal Control (FAR 25.145)
With the landing gear extended, no change in trim control, or exertion of more than 50
pounds control force (wheel controller) may be required for the following maneuvers:
I) With power off, flaps retracted, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4Vsl, extend the flaps
as rapidly as possible while maintaining the airspeed at approximately 40 percent above
the smiling speed existing at each instant throughout the maneuver.
2) Repeat subparagraph (I) except initially extend the flaps and then retract them as
rapidly as possible.
3) Repeat subparagraph (2) except with takeoff power.
4) With power off, flaps retracted, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSI, apply takeoff
power rapidly while maintaining the same airspeed.
5) Repeat subparagraph (4) except with flaps extended.
6) With power off, flaps extended, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSI, obtain and
maintain airspeeds between I.I VSI and either 1.7 VSl, or VFE, whichever is lower.
f) Approach in crosswind (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.7.1)
It must be possible to develop at least I0 degrees of sideslip with yaw control pedal forces
not exceeding 100 Ibs. and roll control not exceeding 75% of total control power available
to the pilot, with-
I) Power approach configuration;
2) Trimmed at VREF;
3) Most critical configuration of c.g., flaps, and weight,
4) With a 30 knot crosswind.
g) Landing in crosswind (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.9)
The airplane shall be safely controllable following sudden asymmetric loss of thrust in a
landing with a 30 knot crosswind from the unfavorable direction, with-
1) Trimmed at VREF
2) Most critical configuration of c.g., flaps, weight
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C.M.F.2.4.5 Takeoff
Verify adequate controllability during takeoff for the following task-related maneuvers:
a) Lateral control (FAR 25.147)
It must be possible to make 20 degree banked turns, with and against the inoperative
engine, from steadystate flight at a speed equal to 1.4 VS1 with-
I) The critical engine inoperative;
2) The remaining engine(s) at maximum continuous power;
3) The most unfavorable center of gravity;
4) Landing gear (i) retracted and (ii) extended;
5) Flaps in the most favorable climb position; and
6) Maximum takeoff weight.
(FAR 25.175 - Conventional Control)
force curve must have a stable slope at speedsbetween 85 and 115 percent of
at which the airplane-
b) Climb
The stick
the speed
1) Is trimmed with-
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
2)
Wing flaps retracted;
Landing gear retracted;
Maximum takeoff weight; and
Maximum power or thrust for use during climb; and
Is trimmed at the speed for best rate-of-climb except that the speed need
not be less than 1.4 VS1.
c) Longitudinal Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
In lieu of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and
25.181(a) of the FAR, the airplane must be shown to have suitable dynamic and static
longitudinal stability in any condition normally encountered in service, including the ef-
fects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special Conditions)
d) Crosswind takeoff (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.7)
It shall be possible to takeoff with normal pilot skill and technique in a 90-degree 30 knot
crosswind with no more than 20 lbs (center stick) roll control force and 100 lbs yaw
control force, with
1) 30 knot crosswind
2) All engines operating
3) Maximum takeoff power
4) Most critical configuration - c.g., flaps, weight
5) Normal rotation
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e) Thrust loss during takeoff roll (Iv[IL-F-8785C 3.3.9.1)
It shall be possible for the pilot to maintain control of an airplane on the takeoff surface
following sudden loss of thrust from the most critical engine. Thereafter, it shall be
possible to achieve and maintain a straight path on the takeoff surface without a deviation
of more than 30 feet from the path originally intended.
1) For continued takeoff, verify with speeds from the refusal speed to the
maximum take off speed, with
i) Takeoff thrust on the operative engine(s)
ii) Using only control not dependent upon friction against the takeoff
surface or upon release of the pitch, roll, yaw or throttle controls.
iii) Most critical configuration - c.g., flaps, weight.
2) For the aborted takeoff, verify with all speeds below the maximum takeoff
speed, with
i) Use of nosewheel steering and differential braking allowed,
ii) Most critical configuration - c.g., flaps, weight.
C.M.F.2.4.6 Dive/Upset:
Verify that sufficient control is available to meet the following speed increase and
recover 3 ' characteristics: (FAR 25.253)
1) Operating conditions and characteristics likely to cause inadvertent speed increases
(including upsets in pitch and roll) must be simulated with the airplane trimmed at any
likely cruise speed up to VMO/MMO. These conditions include:
i) gust upsets;
ii) inadvertent control movements;
iii) passenger movement;
iv) leveling off from climb; and
iv) descent from Mach to airspeed limit altitudes.
2) Allowing for pilot reaction time after speed warning occurs, it must be shown that the
airplane can be recovered to a normal altitude and its speed reduced to VMO/MMO,
without-
i) Exceptional piloting strength or skill;
ii) Exceeding VD/MD, VDF/MDF or the structural limitations;
iii) Buffeting that would impair the pilot's ability to read the instruments or
control the airplane for recover3'.
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C.M.F.2.4.7 Cruise
a) Static longitudinal stability must be shown in the cruise condition as follows (static
longitudinal stability FAR 25.175(b) - Conventional Control):
1) With the landing gear retracted at high speed, the stick force curve must have a stable
slope at all speeds within a range which is the greater of 15 percent of the trim speed plus
the resulting free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the resulting free return speed
range, above and below the trim speed with-
i) The wing flaps retracted;
ii) The center of gravity in the most adverse position;
iii) The most critical weight between the maximum takeoff and maximum
landing weights;
iv) Maximum cruising power;
v) The airplane trimmed for level flight.
2) With the landing gear retracted at low speed, the stick force curve must have a stable
slope at all speeds within a range which is the greater of 15 percent of the trim speed plus
the resulting free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the resulting free return speed
range, above and below the trim speed with
i) The wing flaps retracted;
ii) The center of gravity in the most adverse position;
iii) The most critical weight between the maximum takeoff and maximum
landing weights;
iv) Power required for level flight at a speed equal to (VMO+I.4Vs1)/2;
v) The airplane trimmed for level flight.
3) With the landing gear extended, the stick force curve must have a stable slope at all
speeds within a range which is the greater of 15 percent of the trim speed plus the result-
ing free return speed range, or 50 knots plus the resulting free return speed range, above
and below the trim speed with
i) The wing flaps retracted;
ii) The center of gravity in the most adverse position;
iii) The most critical weight between the maximum takeoff and maximum
landing weights;
iv) Maximum cruising power;
v) The aircraft trimmed for level flight.
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b) Longitudinal Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
In lieu of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and
25.181(a) of the FAR, the airplane must be shown to have suitable dynamic and static
longitudinal stability in any condition normally encountered in service, including the ef-
fects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special Conditions)
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Operational Flight Envelope (C.M.F. 3)
C.M.F.3.1 General
At all altitudes, the operational flight envelope is defined in terms of a suitable
normal acceleration and speed boundary for each configuration of the aircraft.
Within these envelopes, the aircraft shall comply with the control and handling qualities
criteria except where specifically exempted. Minimum and maximum design and
operating speeds are presented in Figure C.M.F.3-1, and defined below. (FAR
25.1503)
C.M.F.3.2 Normal Acceleration
The maximum normal acceleration considered is determined from stall considerations,
structural limits, or maximum control authority which ever is most restrictive. Maximum
positive and negative normal accelerations, nz, are presented in Figure C.M.F.3-2.
(FAR 25.333(b) and FAR 25.1531)
C.M.F.3.3 Minimum Speeds
The minimum speeds associated with the operational flight envelopes shall be
determined for each configuration on the basis of minimum demonstrated speed
considerations as explained in the following paragraphs. (Note that the FA.A is currently
specifying new regulations to define the stall speed.)
a) Stalling Speed - Vs
Stalling speed is the lowest airspeed that will be demonstrated inflight with idle power
using a deceleration of 1 knot per second. This is the FAA stall speed. (Vso - Stall
speed in the landing configuration, VSl- stalling speed appropriate to the configura-
tion). (FAR 25.201(c), FAR 25.49)
b) Minimum Warning Speed -VMIN _'ARN"
Minimum warning speed is the airspeed at which positive warning is given to the
pilot, either through natural aerodynamic means or through an artificial warning or
control subsystem. (FAR 25.207)
c) Minimum Operating Speed -VMIN OP
Minimum operating speed is the minimum airspeed at which the aircraft is intention-
ally operated. This includes consideration of all operating concerns such as perform-
ance, handling qualities, systems operations, etc.
d) Minimum Control Speed
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I) Minimum Control Speed,Ground - VMCG
This is defined as the minimum speed during takeoff at which, if a critical engine
becomes inoperative, control can be maintained through primary aerodynamic
controls. The lateral deviation following an engine failure at VMCG shall not exceed
30 feet from the runway centerline. The effect of nosewheel steering shall not be
included. (FAR 25.149 and FAR 25.1513)
2) Minimum Control Speed, Air - VMCA
This is defined as the minimum airplane speed in the takeoff configuration at which, if
a critical engine becomes inoperative, control is regained, and straight steady flight
maintained with either zero yaw or no more than 5 degrees of bank, with the operating
engine(s) at maximum takeoff thrust. (FAR 25.149(b))
3) Minimum Control Speed During Landing Approach - VMCL
This is defined as the minimum airplane speed in the approach configuration at which,
if a critical engine becomes inoperative, control is regained, and straight steady flight
maintained with either zero yaw or no more than 5 degrees of bank, with the operating
engine(s) at maximum takeoff thrust. (FAR 25.149(f))
e) Takeoff Speeds
1) Engine Inoperative Speed - VEF
This speed shall be at least equal to the minimum speed during
primary aerodynamic controls alone are adequate to safely continue
the critical engine suddenly fails. VEF _> VMCG (FAR 25.109(a))
takeoff at which
the takeoff when
2) Minimum Climb Speed - V2MIN
This speed shall provide at least the minimum
25.121(b)) between 35 and 400 feet with the critical
least 1.10VMCA or 1.20 VS1. (FAR 25.107(b))
required gradient of climb (FAR
engine inoperative and shall be at
3) Rotation Speed - VR
This speed shall be at least 1.05VMCA and allow attainment of V2 MIN. (FAR 25.107(e))
O Landing Approach Speed - VREF
1) A calibrated airspeed that is not less than 1.3 VSO. This speed shall be maintained
down to the 50 foot height for landing (FAR 25.125(a)(2))
2) This speed shall be greater than or equal to VMCL + 5 Kt. (BCAR D2-8-3.5 (Ref. 8))
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C.M.F.3.4 Maximum Speeds
The maximum speeds associated with the operational flight envelopes shall be
determined for each configuration, on the basis of the following:
a) Flap Extended Speed -VFE
The flap extended speed, VFE, for each flap position shall be sufficiently greater than
the operating speed recommended for the corresponding stage of flight (including
balked landings) to allow for probable variations in control of airspeed and for
transition from one flap position to another. VFE must be equal to or less than the
design flap speed, VF. (FAR 25.1511, FAR 25.335(e) and FAR 25.345)
b) Landing Gear Operating Speed - VLO
The landing gear operating speed shall not exceed the speed at which it is safe to
extend or retract the landing gear, either for structural load or flight characteristics
reasons. (FAR 25.1515 and FAR 25.729)
c) Landing Gear Extended Speed - VLE
The landing gear extended speed shall not exceed the speed at which it is safe to fly
with the landing gear secured in the fully extended position. (FAR 25.1515, FAR
25.729)
d) Maximum Operating Speeds&lach Numbers - VMOtrM.MO
The maximum operating speeds and Mach numbers (VMO_LMO) shall be determined
for the cruise configuration in such a manner as to include all normal operational
flight conditions, including climb, cruise and descent, consistent with the appropriate
thrust requirements. (FAR 25.1505, FAR 215.335(b) and FAR 25.253)
e) Design Dive Speed, - VD/IViD
The design dive speed, VD/MD, is based on the following criteria: From an initial
condition of stabilized flight at VMO&tMO the airplane is upset, flown for twenty
seconds along a flight path of 7.5 degrees below the initial path, and then pulled up at
a normal load factor of 1.5 (0.5 g acceleration increment). Cruise power will be
maintained until the pullup is initiated, at which time power reduction and pilot
controlled drag devices shall be applied. The maximum speed reached in this
maneuver shall be less than VD/MD. The speed margin between lVLMO and MD shall
not be less than Mach= 0.05 for FAA, or less than Mach= 0.07 for CAA. (FAR
25.335(b), FAR 25.253)
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f) Flight Characteristics Demonstration Speeds - VFC/MFc
VFC_tFC is the maximum speed at which normal control and stability requirements
shall be met. Vr:c is the speed mid-way between VMO and VD. M_FC is .01 Mach higher
than MMO when a Mach overspeed device is used. Otherwise it is mid-way between
MMO and MD. (FAR 25.253(b))
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Manual and Automatic Trim Functions (C.M.F.4)
Longitudinal Trim
Manual pitch trim and autotrim shall be provided over the normal flight envelope trim
range. The crew shall have an alternate trim capability independent of the normal and
automatic trim capability. Alternate crew trim shall have control capability over the entire
mechanical trim range and shall override normal crew and automatic trim control at all
times. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.3.5) The probability of loss of manual trim shall be
< 10E-7.
Automatic trim control shall be operable during autopilot and enhanced maneuver control
following lift-off. The automatic trim mode shall reduce steady-state elevator deflections
to the neutral position by offloading to the stabilizer. The probability of loss of automatic
trim shall be < 10E-06.
Longitudinal Trim Indication
There shall be positive indication of the trim position in the flight deck. A takeoff configura-
tion warning shall be provided when the throttles are advanced for takeoff and the stabilizer
is in a position that would not allow a safe takeoff. Annunciation of failure to trim on com-
mand and uncommanded trim operation shall be provided except when either the pilot or
co-pilot is using the trim controls. (FAR 25.677(b), FAR 25.703)
Lateral Trim
Manual and automatic lateral trim shall be provided. Crew trim control shall be provided
for use in the core control (normal and minimum acceptable). Automatic trim control shall
be provided during enhanced and autopilot control. Probabilit3' of loss of function shall be <
10E-6.
Lateral Trim Indication
Trim position indication shall be displayed to the flight crew. (FAR 25.677(b)
Directional Trim
Manual and automatic directional trim shall be provided. Crew trim control shall be pro-
vided for use in the core control (normal and minimum acceptable). Automatic trim control
shall be provided during enhanced and autopilot control. Probability of loss of function
shall be < 10E-6.
Directional Trim Indication
Trim position indication shall be displayed to the flight crew. (FAR 25.677(b)
5]
Trim Indication Reliability
No single failure or combination of failures shall cause erroneous trim position indication
unless the failure(s) is improbable. (FAR 25.677(b), FAR 25.703, FAR 25.671)
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Envelope Protection (C.M.F.5)
Envelope protection functions shall be provided to prevent the aircraft from exceeding
the normal operating envelope boundaries. Protection shall be provided for stall, load
factor, pitch attitude, overspeed, sideslip, and roll angle boundaries. The following
envelope protection functions shall be provided with a probability of loss of function
< 10E-06.
Function
Stall
Load Factor
Overspeed
Pitch Attitude
Bank Angle
Sideslip Angle
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Autopilot Limiting and Actuation (C.M.F.6)
Core control shall provide autopilot authority limiting and actuation. Autopilot limiting
and monitoring shall limit the maneuver response of the airplane to autoflight malfunc-
tions and protect the airplane against autoflight oscillatory failures. The autoflight limit-
ing function shall protect against single and multiple axes failures. The probability of loss
of autopilot limiting shall be < 10E-6.
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ManeuverControl Lags (C.M.F.7)
a) The airplane responseto pilot controller inputs shall have an equivalent time delay
(rE) within the following limits: (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.3)
"rE <_. 0.1 sec.
b) The equivalent time delay shall be measured from the pitch and roll rate responses
to step controller inputs as shown in Figures C.M.F.7-1 and C.M.F.7-2
respectively.
The time delay contributions of all system elements from the pilot controller to
the control surface shall be included. The airplane responses shall meet the
requirements for both small inputs typical of fine tracking tasks and large
maneuvers.
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Requirement in Icing Conditions (C.M.F.8)
C.M.F.8.1 Ice Protection System Operation General
Ice protection systems whether manual or automatic shall provide acceptable maneuver
margins and handling qualities. (FAR 25.1419)
C.M.F.8.2 Handling Qualities/Controllability
The airplane stall characteristics and longitudinal control power shall meet the requirements
of the following sections for operation in icing conditions with the ice protection system
functioning: (FAR 25.1419)
C.M.F.11
C.M.F. 11
C.M.F.12
C.M.F. 16
Title
Stall Recovery
Landing Go-Around
Trim Range Limits
Stall Characteristics (Lateral Stability)
C.M.F.8.3 Maneuver Margin and Stall Warning
a) A maneuver margin equivalent to 40 deg of bank to natural or artificial stall warning
must be available for any flap setting and speed normally used for holding, descent, and
approach. A 30 deg bank margin must be available for the flap setting and speed normally
used for go-around. (FAA Issue Paper F-3)
b) Natural or artificial stall warning shall meet the requirements of paragraph P.S.A.W.I.1
(page 126).
c) The evaluation will be made with the ice protection system in operation and ice
accreted at an)' flap setting and speed normally used for holding, descent, and approach.
(FAR 25.1419)
C.M.F.8.4 Stall Warning with Failed Ice Protection System Elements
Crew warning shall be provided when the failed ice protection system element could result
in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. (FAR 25.672(a))
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Control System StabiliB' Requirement (C.M.F.9)
a) There shall be no tendency for system or pilot induced oscillations resulting from the
efforts of the pilot to control the airplane. This shall include saturation effects due to control
system rate or position limits. The control system shall produce no objectionable airplane
response or control characteristics including the effect of:
Feedback gain magnitudes
System rate limits
System position limits
System time delays
Structural mode coupling
Power supply var i,_tions
Abnormal flight conditions such as stall, speeds to 1.2 VD/MD, or
large maneuver angles.
b) Stability Margin Criteria
1) The FCS shall satisfy the stability criteria in Table C.M.F.9-1. The criteria apply to
either single or multiloop systems. In a multiloop system the phase and gain of the feedback
paths, except for the path under investigation, shall be held at nominal values. The criteria
shall be satisfied at all possible airplane weights and center of gravity locations and for any
flight condition within the design flight envelope. The term gain (or phase) margin as used
in Table C.M.F.9-1 means the variation in loop gain (or phase) from nominal that is allow-
able without causing the loop and mode in question to become unstable. (MIL-F-9490D
3.1.3.6.1)
2) With any single failure, regardless of probability, or any combination of failures not
extremely improbable, flight control shall be free of instabilities which preclude safe flight
at any speed up to VD. (FAR 25.629(d)(1), FAR 25.1309)
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TABLE C.M.F.9-1 GAIN AND PHASE REQUIREMENTS (DB, DEGREES)
Airspeed
Frequency " Hz
fM < 0.06
0.06< fM_< t'nts_ao-
FA.ASTIC
t_ODE
f M > t-resT*a-RO-I.I.ASTIC
MODE
Below VMIN OP
To At V D At 1.15 V D
VMIN OP VMO
i
GM = 6 DB
(NO PHASE
REQUIRE-
MENT
BELOW
VMIN OP)
OM =+ 4.5
PM =+ 30
GM = + 6.0
PM = + 45
GM = + 8.0
PM = + 60
GM=+ 3.0
PM =+ 20
GM = + 4.5
PM = + 30
GM=+ 6.0
PM =+ 45
GM=0
PM=0
(Stable at
Nominal
Phase and
Gain)
fM = Mode Frequency
GM = Gain Margin
PM = Phase Margin
6o
Residual Oscillations (C.M.F.10)
a) Any limit cycle that occurs in normal or enhanced control shall not exceed flight crew
or passenger perception threshold levels. These thresholds are defined as 0.04 g peak-
to-peak in the vertical direction and 0.02 g peak-to-peak in the lateral direction.
(MIL,-F-9490D 3.1.3.8)
b) Any residual oscillation or sustained limit cycle that occurs during degraded opera-
tion (minimum acceptable control) shall not interfere with the pilot's ability to control
and safely land the airplane. Accordingly, normal acceleration at the crew station due to
residual oscillations shall not exceed :t. 0.05 g. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.1.3) Residual oscilla-
tions in roll and yaw attitude at the pilot's station shall not exceed 0.6 degrees peak to
peak. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.3.8)
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Longitudinal Control Power Requirements (C.M.F.11)
C.M.F.11.1 Takeoff Control Requirements
C.M.F.11.I.1 Normal Takeoff (All Engines)
Normal rotation at VR shall provide liftoff attitude at the liftoff speed with the following
requirements: (FAR 25.107(e))
a) Not more than 75% of the available elevator control shall be required.(MIL,-F-8785C
3.2.3.3.2)
b) There shall be a perceptible pitch response to controller input at rotation.
C.M.F.11.1.2 Mistrim Takeoff (All Engines)
The airplane shall be capable of safe takeoff with the longitudinal trim set at any
position within the normal takeoff trim range.
C.M.F.11.1.3 Takeoff With Adverse Failures
For failure conditions not extremely improbable there shall be sufficient control to
takeoff safely. (FAR 25.671)
C.M.F.11.2 Maneuver Control Requirements
C.M.F.I1.2.2 Longitudinal Control In Maneuvering Flight
a) It must be possible at any speed between the trim speed prescribed in FAR 25.103(b)
and VS to pitch the nose downward so that the acceleration to this selected trim speed is
prompt with- (FAR 25.145(a))
1) The airplane trimmed at the trim speed (FAR 25.103(b))
2) The landing gear extended
3) The wing flaps (i) retracted and (ii) extended, and
4) Power (i) off and (ii) at maximum continuous power.
b) With the landing gear extended, no change in trim control, or exertion of more than
50 pounds of wheel controller force may be required for the following maneuvers: (FAR
25.145(b))
1) With power off, flaps retracted, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSt, ex-
tend the flaps as rapidly as possible while maintaining the airspeed at approximately 40
percent above the stalling speed existing at each instant throughout the maneuver.
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2) Repeat subparagraph (1) except initially extend the flaps and then retract
them as rapidly as possible.
3) Repeat subparagraph (2) except with takeoff power.
4) With power off, flaps retracted, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSl, apply
takeoff power rapidly while maintaining the same airspeed,
5) Repeat subparagraph (4) except with flaps extended.
6) With power off, flaps extended, and the airplane trimmed at 1.4 VSx, obtain
and maintain airspeeds between 1.1 Vsl and either 1.7 Vsl, or VFE, whichever is lower.
c) Within the Operational Flight Envelope, it shall be possible to develop, by use of the
pitch control alone, the maximum and minimum service load factors as defined in
ME,-F-8785C 3.1.8.4. This maneuvering capability is required at the lg trim speed and,
with trim and throrde settings not changed by the crew, over a range about the trim speed
the lesser of :t. 15 percent or + 50 knots equivalent airspeed (except where limited by the
boundaries of the Operational Flight Envelope) (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.3.2)
C.M.F.11.2.3 Maneuvering After High-Speed Upsets
There shall be no reversal in the effectiveness of the pitch control surfaces at speeds
up to 1.15 VD. (ME.-F-9490D 3.1.3.6.1)
C.M.F.11.3 Landing Control Requirements
The pitch control shall be sufficiently effective in the landing flight phase in close prox-
imity to the ground, that in calm air:
a) The geometry-limited touchdown attitude can be maintained in level flight or
b) The lower of Vs(L) or the guaranteed landing speed can be obtained.
This requirement shall be met with the airplane trimmed for the approach flight phase at
the recommended approach speed. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.3.4)
C.M.F.11.4 Stall
a) There shall be sufficient nose down pitch capability to ensure prompt
acceleration to the trim speed from the stall speed, power on and off. (FAR 25.145)
b) There shall be sufficient elevator control power with idle power, trim at 1.3 Vs, and
at the forward center-of-gravity limit, to demonstrate F.A.R. stall speeds in all airplane
configurations. (FAR 25.201)
C.M.F. 11.5 Stall Recovery
a) It shall be possible to recover from a stall by simple use of the pitch, roll and yaw
controls _ith cockpit control forces not to exceed those of F.C.S.8. and to regain level
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flight without excessivelossof altitude or buildup of speed. Throttles shall remain fixed
until speed has begun to increase and an angle of attack below the stall has been regained
unless compliance would result in exceeding engine operating limitations. In straight-
flight stalls with the airplane trimmed at an airspeed not greater than 1.4vs, pitch control
shall be sufficient to recover from any attainable angle of attack. (MIL-F-8785C
3.4.2.1.3)
b) It must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of the
aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the airplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up
pitching may occur. The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout
the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from
a stall by normal use of the controls. (FAR 25.203(a))
c) For level wing stalls, the roll occurring between the stall and the completion of the
recovery may not exceed approximately 20 degrees. (FAR 25.203(b))
d) For turning flight stalls, the action of the airplane after the stall may not be so violent
or extreme as to make it difficult, with normal piloting skills, to effect a prompt recovery
and to regain control of the airplane. (FAR 25.203(c))
e) It must be possible to safely recover from a stall with the critical engine inoperative-
1) Without applying power to the inoperative engine;
2) With flaps and landing gear retracted;
3) With the remaining engines at up to 75 percent of maximum continuous
power, or up to the power at which the wings can be held level with the use
of maximum control trave.lt whichever is less. (FAR 25.205(a));
4) The operating engines may be throttled back during the stall recovery.
C.M.F.11.6 Landing Go Around
a) The airplane shall have sufficient pitch control to perform a go-around. (FAR
25.145(c)) The following maneuver will be used to evaluate compliance with this
requirement:
It must be possible, without exceptional piloting skill, to prevent loss of altitude when
complete retraction of the high lift devices from any position is begun during steady,
straight level flight at 1.2 VSl with-
1) Simultaneous application of not more than takeoff power taking into account
the critical engine operating condition;
2) The landing gear extended;
3) The critical combination of landing weights and altitudes.
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If gated high-lift device control positions are provided, retraction must be shown from
any position from the maximum landing position to the first gated position, between gated
positions, and from the last gated position to the full retraction position. In addition, the
first gated control position from the landing position must correspond with the high-lift
devices configuration used to establish the go-around procedure from the landing
configuration.
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Longitudinal Trim Authority (C.M.F.12)
The following trim system requirements are applicable to airplanes where primary
longitudinal trim is provided by a movable horizontal stabilizer or by a trimmable elevator
on a fixed stabilizer.
C.M.F.12.1 Trim Range Limits
a) The normal trim limits shall be set to allow the airplane to maintain longitudinal trim
during: (FAR 25.655(b))
1) A climb with maximum continuous power at a speed not more than 1.4 VSl, with
the landing gear retracted, and the flaps (i) retracted and (ii) in the takeoff position;
2) A glide with power off at a speed not more than 1.4 VSl, with the landing gear
extended, the wing flaps (i) retracted and (ii) extended, the most unfavorable center of
gravity position approved for landing with the maximum landing weight, and with the
most unfavorable center of gravity position approved for landing regardless of weight;
3) Level flight at any speed form 1.4Vsl to VMO/MMO, with the landing gear and
flaps retracted, and form 1.4Vsl to VLE with landing gear extended.
b) The airplane must maintain longitudinal trim at 1.4 Vsl during climbing flight with:
(FAR 25.161(d))
1) The critical engine inoperative.
2) The remaining engines at maximum continuous power.
3) The landing gear and flaps retracted.
C.M.F.12.2 Trim Rate
The trim rate shall be rapid enough to enable the pilot to maintain low control forces
under changing conditions normally encountered in service, yet not so rapid as to cause
oversensitivity or trim precision difficulties under any conditions. (MIL-F-8785C 3.6.1.2)
C.M.F.12.3 All Engine Inoperative Trim Capability
Trim capability with all engines inoperative shall be provided unless sufficient
longitudinal control power is available. (FAR 25.671(d))
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EnhancedLongitudinal Control Maneuver Response(C.M.F.13)
a) Pitch Rate Response
Pitch rate response to a pitch control step input shall comply with the requirements of
figure C.M.F.13-1. (Ref. 7 - AFWAL--TR-81-3109 3.2.2.1)
Transi¢lqt Peak Ratio
The transient peak ratio Aq 2/Aq 1 shall meet the following requirement:
Aq 2/Aq 1 <_ .30
where Aq I = magnitude of first overshoot
Aq 2 = magnitude of first undershoot.
_se Time Parameter
The rise time parameter, At = t2 - t 1 shall have a value between the
following limits:
Nonterminal Flight Phase
Min Max
where
..9_.. <- /_t <- 500
vT vr
VT -- ft/sec true airspeed
t 1 = equivalent time delay
Terminal Flight Phase
Min Max
..9_<_ zxt <_2oo
vT va-
t 2 = time to reach first crossing of steady state pitch rate.
FIGURE C.M.F.13-1 PITCH RATE RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS
b) Frequency and Damping
I) Short period frequencies shall be within the boundaries shown
C.M.F.13-2 and C.M.F.13-3. (M]2.,-F-8785C 3.2.2.1.1.)
in Figures
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2) Short period damping ratios shall be within: 0.35 <_._p <_.1.0 (MIL-F-8785C
3.2.2.1.2)
3) Stability augmentation shall suppress any aerodynamic long period oscillation
by holding a selected airplane state constant when the pilot's controller is
neutral.
e) Longitudinal Stability With Respect to Speed (Conventional Control)
The stick force versus speed average gradient shall be greater than or equal to
1 pound per 6 knots. (FAR 25.173(c))
d) Longitudinal Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
In lieu of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and
25.181(a) of the FAR, the airplane must be shown to have suitable dynamic and static
longitudinal stability in any condition normally encountered in service, including the ef-
fects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special Conditions)
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Roll Mode Time Constant (C.M.F.14)
The roll-mode time constant shall be no greater than the following: (MII.,-F-8785C
3.3.1.2 - Class II-L & IT[ aircraft)
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE
1.4 Sec 10.0 Sec
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Pilot - Induced Oscillations (C.M.F.15)
Thereshall be no tendencyfor sustainedor uncontrollable lateral-directional oscillation
resulting from effort of the pilot to control the airplane. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.3)
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Stall Characteristics (C.M.F.16)
The lateral control shall be sufficient to control the bank
upset during a stall recovery. (FAR 25.203(b))
angle to less than a 20 deg
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Lateral Control Power Requirements(C.M.F.17)
C.M.F.17.1 Static Balance
a) The static directional stability shall be such that at all speeds above 1.4 VMIN, with
asymmetric loss of thrust from the most critical engine while the other engine(s) develop
normal rated thrust, the airplane with yaw control pedals free may be balanced direction-
ally in steady straight flight. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.9.4)
b) There must be enough excess lateral control in sideslips (up to sideslip angles that
might be required in normal operation), to allow a limited amount of maneuvering and to
correct for gusts. (FAR 25.147(e))
c) It must be possible to make 20 deg banked turns, with and against the inoperative
engine, from steady flight at a speed equal to 1.4 VSl with - (FAR 25.147(c))
I) The critical engine inoperative and its propeller (if applicable) in the minimum drag
position;
2) The remaining engines at maximum continuous power;
3) The most unfavorable center of gravity;
4) Landing gear (i) retracted and (ii) extended;
5) Flaps in the most favorable climb position;
6) Maximum takeoff weight
d) It shall be possible to take off and land with normal pilot skill and technique in a 30
knots 90-degree crosswind from either side. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.7) Minimum accept-
able: Directional stability shall be adequate to permit safe use of rudder to takeoff and
land on dry runways in a crosswind of 20 knots or 0.2 Vso, whichever is greater, except
that it need not exceed 25 knots. (FAR 25.237)
e) Yaw and roll control power shall be adequate to develop at least 10 degrees of sideslip
(yaw-control-induced steady, zero-yaw-rate sideslip with airplane trimmed for wings-
level straight flight) in the power approach configuration. Roll control shall not exceed
75% of control power available to the pilot. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.7.1)
f) Following sudden asymmetric loss of thrust from any factor, the airplane shall be
safely controllable in the crosswinds of paragraph d) above, from the unfavorable direc-
tion. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.9)
g) During takeoff it shall be possible to achieve straight flight following sudden
asymmetric loss of thrust from the most critical engine at speeds from VMIN tO VMAX
and thereafter to maintain straight flight throughout the climbout (without a change
in selected configuration). Roll control shall not exceed 75 percent of available control
power, with takeoff thrust maintained on the operative engine(s) and trim at normal
setting for takeoff with symmetric thrust. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.9.2)
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C.M.F.17.2 Roll Response
Lateral control for maneuvering shall be defined by the time required to achieve a
specific bank angle in a given time in response to a maximum roll command. The
required bank angle responses are:
a) Terminal Flight Phase - (Flaps down, 1.3 Vsl to VFE.)(MIL,-F-8785C 3.3.4.2)
I) Change bank angle 30 degrees within not more than 2.5 seconds, with probable
system failures.
2) Minimum Acceptable: Under the most adverse failure conditions change
bank angle 30 degrees within not more than 6 seconds.
b) Nonterminal Flight Phase - (Flaps up, 1.3 VSl to VMO/MMo.)(MIL-F-8785C 3.3.4.2)
1) Change bank angle 30 degrees within not more than 2.3 seconds, with probable
system failures.
2) Minimum Acceptable: Under the most adverse failure conditions change
bank angle 30 degrees within not more than 5 seconds.
c) High speed (VMOfJVIMO tO VD/]VID)
With all hydraulic or electrical systems operating, lateral control shall
be sufficient to roll from a steady 30 degrees banked turn through 60 degrees
so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 11 seconds with no
pilot rudder controller input, and in no more than 14 seconds with full
rudder controller used in the conventional sense (where rudder application
has an adverse effect on rate of roll). (BCAR D2-8, 6.5.4)
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Roll ResponseLinearity (C.M.F.18)
There shall be no objectionable nonlinearities in the variation of rolling response with roll
control deflection or force. Sensitivity or sluggishness in response to small control deflec-
tions or force shall be avoided. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.4.4)
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Roll Control Cross Coupling (C.M.F.19)
Lateral control deflection shall not cause objectionable
(MIL--F-8785C 3.4.3)
pitch and/or yaw transients.
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Lateral Trim Authority (C.M.F.20)
a) The lateral trim system shall be capable of reducing roll moments to zero in straight
flight and the bank angle may not exceed five degrees at 1.4 Vsl during climbing flight
with: (FAR 25.161(d))
1) The critical engine inoperative.
2) The remaining engines at maximum continuous power.
3) The landing gear and flaps retracted.
b) The airplane must maintain lateral trim with the most adverse lateral displacement of
the center of gravity (maximum wing tank fuel asymmetry) within the relevant operating
limitations, during normally expected conditions of operation (including operation at any
speed from 1.4 VSl to VMO/MMO). (FAR 25.161(b))
c) Trim inputs shall not prevent the pilot from obtaining full surface displacement achiev-
able at that condition.
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EnhancedRoll Maneuver Control (C.M.F.21)
The normal augmentation function shall suppressthe aerodynamic spiral mode by
holding a selected airplane state (e.g. roll attitude) constant when the lateral
controllers are centered.
In addition a heading or track angle hold shall be provided as an enhanced manual
control mode.
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Dynamic Stability (C.M.F.22)
a) Normal Operation: Dutch roll frequency and damping shall
requirements. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.1.1 -Most restrictive requirement
type aircraft.)
FLIGHT
CONDITION
TAKEOFF.
LANDING
CLIMB,
CRUISE,
DESCENT
Min _D ]VlJn
0.19
0.19
0.35
0.35
meet the following
for class rl and 11I
Min to D
0.4
0.4
(For passenger comfort a more stable platform is desirable and thus a _D = 0.4 is an
objective.)
b) Minimum Acceptable: Dutch roll damping shall be greater than zero. (FAR 25.181(b))
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Turn Coordination (C.M.F.23)
a) Normal Operation: Automatic turn coordination shall be provided, such that:
1) With rudder pedals fixed the lateral acceleration at the cg shall not exceed ±0.1 g for
maximum roll rates of C.M.F.17. This limit shall be met for aircraft in essentially con-
st.ant altitude flight while rolling smoothly from one side to the other. (MIL-F-9490D
3.1.2.4.2)
2) With rudder pedals fixed, the sideslip angle shall not be greater than 2 degrees and
lateral acceleration shall not exceed 0.03g, while at steady bank angles up to the maneu-
ver bank angle limit. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.2.4.1)
3) The airplane shall be capable of making heading changes without requiring the use
of rudder pedals to coordinate the turn entr 3' and exit maneuvers. It is required that
heading rate follow bank angle with an average lag ('to) of less than TBD seconds
(Figure C.M.F.23-l).
b) Minimum Acceptable: It shall be possible to coordinate the turn entry with normal pilot
use of the rudders.
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Directional Control Power Requirements (C.M.F.24)
The airplane should have sufficient directional control such that
minimum control speeds (VMCA and VMCG)will not limit
normal range of operating weights.
C.M.F.24.1 Engine Inoperative Control Requirements
a)
b)
C) VMCG
C.M.F.24.2
a)
engine inoperative
performance over the
b)
VMCA _< V2/1.1 and VR/1.05 at critical weight. (FAR 25.107(b) and FAR
25.125(a))
VMCL <_. 1.3 VSO -5 knots at critical weight. (BCAR D2-8, 3.2.2(c))
<_. VEF. (FAR 25.107(a)(1))
Crosswind Control Requirements
The airplane shall have the capability to takeoff and land in a 30 knot crosswind.
(MIL-F-8785C 3.3.7)
Minimum acceptable: Directional stability shall be adequate to permit safe use of
rudder to takeoff and land on dry runways in a crosswind of 20 knots or 0.2 Vso,
whichever is greater, except that it need not exceed 25 knots. (FAR 25.237)
83
Directional Trim Authority (C.M.F.25)
The directional trim authority shall be sufficient to trim with the most critical engine
failed for the following conditions:
a) Enroute Climb (FAR 25.161)
b) Approach flaps with power for level flight at 1.4 VS at maximum landing weight.
(FAR 25.161)
c) V2 with takeoff thrust and at minimum service takeoff gross weight (typically 1.25
OEW). (FAR 25.161)
d) The rudder trim rate shall be rapid enough to enable the pilot to maintain low control
forces under changing conditions normally encountered in service (i.e. engine failure with
flaps down), yet not so rapid as to cause oversensitivity or trim precision difficulties under
any conditions. (MIL-F-8785C 3.6.1.2)
Trim inputs shall not prevent the pilot from obtaining full surface displacement achiev-
able at that condition.
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Flutter Prevention Requirements (C.M.F.26)
The airplane shall comply with the flutter requirements in FAR 25.629. A flutter sup-
pression function may be provided by the flight control system to satisfy the flutter re-
quirements. There shall be no flutter, buzz or divergence of the airplane or its compo-
nents at all speeds up to 1.2 VD for all ranges of altitudes, maneuvers (including
maneuvers within the VD/MD envelope where losses in rigidity may occur) and loading
conditions. Clearance to 1.2 MD must also be shown, except the Mach effects need not
be included for Mach numbers greater than 1.0 as long as a proper margin of damping
exists at all speeds up to MD and there is no large and rapid reduction in damping as
MD is approached. The damping coefficient, l;, for any critical flutter mode shall be at
least 0.03 for all altitudes and speeds up to VD for unfailed conditions. Compliance
with these requirements may be shown by analyses, tests, or some combination
thereof. Ground vibration testing will be used to collect modal data for the airplane
and some of the components. Flight testing will be used to demonstrate flutter
compliance of the airplane at speeds up to VD/M.D. (FAR 25.629(a)&(b))
Fail-Safe Requirements
a) It shall be shown by analysis or tests that the airplane is free from such flutter
or divergence that would preclude safe-flight at any speed up to VD after each of the
failures, malfunctions or adverse conditions listed below. (FAR 25.629(d))
1) Failure of any single element of the structure supporting any engine, independ-
ently mounted propeller shaft, or large externally mounted aerodynamic body.
2) Any singIe failure of the engine structure that would reduce the yaw or pitch rigidity
of the engine fan or propeller rotational axis.
3) Absence of propeller aerodynamic forces resulting
propeller. In addition any single feathered propeller
specified in (1) and (2) above.
from the feathering of any single
must be paired with the failures
4) Any single engine fan or propeller rotating at the highest likely overspeed.
5) Any structural failure resulting in reduced stiffness of a single nacelle strut,
including complete engine loss.
6) Failure of each single principal structural element for which fail-safe strength is
demonstrated. This may be substantiated by showing that losses in rigidity or
changes in frequency, mode shape, or damping are within the parameter variations
shown to be satisfactory in the flutter and divergence investigations. (FAR 25.571(c))
7) Any single failure or malfunction or combination thereof, in the flight control
system considered under FAR 25.671, 25.672 and 25.1309, and any single failure in
any flutter damper system. Investigation of forced structural vibration other than
85
flutter, resulting from failures,
flight control system may be limited to airspeeds
8) Any other combination of failures affecting
extremely improbable.
b) In complying with the above conditions, the following
flight control system:
malfunctions, or adverse conditions in the automatic
up to Vc/Mc.
flutter or divergence not shown to be
must be considered for the
1) The airplane must be shown to be free from flutter after an)' of the following
failures in the flight control system and surfaces: (FAR 25.671(c)(d), FAR 25.672(c))
- Any single failure such as disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or
structural failure of hydraulic components such as actuators, control spool
housing, and valves.
- Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable such as
dual hydraulic system failure, or any single failure in combination with any
probable hydraulic failure.
2) It must be shown that after an)" single failure of the stability augmentation system
or any other automatic or power operated system that flutter does not occur within the
airplane operating envelope. (FAR 25.672(c))
3) The airplane must not flutter if any or all engines fail. Compliance with this
requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.
(FAR 25.671(c)(d))
4) The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in
relation to other systems, must be designed so that the occurrence of an)' failure condi-
tion which would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane is ex-
tremely improbable. Compliance with this requirement must be shown by analysis and
where necessary, by appropriate tests. The analysis must consider possible modes of
failure, including malfunctions and damage from external sources. Also the
probability of multiple failures or undetected failures must be considered.
(FAR 25.1309(b)(d))
5) If a failure, malfunction or adverse condition is simulated during a flight test, the
maximum speed investigated need not exceed VFC if it is shown, by correlation of the
flight test data with other test data or analyses, that flutter will not occur at an), speed up
to VD. (FAR 25.629(d))
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Process Descriptions
Control Mission Flight
Description Zxpl name Page
......................................................................................................
This function controls drag and lift dumping to provide an Control Aerodynamic Braking 105
aerodynamic braking capability.
This function configures the wing for different lift properties such
that required lift mad control is achieved at low speed (takeoff &
landing) and low drag can be achieved at high speeds.
This function performs ell functions required to control the
longitudinal axis by controlling the pitch angle.
This function performs all functions required to control the lateral
axis by controlling the roll angle.
This function controls the aircraft directional axis.
This function includes the airframe and the flight environment and
outputs the aircraft flight state as • result of the flight state and
the configuration of the flight control system.
Control Lift Configuration 112
Control Pitch 120
Control Roll 145
Control Yaw 18D
Update Aircraft State
Data Flow Description
Control Mission Flight
Description Name
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
s.bll as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Aircraft pitch, roll and heading attitudes.
Directional trim actuator position displayed to the crew.
Indication to the crew of the speedbrake position and status.
Longitudinal trim position displayed to the crew.
Roll trim position displayed to the crew.
Crew displayed high lift device positions and failure status
annunciation.
Position of the system used to generate drag used for in air and on
ground aerodynamic braking.
Thrust measurements of engines to determine capture engine out event.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the
actuation forces acting on the aerodynamic braking and roll actuation
mystem.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the
actuation forces •cLing on the aerodynamic braking system.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other that the
actuation forces acting on the yaw actuation system.
Configuration of lift system to achieve necessary lift to support
desired flight path angle at ell mission phases (speeds and
altitudes). The record consists of the leading edge and trailing edge
flap positions.
angular position of the nosewheel used for on ground low speed
heading control.
Position of the actuator(s) which provide aircraft pitch maneuver and
trim control.
Position of the surface which makes the aircraft roll.
Audible and visual indication to the crew that the aircraft
is approaching the stall angle of attack.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Configuration of the system which controls the magnitude and
direction of the thrust vector.
Data Flow Description
$8
Aircraft Attitudes
Displayed Directional Trim Pos
Displayed Inflight Brake Pos
Displayed Longitudinal Trim Pos
Displayed Roll Trim Position
Displayed Config & Failure Statu
Drag Actuators Position
Engines Thrust
External Forces on Actuator
External Forces on Pitch Actuate
External Forces on Yew Actuator
Lift Configuration
Nosewheel Position
Pitch Actuator Position
Roll Actuator Position
Stall Angle of Attack Warning
Target Flight Path
Thrust Vector Actuator Config
Control gission Flight
Description Name
The position of the wheel brake actuator. Wheel Brake Position
Position of the system which caused the aircraft to yaw (rudders). Yew Actuator Position
Expl name
Process Requirements Links
Control Mission Flight
Control Aerodynamic Braking
Control Lift Configuration C.L.C.1 92
C.L.C.2 93
Control Pitch C.P.1 94
C.P.2 95
Control Roll C.R.I De
C.R.2 97
Control Yaw C.¥.1 98
C.¥.2 g9
Update Aircraft State
Re ference Page
....................................
C.A.B.Z 90
C.A.B.2 gl
U.A.$.I 100
U.A.S.2 101
U.A.S.3 102
U.A.S.4 103
U.A.S.5 104
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Control Aerodynamic Braking (C.A.B.1)
Manual and automatic control of aerodynamic braking shall be available. Manual control
shall be able to override the automatic control function. The aerodynamic speed brake
control function shall be available for on-ground and in-flight operation.
1.0 Ground Speed Brake Control
Ground speedbrake control shall provide ground deceleration capability consistent with
operational field landing length requirements.
2.0 Inflight Speed Brake Control
a) The inflight speed brake actuators shall be sized to give adequate inflight deflection
at VMO/MMO for emergency descent.
b) Normal descent speed brake requirements shall not cause objectionable horizontal
tail buffet or engine flow distortion. (FAR 25.251(b))
c) Control forces to trim the pitching moment change shall be less than or equal to those
required by FAR 25.143(b).
9O
Aerodynamic Braking Functional Availability Requirements (C.A.B.2)
a) Each individual speed brake device shall provide fail-passive control for failure modes
more probable than 10-7/fit hour.
b) Loss of all speedbrake control shall be less than 10-7/flt hour.
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Control Lift Configuration (C.L.C.1)
The wing high lift design (both leading edge and trailing edge devices) shall be adjustable
to provide a variable lift capability to ensure the achievement of low speed performance
requirements coupled with certifiable handling characteristics. Manual and automatic
system operation shall be provided. High lift device position indication and failure status
shall be available.
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Lift Configuration Control Functional Availability Requirements (C.L.C.2)
The high lift system shall provide the following functional availability:
Function Probability of Loss of Function
L. E. and T. E. Control < 10-7
L. E. Control < 10-6
T. E. Control < 10-6
Autoslat < 10-5
Flap Load Relief < 10-5
LE and TE Failure Annunciation < 10-5
LE Control and LE Failure Annunciation < 10-9
TE Control and TE Failure Annunciation < 10-9
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Trim Control System Dynamics (C.P.I)
The stabilizer shall operate at a constant rate in response to a trim command.
Trim system start-up and run-on equivalent time delays shah be less than 0.10 seconds.
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Longitudinal Control Functional Availability Requirements (C.P.2)
The longitudinal control system shall provide the following functional availability:
Function Probability of Loss of Function
Pilot Control
Enhanced mode < 10-6
Normal Core < 10-7
Min Acceptable Core < 10-9
Stab Trim < 10-7
Feel and Centering < 10-9
Envelope Protection
Load factor < 10-6
Stall < 10-6
Overspeed < 10-6
Pitch Attitude < 10-6
Autopilot Limiting
Pitch Augmentation
< 10-6
< 10-6
95
Lateral Control Functional Availability Requirements (C.R.1)
The lateral control system shall provide the following functional availability:
Function Probability of Loss of Function
Pilot Control
EnhancedMode < 10-6
Normal Core < 10-7
Min. Acceptable Core < 10-9
Lateral Trim < 10-6
Feel and Centering < 10-9
Envelope Protection
Bank Angle
Autopilot Limiting
< 10-5
< 10-6
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Lateral Trim Control Dynamics (C.R.2)
Trim rate shall be 2.5% (TBV) max lateral control per second.
be less than 0.10 seconds.
Startup and run-on shall
97
Directional Control Functional Availability Requirements (C.Y.1)
The directional control system shall provide the following functional availability:
Function Probability of Loss of Function
Pilot Control
Enhanced mode
Normal Core
Min Acceptable Core
Directional Trim
Feel and Centering
Engine-Out Control Augmentation
< 10-6
< 10-7
< 10-9
< 10-6
< 10-9
< 10-6
Envelope Protection
Sideslip Limiting
Autopilot Limiting
Rudder Position Limiting
<
<
<
10-6
10-6
10-9
98
Directional Trim Control Dynamics (C.Y.2)
Trim rate shall be 2.5% max rudder per second(TBV).
than 0.10 seconds(TBV).
Start-up and run-on shall be less
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Static and Dynamic Stability Requirements (U.A.S.I)
The airplane shall be designed to have static and dynamic longitudinal characteristics as
follows:
a) For normal operation the short-period damping ratio shall be 0.35 _< _p <_. 1.0.
(MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.1.2) The phugoid mode shall be damped under normal flight
conditions, i.e., divergent characteristics shall not be acceptable for normal operation.
(MIL-F-8785C 3.2.1.2)
b) Positive static longitudinal stability shall be exhibited for all speeds and c.g.
locations within the normal flight envelope, i.e. the airplane shall return to the approxi-
mate trim speed after a speed upset. (FAR 25.171 Conventional Control)
c) Longitudinal Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
In lieu of compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and
25.181(a) of the FAR, the airplane must be shown to have suitable dynamic and static
longitudinal stabilit3' in any condition normally encountered in service, including the effects
of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special Conditions)
d) Minimum acceptable:
Static stability is not required; however, the level of instability shall not exceed that
which permits an unstable root having a time to double amplitude of less than six (6)
seconds. NOTE: If minimum acceptable dutch roll damping is present, static longitudinal
stability shall be neutral or positive. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.1.1)
IOO
Flight Path Stability (U.A.S.2)
a) Conventional Control - An unstable _/ vs V relationship is acceptable provided the
slope d_/dV is no more than .06 degrees/knots. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.1.3)
b) Maneuver Demand Control - In lieu of compliance with the requirements of para-
graphs 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and 25.181(a) of the FAR, the airplane must be shown to
have suitable dynamic and static longitudinal stability in any condition normally encoun-
tered in service, including the effects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR
Special Conditions)
I01
Static Lateral Stability (U.A.S.3)
a) The airplane shall have stable static lateral stability in rudder induced sideslips
at all speeds from 1.2 VSl to VMO/MMO. (FAR 25.177(b) Conventional Control)
b) For speeds from VMO/M.MO to VFc/MFc, any tendency to divergence shall be gradual
and easily recognizable and controllable by the pilot. (FAR 25.177(b) Conventional Con-
trol)
c) Lateral - Directional Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
(1) In lieu of compliance with paragraph 25.171 of the FAR, the airplane must be shown
to have suitable static lateral-directional stability in any condition normally encountered
in service, including the effects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special
Conditions)
(2) In lieu of compliance with paragraphs 25.177(b) and 25.177(c), the following applies:
In straight, steady, sideslips (unaccelerated forward slips) the rudder control-movements
and forces must be substantially proportional to the angle of sideslip, and the factor of
proportionality must lie between limits found necessary for safe operation throughout the
range of sidelip angles appropriate to the operation of the airplane. At greater angles, up
to the angle at which full rudder control is used or a rudder pedal force of 180 pounds is
obtained, the rudder pedal forces may not reverse and increased rudder deflection must
produce increased angles of sideslip. Unless the airplane has suitable sideslip indication,
there must be enough bank and lateral control deflection and force accompanying
sideslipping to clearly indicate any departure from steady unyawed flight. (Airbus A-320
FAR Special Conditions)
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Spiral Mode (U.A.S.4)
a) If unstable, the spiral mode time to double amplitude shall be no less than 20
secondsat all speedsfrom 1.2 VSl to VFC/M.Fc.(BCAR, D2-8,2 - Conventional Control)
b) The airplane characteristicsshall not exhibit a coupled roll-spiral mode in response to
the pilot roll control commands. (M]_F-8785C 3.3.1.4 - Conventional Control)
c) Minimum acceptable: the spiral mode time to double amplitude shall be greater than 4
seconds. (MIL-F-8785C 3.3.1.3 - Conventional Control)
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Static Directional Stability (U.A.S.5)
Static directional stability shall be adequate to meet the following requirements:
a) Skid recovery from 1.2 VSl to VFc/MFc. (FAR 25.177(a) - Conventional Control)
b) In straight, steady, sideslips the aileron and rudder control movements and forces
must be substantially proportional to the angle of sideslip, and the factor of proportional-
ity must lie between limits found necessary for safe operation throughout the range of
sideslip angles appropriate to the operation of the airplane. At greater angles, up to the
angle at which full rudder control is used or a rudder pedal force of 180 pounds is ob-
tained, the rudder pedal forces may not reverse and increased rudder deflection must
produce increased angles of sideslip. Unless the airplane has a yaw indicator, there must
be enough bank accompanying sideslipping to clearly indicate any departure from stead)'
unya_ved flight. (FAR 25.177(c) - Conventional Control)
c) Lateral - Directional Stability (Maneuver Demand Control)
(1) In lieu of compliance with paragraph 25.171 of the FAR, the airplane must be shown
to have suitable static lateral-directional stability in an)' condition normally encountered
in service, including the effects of atmospheric disturbance. (Airbus A-320 FAR Special
Conditions)
(2) In lieu of compliance with paragraphs 25.177(b) and 25.177(c), the following applies:
In straight, steady, sideslips (unaccelerated forward slips) the rudder control movements
and forces must be substantially proportional to the angle of sideslip, and the factor of
proportionality must lie between limits found necessary for safe operation throughout the
range of sidelip angles appropriate to the operation of the airplane. At greater angles, up
to the ano.le at which full rudder control is used or a rudder pedal force of 180 pounds is
obtained, the rudder pedal forces may not reverse and increased rudder deflection must
produce increased angles of sideslip. Unless the airplane has suitable sideslip indication,
there must be enough bank and lateral control deflection and force accompanying
sideslipping to clearly indicate any departure from steady unyawed flight. (Airbus A-320
FAR Special Conditions)
d) At all speeds above 1.4Vs, lateral control authority shall be adequate to control the
airplane without pilot use of rudder controller following a critical engine failure.
Roll-control forces shall not exceed 20 pounds (centerstick controller). (MIL-F-8785C
3.3.9.4)
e) Minimum Acceptable: Directional stability shall be adequate to permit safe use of
rudder to takeoff and land on dr) runways in a cross\rind of 20 knots or 0.2 \/so, which-
ever is greater, except that it need not exceed 25 knots. (FAR 25.237)
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Process Descriptions
Control Aerodynamic Braking
Description Expl name
Function which indicates to the flight crew the position of the Display Speed Brake Pea
speedbrake system and annunciates unsafe speedbrake positions and
unsafe failures.
Function involving generation of the speedbrake command in an
automated fashion.
Function to generate a drag actuator command based on the manual and
auto braking commands.
Function to generate the speadbrake command manually (ie by the
crew).
Function to move the position of the system which provides the
aerodynamic braking and lift dumping capability
(spoiler/speedbrakes}.
Function which converts the force exerted by the crew into an
aerodynamic braking command.
Generate Auto Brake Command
Generate Drag Actuator Command
Generate Manual Brake Command
Move Drag Actuator
Provide Crow Braking Interface
Data Flow Description
Control Aerodynamic Braking
Description Expl name
Sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
automatically (non-manual} generated aerodynamic braking command.
Force exerted by crew (pilot or copilot) on the aerodynamic braking
controller.
Comnded drag actuator position.
Indication to the crew of the speedbrake position and status.
Displacement of the drag actuators (me the speedbrakes).
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the
actuation forces acting on the aerodynamic braking and roll actuation
system.
Speedbrake command generated as s result of the crew exerting a
force on the controller.
Desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Auto Brake Command
Crew Brake Force
Desired Drag Actuator Position
Displayed Inflight Brake Pos
Drag Actuator Displacement
External Forces on Actuator
Manual Brake Command
Target Flight Path
Expl name
Display Speed Brake Pos
Generate Auto Brake Command
Generate Drag Actuator Command
Generate Manual Brake Command
Move Drag Actuator
Provide Crew Braking Interface
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Process Requirements Links
Control Aerodynamic Braking
I-L Reference Page
D.S.B.P.I i07
G.A.B.C.I 108
G.D.A.C.I 109
M.D.A.1 II0
P.C.B.I.1 III
Indication (D.S.B.P.1)
a) Means shall be provided to indicate to the flight crew the position of the speed brake
system.
b) Annunciation of failures or system operation which could result in an unsafe condition
if the crew were not aware of the condition shall be provided. (FAR 25.672)(a)
c) Annunciation to the crew (in the form of an aural warning) shall be provided for
speedbrake deployment for the following condition: Take-off power and airplane on
ground. (FAR 25.703)(a)
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Automatic Speed Brake Control (G.A.B.C.1)
a) Automatic speed brake control shall be available for on-ground operation.
b) Automatic speed brake extension shall occur for the following conditions:
1) At landing touchdown if the pilot has armed the system.
2) At take-off if an RTO is conducted.
e) The automatic ground speed brake system shall retract the spoilers and reset the speed
brake control when the throttles are advanced to takeoff power.
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Aerodynamic Braking Control Requirements (G.D.A.C.I)
a) The system shall maintain its selected position, except for movement produced by an
automatic positioning or load limiting device, without further attention by the flight crew.
b) Control surface deflection for devices used both in-flight and on the ground shall be
proportional to speed brake lever command.
c) Ground-only speed brake devices shall be inhibited from operating in-flight with
speed brakes deployed. Operation shall only be possible when the airplane is in positive
contact with the ground. (FAR 25.697(b))
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Speed Brake Actuation (M.D.A.1)
It shall be possible to position all speed brakes in the fully extended or fully retracted
position on the ground.
All ground speedbrakes shall be capable of maximum deflection at the maximum refused
takeoff speed.
II0
Crew to Aerodynamic Braking Interface (P.C.B.I.1)
The controller shall be designed to make inadvertent operation improbable and it shall not
creep.
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Description
Process Descriptions
Control Lift Configuration
Display to the crew the position of the high lift devices and
annunciate any high lift device failure conditions.
Generate the high lift configuration command in an automated
fashion (ie by • computer system).
Generate high lift configuration actuator commands based on the
manual and auto configuration commands and the sensed high lift
device positions.
Generation of the high lift configuration command in a manual
fashion [ie by the crew).
Actuation of the high lift devices (ie the leading edge & trailing
edge flaps).
Interface which allows the crew to input coL_ands to the high
lift system.
Expl name
Display HL Config & Fail Status
Generate Auto Config Command
Generate Config. Actuator Cmd
Generate Manual Config Cad.
Move Lift Config. Actuator
Provide Crew Config Interface
Data Flow Description
Control Lift Configuration
Description Name
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requiresents.
The automatically generated commands for the leading edge and
trailing edge high lift devices.
This is the force exerted by the crew to generate the manual high
lift configuration command.
Crew displayed high lift device positions and failure status
annunciation.
Cos=ands to the various actuators which move the leading edge and
trailing edge flaps.
Sensed positions of the leading edge and trailing edge high lift
positions.
Position of leading edge and trailing edge high lift devices and
failure status of the high lift devices.
Configuration of lift system to achieve necessary lift to support
desired flight path angle at all mission phases (speeds and
altitudes). The record consists of the leading edge and trailing edge
wing positions.
Manual high lift configuration co.and.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
the navigation function.
Auto Config Command
Crew HL Config Cmd Force
Displayed Config & Failure Statu
High Lift Actuator Command
High Lift Device Positions
High Lift Config a Failure Statu
Lift Configuration
Manual Config Cmd
Target Flight Path
Process Requirements Links
Control Lift Configuration
Expl mme I-L Reference Page
Display HL Config k Fail Status
Generate Auto Config Co.and
Generate Config. Actuator Cmd
Generate Manual Config Cmd.
Move Lift Config. Actuator
D.HL. C.F.S. 1 114
G.A.C.C.I 115
G.C.A.C.I 118
M.L.C.A.1 117
M.L.C.A.2 118
Provide Crew Config Interface P.C.C.I.I 119 I13
Position Indication and Warning (D.H1..C.F.S.1)
a) There shall be positive indication of the position of the left and right trailing edge and
leading edge flaps. The indicator shall give clear indication of the degree of asymmetry
between corresponding left and right flap segments. (FAR 25.699)(a)
b) Monitoring shall be provided to detect and annunciate the following to the flight crew:
(FAR 25.699)(a)
1) Uncommanded motion of the leading edge or trailing edge high lift devices.
2) Failure to go to a commanded position.
3) Asymmetry between corresponding left and right LE/TE devices.
c) There must be means to indicate to the pilots the takeoff, en route, approach, and
landing lift device positions. (FAR 25.699)(b)
d) If any extension of the lift and drag devices beyond the landing position is possible, the
control must be clearly marked to identify the range of extension. (FAR 25.699)(c)
e) A takeoff warning system must be installed and must meet the following requirements:
(FAR 25.703)
(1) The system must provide to the pilots an aural warning that is automatically
activated during the initial portion of the takeoff roll if the airplane is in a configuration,
including the following that would not allow a safe takeoff: The wing flaps or leading edge
devices are not within the approved range of takeoff positions.
(2) The warning required by paragraph (1) of this section must continue until-
(i) The configuration is changed to allow a safe takeoff;
(ii) Action is taken by the pilot to terminate the takeoff roll;
(iii) The airplane is rotated for takeoff; or
(iv) The warnino_ is manually deactivated by the pilot.
(3) The means used to activate the system must function properly throughout the
ranges of takeoff weights, altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.
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Automatic High Lift Control (G.A.C.C.1)
A flap load alleviation function shall be provided that automatically limits the loads that
can be applied to the trailing edge flaps. The flap load alleviation function shall satisfy
the following requirements.
I) Operate at an adequate margin from normal operating speeds.
2) Preserve the stall warning schedule with flap deflection.
3) Not inhibit normal operation of the flap position indicator. (FAR 25.699(a))
4) The rate of motion of the surfaces in response to the operation of the control and the
characteristics of the automatic positioning or load limiting device must give satisfactory
flight and performance characteristics under steady or changing conditions of airspeed,
engine power, and airplane attitude. (FAR 25.697(c))
115
Leading Edge and Trailing Edge Control (G.C.A.C.1)
Each lift device control must be designed so that the pilots can place the device in any
takeoff, en route, approach, or landing position established under FAR 25.101(d). Lift
and drag devices must maintain the selected positions, except for movement produced by
an automatic positioning or load limiting device, without further attention by the pilots.
(FAR 25.697(a))
Each lift and drag device control must be designed and located to make inadvertent op-
eration improbable. Lift and drag devices intended for ground operation only must have
means to prevent the inadvertent operation of their controls in flight if that operation
could be hazardous. (FAR 25.697(b))
116
Trailing Edge Flaps (M.L.C.A.1)
M.L.C.A.I.1 Flap Positioning Flexibility
The flap drive system shall be capable of positioning the flaps at any takeoff, en route,
approach, or landing position. (FAR 25.697)
M.LC.A.1.2 Flap Asymmetry
The motion of trailing edge devices on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry shall be
synchronized, unless the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the devices retracted
on one side and extended on the other. (FAR 25.701)
M.L.C.A.I.3 Flap Actuation Flight Conditions
Trailing edge flap retraction shall be possible during steady state flight at maximum
continuous engine power at all speeds below VFE + 9 knots. (FAR 25.697(d)).
117
Leading Edge High Lift Devices (M.L.C.A.2)
M.L.C.A.2.1 Leading Edge High Lift Device Extension Requirements
The leading edge device drive system shall be capable of positioning the leading edge
devices at any takeoff, en route, approach, or landing position. (FAR 25.697)
M.L.C.A.2.2 Leading Edge Device Actuation Flight Conditions
Leading edge flap retraction shall be possible during steady state flight at
maximum continuous engine power at all speeds below VFE + 9 knots. (FAR 25.697(d))
M.L.C.A.2.3 Leading Edge Actuation Flight Conditions
The leading edge devices shall be designed to permit deployment in icing conditions.
(FAR 25.1419)
M.L.C.A.2.4 Flap Asymmetry
The motion of leading edge devices on opposite sides of the plane of symmetry shall be
synchronized by a mechanical interconnection or equivalent asymmetry monitor unless
the airplane has safe flight characteristics with the devices retracted on one side and
extended on the other. (FAR 25.701)
I18
Manual High Lift Control (P.C.C.I.1)
Means shall be provided to select specific flap positions (FAR 25.697 (a)). Gates shall be
provided on the controller at the go-around flap setting (ACJ 25.697 (a)) and at the
position just prior to full retraction of the leading edge devices.
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Process Descriptions
Control Pitch
Description Expl name
This function displays the longitudinal trim status to the crew.
This function generates trim commands to offload steady state
pitch commands from the elevator to the stabilizer.
This function compares the actual flight path angle to the desired
flight path angle and generates the necessary flight path angle
command.
This function generates the pitch actuator (elevator k stabilizer)
position commands based on the flight path angle and longitudinal
trim commands.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects
against failures (in particular hardover and oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This function receives the desired pitch actuators positions and
attempts to move the actuators to those positions.
This function monitors the aircraft states and modifies the flight
path angle command as necessary to satisfy the longitudinal envelope
protection requirements.
This function monitors the aircraft flight path state vector and
attitudes and generates a warning for the crew when approaching the
aircraft stall angle of attack.
Display Longitudinal Trim Posit.
Generate Longitudinal Trim Cmd
Generate Plight Path Command
Generate Pitch actuator Command
Limit Auto Pitch Commands
Move Pitch Actuators
Provide Long. Envelope Protect
Provide Stall AOA Warning
Data Flow Description
Control Pitch
Description Name
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Flight path command generated in an automated fashion (is by a
computer system).
Longitudinal trim command generated automatically during enhanced
manual control and autoflight control.
The desired pitch actuator (elevator) position such that the limited
flight path angle command is achieved.
This flow is the longitudinal trim position displayed to the crew.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the
actuation forces acting on the pitch actuator.
The automatically generated flight path command limited to the
autoflight pitch authority.
The flight path command limited such that envelope protection is not
violated.
Position o£ the longitudinal trim actuator.
Flight path angle command generated manually (ie by the crew).
The longitudinal trim command generated by the crew for use during
normal and backup control.
Position of the actuator(s) which provide aircraft pitch maneuver and
trim control.
This flow is the audible and visual indication to the crew that the
aircraft is approaching the stall angle of attack.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Auto Flight Path Command
Auto Longitudinal Trim Command
Desired Pitch Actuator Position
Displayed Longitudinal Trim Pos
External Forces on Pitch Actuate
Limited Auto Plight Path Command
Limited Flight Path Command
Longitudinal Trim Position
Manual Flight Path Command
Manual Longitudinal Trim Command
Pitch Actuator Position
Stall Angle of Attack Warning
Target Flight Path
12]
Process Requirements Links
Control Pitch
Expl name I-L Reference Page
....................................................................
Display Longitudinal Trim Posit.
Generate Flight Path Command
Generate Longitudinal Trim Cmd
Generate Pitch Actuator Command
Limit Auto Pitch Co|u|ands L.A.P.C.I 123
Move Pitch Actuators
Provide Long. Envelope Protect
Provide Stall AOA Warning
P.L.E.P.I 124
P.L.E.P.2 125
P,S.A.W.1 12_
122
Pitch Autopilot Control and Limiting (L.A.P.C.1)
a) The core longitudinal control shall provide autopilot control authority limiting and
actuation for fail-safe operation and Cat ffIb autoland operation.
b) Maximum autopilot maneuver authority shall not result in the following conditions,
assuming a pilot delay in initiating recovery from any system malfunction: (FAR 25.1329
& FAA Advisory Circular 25.1329-1A)
1) Speeds beyond VFc/MI=C.
2) Structural loads in excess of limit loads due to hardover or oscillatory failures.
3) Airplane stall.
4) Dangerous dynamic conditions or deviations from the flight path.
5) Load factor response in excess of +1.0 g incremental.
The pilot delay from malfunction recognition to initiation of corrective action shall be 3
seconds for normal climb, cruise, and descent, and 1 second for normal maneuvering
flight (turning flight) and during low approaches. (FAA Advisory Circular 25.1329-1A)
123
Enhanced Control Longitudinal Envelope Protection (P.L.E.P.1)
Envelope protection functions shall be provided to assist the pilot or autopilot in prevent-
ing the airplane from exceeding normal operating envelope boundaries. The basic FCS
shall include protection for stall, load factor, pitch attitude, overspeed, sideslip and roll
angle boundaries. The envelope protection limits are TBD.
124
Automated Envelope Protection (P.L.E.P.2)
Automated envelopeprotection shall be provided to relieve pilot workload and shall have
a probability of loss of function < 10E-06.
125
Stall Angle of Attack Warning (P.S.A.W.1)
A tactile and/or audible warning of an impending stall shall be provided. Stall Warning
shall be provided for all selectable flap/slat configurations and for high lift system fail-
ures. The stall warning function is required for dispatch and shall be available after loss
of one engine or electrical generator. Stall warning system reference angles of attack and
system design shall be such as to minimize nuisance warnings and provide normal ma-
neuver capability.
P.S.A.W.I.I Normal Operation
"Normal" stall warning, for normal LE/TE configurations, shall:
a) Provide a stall speed warning margin of at least 7 percent to the
speed. (FAR 25.207)
certified FAR stall
b) Occur prior to "normal I-g stall speed". The "normal l-g stall speed" isdefined as
the minimum l-g corrected flight speed at which nW/qS becomes a maximum value
during an idle thrust, 1 knot/sec entry rate, stall demonstration maneuver.
c) Not occur within the following maneuver envelope:
I) _ < 40 deg with flaps up at enroute climb speed, 1 engine out
2) £b _< 30 deg with takeoff flaps at V2 speed, 1 engine out
3) 4__< 40 deg with approach and landing flaps at approach speed (1.3 VS)
where qb = bank angle in a level flight balanced turn with no pilot rudder input and
power for level flight in the turn. (FAA Issue Paper F-3)
P.S.A.W.I.2 Operation with High Lift System Failures
Stall warning and crew annunciation for failed L.E./T.E. configurations, for which
failure of high lift surface element/elements is not shown to be extremely improbable,
shall be provided.
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Process Descriptions
Generate Flight Path Command
Description Expl name
......................................................................................................
Function to generate a flight path angle command automatically (ie Generate Flight Path Cmd Auto
by • computer) as • result of the difference between the actual and
target flight paths.
This function involves the generation of a flight path command Generate Flight Path Cmd Manual
manually (ie be the crew) as a result of comparing the target and
actual flight paths.
Description
Control Process Descriptions
Generate Flight Path Command
This function activates one of the flight path command generation
processes depending on the mode engaged.
This function decides whether to generate flight path commands
lanually or automatically.
Expl n_e
................................
Engage Man/Auto Operation (FP)
Make Manual/Auto Flight Decision
Date Plow Description
Generate Flight Path Command
Description Name
......................................................................................................
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well ms any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Flight path command generated in an automated fashion (ie by a
computer system).
Flight path angle command generated manually (ie b_ the crew).
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Auto Flight Path Command
Manual Flight Path Command
Target Plight Path
Process Architectural Assignments
Generate Plight Path Command
£xpl name associated aes
................................................................
Generate Flight Path Cmd Auto Auto-Flight System
Generate Flight Path Cnd Manual Pilot
Copilot
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Process Descriptions
Plight Cntrl Sys Pitch Context
Description Expl name
......................................................................................................
This function contains all the flight control functions assigned to Plight Cntrl Sys Pitch Punctns
the FCS. As a result of this assignment several new functions are
created. Some of these are interface functions and others are as a
result of how functions were allocated to AEs. (ie. Envelope
Protection was assigned to the FCS with a probability of failure
<fOE-8. However this function requires <tOE-9. Therefore the pilot &
copilot must perform envelope protection when not being performed by
the FCS. Thus a pilot indication function of the status of envelope
protection is generated.) Pilot & copilot can command roll rate,
thus there is a functional req. to resolve control contention,
Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Context
Description Name
......................................................................................................
Flight path command generated in an automated fashion (ie by a Auto Flight Path Command
computer system).
Longitudinal trim command generated automatically during enhanced
manual control and autoflight control.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the flight path angle command.
This flow is the physical force generated by the copilot to control
the aircraft flight path angle. It is in the form of a force exerted
by the pilot's hand.
This is the physical force exerted by the copilot's hand to generate
the desired longitudinal trim command.
The physical signal created by the pilot to control the aircraft
flight path. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilot.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the pilot indicative of the flight path command.
This flow is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to
generate the desired longitudinal trim command.
Position of the actuator(s) which provide aircraft pitch maneuver and
trim control.
Auto Longitudinal Trim Command
Copilot Flight Path Cmd Feel For
Copilot Plight Path Cmd Force
Copilot Longitudinal Trim Force
Pilot Flight Path Cmd Force
Pilot Flight Path Feel Force
Pilot Longitudinal Trim Force
Pitch Actuator Position
Process Requirements Links
Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Context
Expl name I-L Reference Page
....................................................................
Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Punctns F.C.S.P.F.I IS1
F.C.S.P.F.2 132
130
Pilot and co-pilot contention resolution (F.C.S.P.F.1)
Pilot and co-pilot longitudinal control contention shall be resolved.
(This functional requirement arises because the generate manual
flight path command was assigned to both the pilot and copilot AEs)
131
Envelope Protection Mode Indication and Alert (F.C.S.P.F.2)
Indication shall be provided to inform the pilot when an envelope protection mode has be-
come active. An alert indication shall inform the pilot of loss of an envelope protection
function. The loss of an envelope protection function and the failure to inform the pilot of
the loss shall be extremely improbable. (FAR 25.672(a))
(This functional requirement was generated because the pilot is responsible for envelope
protection when not provided automatically.)
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Process Descriptions
Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Functns
Description Expl name
This transform displays the longitudinal trim status to the crew. Display Longitudinal Trim Posit.
This transform results from the allocation of Provide Longitudinal
Envelope Protection to the FCS with a probability of loss of function
of <fOE-6. Pitch envelope protection has a req for probability of
loss of function <IOE-g and thus the crew has responsibility for
pitch envelope protection when not performed by the FCS. Thus the
crew must be aware of envelope protect status, hence the functional
requirement to Display Longitudinal Envelope Protect Status.
This process generates the pitch actuator (elevator k stabilizer)
position commands based on the flight path angle and longitudinal
trim comnds.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects
against failures (in particular hardover and oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This transform receives the desired pitch actuators positions and
attempts to move the actuators to those positions.
This transform provides the same capability for the copilot as the
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface does for the pilot.
This transform converts the signal received from the pilot in the
form of a force exerted by the pilot into a flight path angle command
signal to be used by the FCS. It also provides the pilot with a
feedback feel force indicative of the command.
This transform monitors the aircraft states and modifies the flight
path angle command as necessary to satisfy the longitudinal envelope
protection requirements.
This function monitors the aircraft flight path state vector and
attitudes and generates a warning for the crew when approaching the
aircraft stall angle of attack.
This transform was generated by the assignment of the Generate Flight
Path Command Manual to both the pilot & copilot.
Display Pitch Envlp Protct Stats
Generate Pitch Actuator Command
Limit Auto Pitch Commands
Move Pitch Actuators
Provide Copilot Pitch Interface
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface
Provide Long. Envelope Protect
Provide Stall AOA Warning
Resolve Pitch Control Contention
Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl Sys Pitch Tunctns
Description Name
......................................................................................................
The sensed • dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Flight path command generated in an automated fashion (ie by a
computer system).
Longitudinal trim command generated automatically during enhanced
manual control and autoflight control.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the flight path angle command.
This flow is the physical force generated by the copilot to control
the aircraft flight path angle. It is in the form of a force exerted
by the pilot's hand.
Numeric value of the copilot flight path command obtained from the
Copilot Flight Path Cmd Force.
_umeric value of the copilot longitudinal trim command obtained
from the Copilot Longitudinal Trim Force.
This is the physical force exerted by the copilot's hand to generate
the desired longitudinal trim command.
The desired pitch actuator {elevator) position such that the limited
flight path angle command is achieved.
This fie. is the longitudinal trim position displayed to the crew.
The status of the longitudinal envelope protection function assigned
to the PCS
134
Auto Flight Path Command
Auto Longitudinal Trim Command
Copilot Flight Path Cmd Feel For
Copilot Flight Path Cmd Force
Copilot Flight Path Command
copilot Longitudinal Trim cmd
Copilot Longitudinal Trim Force
Desired Pitch Actuator Position
Displayed Lon_itudina! Trim Pcs
Dsp!yd Long Envlp Protct Status
DataFlowDescriptionPlight Cntrl SysPitch Functns
Description Name
......................................................................................................
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the £xternal Forces on Pitch Actuato_
actuation forces acting on the aerodynamic braking system,
The automatically generated flight path command limited to the
autoflight pitch authority.
The flight path command limited such that envelope protection is not
violated.
Activity and avai]ability of the longitudinal envelope protection
function.
Position of the longitudinal trim actuator.
Flight path angle command generated manually (ie by the crew).
The physical signal created by the pilot to control the aircraft
flight path. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilot.
Numeric value of the pilot's flight path angle command obtained
from the Pilot Flight Path Cmd Force.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the pilot indicative of the flight path command.
Numeric value of the pilot's longitudinal trim command obtained
from the Pilot Longitudinal Trim Force.
This flow is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to
generate the desired longitudinal trim command.
Position of the actuator(s) which provide aircraft pitch maneuver and
trim control.
This flo_ is the audible and visual indication to the crew that the
aircraft is approaching the stall angle of attack.
Limited Auto Flight Path Command
Limited Flight Path Command
Longitudinal Envlop Protect Star
Longitudinal Trim Position
_anual Flight Path Command
Pilot Flight Path Cmd Force
Pilot Flight Path Command
Pilot Flight Path Feel Force
Pilot Longitudinal Trim Command
Pilot Longitudinal Trim Force
Pitch Actuator Position
Stall Angle of Attack Warning
Process Requirements Links
Plight Cntrl Sys Pitch Functns
Expl name l-i Reference
....................................................................
Display Longitudinal Trim Posit.
Display Pitch Envlp Protct Stats
Generate Pitch Actuator Command
Limit Auto Pitch Commands L.A.P.C.I
Move Pitch Actuators
Provide Copilot Pitch Interface
Provide Long. Envelope Protect P.L.E.P.I
P.L.E.P.2
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface
Provide Stall AOA Warning P.S.A.W. 1
Resolve Pitch Control Contention R.P.C,C.I
135
Pilot and co-pilot contention resolution (R.P.C.C.1)
Pilot and co-pilot longitudinal control contention for sidestick controllers shall be resolved
as follows.
a) Pilot and copilot commands of same sign chose larger command.
b) Pilot and copilot commands of opposite sign add commands algebraically.
c) In the event of a controller jam the function shall operate as though the jammed con-
troller _vere in the detent position.
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Process Descriptions
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface
Description £xpl name
This transform translates the physical displacement of the pitch Translate Flight Path Displ-Cmd
controller into a flight path command.
This transform generates a force to feedback to the pilot which is
indicative of the pitch maneuver and trim commands.
This transform converts %he physical displacement generated by the
physical force exerted by the pilot into a trim command for use by
the FCS.
This transform receives the pilot force and feedback feel force and Convert Flight Path Forces-Displ
generates a displacement.
Generate Flight Path Feel Force
Translate Long Trim Force to Cmd
Data Flow Description
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface
Description Name
Numeric value of the manual flight path angle command obtained from Flight Path Angle Command
the flight path angle controller displacement.
This flow is the flight path angle command in the form of the
controller displacement.
This flow is the resistance force exerted by the controller which is
a feedback to the pilot indicative of the f_ight path command.
This is the physical signal created by the crew (pilot/copilot) to
control the aircraft flight path angle, It is in the form of a
physical force exerted by the pilot.
Numeric value of the pilot's longitudinal trim command obtained
from the pilots longitudinal trim command force.
The physical force generated by the pilot to generate the desired
longitudinal trim.
Flight Path Command Displacement
Flight Path Command Feel Force
Flight Path Command Force
Longitudinal Trim Command
Longitudinal Trim Force
Process Requirements Links
Provide Pilot Pitch Interface
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Convert Plight Path Forces-Displ C.F.P.P.I
Generate Flight Path Peel Force G.F.P.P.F.I
G.F.P.F,F.2
G.F.P.F.P 3
Translate Flight Path Displ-Cmd
Translate Long Trim Force to Cmd T.L.T.F.C.1
138
Longitudinal Controller Deflection Rates (C.F.P.F.1)
No force discontinuities or other objectionable characteristics shall occur for all controller
command rates.
139
Longitudinal Feel Forces (G.F.P.F.F.1)
G.F.P.F.F.I.1 Breakout Forces
Sidestick controller breakout force shall be within 0.5 to 5.0 lbs for normal operation.
Minimum acceptable: Sidestick controllers shall have a breakout force range of 0.5 lbs
to 10.0 lbs. (MIL--F-8785C 3.5.2.1 Class Ill)
G.F.P.F.F.1.2 Maneuvering Controller Forces
1) At constant speed in steady turning flight, pullups and pushovers, the variation in
pitch controller force with steady-state normal acceleration shall have no objectionable
nonlinearities within the following load factor range:
Minimum Maximum
0.5 0.5[no(+) + 1]
where no(+) - maximum service positive load factor.
Outside this range, a departure from linearity resulting in a local gradient which differs
from the average gradient for the maneuver by more than 50 percent is considered exces-
sive, except that larger increases in force gradients are permissible at load factors greater
than 0.85 nLIMIT. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.2.1)
2) All local force gradients shall be within the following limits:
Centerstick
Wheel Controller
Minimum Gradient
3.0 lbs/g
35.0 Ibs/g
Maximum Gradient
28.0 lbs/g
120.0 Ibs/g
In addition the force gradient should be near the upper boundary for combinations of high
frequency and low damping. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.2.1)
G.F.P.F.F.1.3 Configuration Change Controller Forces
a) The longitudinal trim changes caused by changes in power, flap setting, landing
gear operation, deceleration devices, etc., should not be so large that peak longitudinal
control forces in excess of 10 lbs for center stick controller or 50 lbs for wheel controller
push or pull are required for compensation under normal flight conditions. This objective
shall apply to a time interval of at least 5 seconds following the completion of the pilot
action initiating the configuration change. (MIL-F-8785C 3.6.3.1) (FAR 25.145(b))
G.F.P.F.F.1.4 Speed Change Controller Forces
a) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not
be less than I pound for each 6 knots for the conditions specified in FAR 25.175. (FAR
25.173(c)) For a sidestick controller the value is 0.5 ib per 6 knots (1/2 the value of
conventional controllers).
I40
b) There may be no control reversal about any axis at any speed up to VDFtrM.DF. Any
reversal of elevator control force or tendency of the airplane to pitch, roll, or yaw must be
mild and readily controllable, using normal piloting techniques. (FAR 25.253(a)(3))
G.F.P.F.F.I.5 Mistrim Maneuvering Forces
In the out-of-trim condition specified below, it must be possible from an overspeed con-
dition at VDF/MDF tO produce at least 1.5 g for recovery by applying not more than 125
pounds for wheel controller or 60 pounds for centerstick (1/2 the value of conventional
controllers) using the primary longitudinal control. (FAR 25.255(0)
From an initial condition with the airplane trimmed at cruise speeds up to VMO/MMO,
obtain the most out-of-trim nose-up and nose-down conditions resulting from the greater
of-(FAR 25.255(a))
1) A three second movement of the longitudinal trim system at its normal rate for the
particular flight condition with no aerodynamic load, except as limited by stops in the
trim system or;
2) The maximum mistrim that can be sustained by the autopiiot while maintaining
level flight in the high speed cruising condition.
G.F.P.F.F.1.6 Controller Forces - Stall
The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall. (FAR
25.203)
G.F.P.F.F.1.7 Dynamic Control Forces
a) The buildup of control forces during maneuver entry shall not lag the buildup of
normal acceleration at the pilot's location. In addition, the frequency response of
normal acceleration at the pilot station to pitch control force input shall be such that
the inverse amplitude is greater than the following at frequencies greater than 1.0 rad/sec:
(MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.3.1)
ONE-HANDED
CONTROLLERS
(lbs/g)
NOR.MAL MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE
14 8
nLIMI T -I nLIMI T -I
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Enhanced Control Maneuver Control Forces (G.F.P.F.F.2)
a) Sidestick Force per g
Sidestick forces shall provide tactile cues that allow the pilot to maneuver the airplane
precisely. Sidestick forces shall also provide an indication to the pilot of the proximity
of pitch maneuver load factor to structural limits. The pitch sidestick controller shall
include a change in force versus deflection gradient at a specified "soft stop."
Maneuver limit load shall be commanded with stick forces near the soft stop. The
pilot shall be able to command load factors in excess of limit load at his discretion in
emergency situations by applying higher forces to the sidestick controller. The maneuver
stick force per g shall comply with the requirements below for stick forces less than
those of the soft stop. (MIL-F-8785C 3.2.2.2.1)
Flight Condition
Landing & Approach
Climb, Cruise & Descent
Fs/g - lb/g
Minimum Maximum
28
28
b) Takeoff Rotation Forces
Sidestickcontrol forces during
half the value of conventional
aircraft.)
normal takeoff rotation shall not exceed 25 Ibs. (This is
controllers of MIL-F-8785C 3.2.3.3.2 for Class ITI
c) Landing Flare Forces
Sidestick control forces during normal landing flare shall not exceed 25 Ibs. (This is half
the value of conventional controllers of MIL-F-8785C 3.2.3.4.1 for Class Ill aircraft.)
142
Longitudinal Controller Centering (G.F.P.F.F.3)
Positive control centering shall be provided in all modes. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.2.1) A
mechanical or electrical detent equivalent to 10 lbs (TBV) of sidestick controller force
shall be provided during autopilot control to preclude inadvertent pilot inputs.
143
Longitudinal Trim Control (T.L.T.F.C.I)
Trim control shall be operable by each of the pilots without removing hands from the
longitudinal controllers.
An alternate trim control command path operable by both crew members shall be
provided. (MIL-F-8785C 3.6.1)
Means to manually deactivate the trim function shall be provided. (M]]_,-F-9490D 3.1.3.5)
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Process Descriptions
Control Roll
Description Expl name
Display roll trim position to the craw. Display Roll Trim Position
This process generates the roll actuator (aileron / spoiler) position Generate Roll Actuator Command
commands based on roll rate & trim commends.
This function compares the target flight path and actual flight path Generate Roll Rate Commend
and generates necessary roll rate commend to drive the actual to the
target.
This transform generates roll trim commands to offset asymmetries such Generate Roll Trim Commend
as engine out, engine loss and lateral winds.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects Limit Auto Roll Commends
against failures (in particular hardover or oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This transform receives the desired roll actuator position and Move Roll Actuator
attempts to move the roll actuator to that position.
This transform monitors actual roll angle and commanded roll rate and Provide Roll Envelope Protect
and modifies the roll rate command as necessary to prevent the roll
angle from exceeding certain limits.
Data Flow Description
Control Roll
Description Name
......................................................................................................
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Roll rate command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an
eutoflight computer).
Roll trim command generated automatically for use during enhanced
mmnual control and autoflight control.
The desired roll actuator position such that the limited roll rate
command is achieved.
This flow is the roll trim position displayed to the crew.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other than the
actuation forces acting on the aerodynamic braking and roll actuation
system.
The auto roll rate command limited to the autoflight roll authority.
The roll rate commend limited such that the envelope protection
criteria are not violated.
loll rate command generated manually (ie by the crew).
The roll trim command as generated by the crew for normal control.
The trim provides a steady state roll angle to offset asymmetries.
Position of the system which makes the aircraft roll.
Airplane roll angle.
Position of the roll trim actuator.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Auto Roll Rate Command
Auto Roll Trim Cmd
Desired Roll Actuator Pos.
Displayed Roll Trim Position
External Forces on Actuator
Limited Auto Roll Command
Limited Roll Rate Command
Manual Roll Rate Command
Manual Roll Trim Command
Roll Actuator Position
Roll Angle
Roll Trim Position
Target Flight Path
146
Process Requirements Links
Control Roll
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Display Roll Trim Position
Generate Roll Actuator Command
Generate Roll Rate Command
Generate Roll Trim Command
Limit Auto Roll Commands L.A.R.C.I
Move Roll Actuator
Provide Roll Envelope Protect P.R.E.P.1
P.R.E,P.2
147
Roll Autopilot Control and Limiting (L.A.R.C.1)
a) Core lateral control shall provide autopilot control authority limiting and actuation to
ensure safety for probable autopilot failure conditions.
b) Maximum maneuver authority shall not result in the following, assuming a 4 second
pilot delay in initiating recovery from any system malfunction: (FAR 25.1309)
1) Bank angle greater than 60 degrees.
2) Structural loads in excess of limit load clue to harclover or oscillatory failures.
I48
Automated Envelope Protection (P.R.E.P.1)
Automated envelope protection shall be provided to relieve pilot workload and shall have
a probability of loss of function < 10E-06.
149
Enhanced ControI Roll Envelope Protection (P.R.E.P.2)
The enhanced control mode shall provide roll envelope protection that shall satisfy the
following requirements:
a) Roll Angle Limits
1) The roll envelope protection function shall operate to the following
Roll Angle Lateral Controller Roll Angle Limit
Limit Type Position Value (Deg)
Soft All +- 35 (TBV)
Hard Out-of-Detent +- 60 (TBV)
limits
2) When the pilot's lateral controller is returned to neutral following a maneuver beyond
the soft limit, the airplane roll angle shall automatically decrease to 35 deg with the
roll mode time constant specified in Paragraph C.M.F.21(b).
3) If the airplane should be upset to a roll angle greater than 60 degrees, the roll
envelope function shall use a pilot lateral controller input as an indication of the pre-
ferred direction of roll even if that direction results in a roll angle change greater
than the smallest that can be achieved. The roll back from the upset shall be to 35
degrees.
b) Response Characteristics
1) The roll envelope protection function shall not prevent the pilot from attaining the
maximum useful airplane performance.
2) The roll envelope protection function shall comply with the roll mode time constant
in Paragraph C.M.F.21 (b).
3) Control anticipation shall minimize the effect on maneuvers near the protection
boundary. Dynamic overshoots of the boundaries shall be minimized consistent with the
criticality of the limit.
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Process Descriptions
Generate Roll Rate Command
Description Expl name
...................................................................... Generate Roll Rate Cmd. Auto
This process involves the generation of a roll rate command
automatically (ie by a computer) as a result of the difference
between the actual and target flight path.
This process involves the generation of a roll rate command manually Generate Roll Rate Cmd. Manual
(ie by the craw) as a result of comparing the target and actual
flight paths.
Control Process Descriptions
Generate Roll Rate Command
Description Expl name
......................................................................................................
This process activates one of the roll rate generation processes Engage Man/Auto Operatxon
depending on the mode engaged,
This transform decides whether to generate flight path commands Make Manual/Auto Flight Decision
manually or automatically.
Data Flow Description
Generate Roll Rate Command
Description
......................................................................
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Roll rate commend generated in an automated fashion [ie by an
autoflight computer).
Roll rate command generated manually (ie by the crew).
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Name
................................
Actual Plight Path
Auto Roll Rate Command
Manual Roll Rate Command
Target Plight Path
Process Architectural Assignments
Generate Roll Rate Command
Exp] name associated aes
................................................................
Generate Roll Rate Cmd. Auto Auto-Flight System
Generate Roll Rate Cmd. Manual Pilot
Copilot
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Process Descriptions
FliEht Cntrl $ys Roll Context
Description Expl name
This process contains all the flight control functions assigned to Flight Cntrl Sys Roll Functns
the FC$. As a result of this assignment several new. processes are
created. Some of these are interface functions and others are as a
result of how functions were allocated to AEs, (ie. Envelope
protection was assigned to the FCS with a probability of failure
<fOE-6. However this function requires <IOE-09. Therefore the pilot
& copilot most perform envelope protection when not being performed
by the FCS. Thus a pilot indication function of the status of
envelope protection is generated.) Pilot & copilot can command roll
rate, thus there is a functional req. to resolve control contention.
Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl $ys Roll Context
Description Name
......................................................................................................
Roll rate command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an Auto Roll Rate Command
autoflight computer).
Roll trim command generated automatically for use during enhanced
manual control anc au_Of1_gbt control.
This flow is a resistance force exerted b! the controller _'hich is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the roll rate command.
This is the physical signal created by the copilot to control the
aircraft. _t is :n the form of a force exertec by the pilots hand.
This is the physical force exerted by the copilot's hand to generate
the desired roll tr:_ command.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller _hich is a
feedback to the pilot indicatlve of the roll rate command.
This is the physical signal created by the pilot to control the
aircraft. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilots hand.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to generate the Pilot Boll Trim Force
desired roll trim cozmanc.
Post:ion of the system _hich makes the aircraft roll. Roll Actuator Position
Auto Roll Trim Cmd
Copilot RB Cmd. Feel Force
Copilot Roll Bate Force
Copilot Roll Trim Force
Pilot BR Cmd. Feel Force
Pilot Roll Rate Force
Process Requirements Links
Flight Cntrl Sys Roll Context
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
YliEht Cntrl Sys Roll Punctns F.C,S.R,F.I
F.C,S.R.F.2
154
Envelope Protection Mode Indication and Alert (F.C.S.R.F.1)
Indication shall be provided to inform the pilot when an envelope protection mode has
become active. An alert indication shall inform the pilot of loss of an envelope protection
function. The loss of an envelope protection function and the failure to inform the pilot
of the loss shall be extremely improbable. (FAR 25.672(a))
(This functional requirement was generated because the pilot is resposible for envelope
protection when not provided automatically.)
155
Pilot and co-pilot roll control contention resolution (F.C.S.R.F.2)
Pilot and co-pilot roll control contention shall be resolved.
(This functional requirement arises because the generate manual
roll rate command was assigned to both the pilot and copilot AEs)
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Process Descriptions
Flight Cntrl Sys Roll Functns
This transform results from the allocation of Provide Roll Envelope
Protection to the FCS with a probability of loss of function of
<!OE-6. Provide Roll Envelope Protection has a probability of loss of
function of < IOE-9 and thus the crew has responsibility for roll
envelope protection when not performed by the FCS. Thus the crew
must be a_are of envelope protect status, hence the functional
requirement to Display Roll Envelope Protect Status.
This process generates the roll actuator (aileron / spoiler) position
commands based on roll rate & trim commands.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects
against failures (in particular hardover or oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This transform receives the desired roll actuator position and
attempts to move the roll actuator to that position.
This transform provides the same function for the copilot as the
Provide P_lot Boll Interface does for the pilot.
This functions converts the signal received from the pilot in the
form of a force exerted by the pilots hand into a roll rate signal to
be used b}" the FC5. It a!so provides the pilot with a feedback feel
force proportional to the commanded roll rate.
This transform monitors actual roll angle and commanded roll rate and
and modifies the roll rate command as necessary to prevent the roll
angle from exceeding certain limits.
This process ,.as generated by the assignment of the Generate Roll
Rake Cmd. Manual to both the pilot & copilot.
Display Roll Envlp Protct Stats
Generate Roll Actuator Command
Limit Auto Roll Commands
Move Roll Actuator
Provide Copilot Roll Interface
Provide Pilot Roll Interface
Provide Roll Envelope Protect
Resolve Roll Control Contention
Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl Sys Roll Functns
•ell as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Roll rate command generated in an automated fashion (de by an
autofliE_t computer}.
Roll trim command generated automatically for use during enhanced
manual control and autofltgh: control.
This flo- is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the roll rate command.
Numeric value of the copilot roll rate command obtained form the
copilot roll rate force.
This is the physical signal created by the copilot to control the
aircraft. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilots hand.
Numeric value of the copilot roll trim command as obtained from the
copilot roll trim force.
This is the physical force exerted by the copilot's hand to generate
the desired roll trim command.
This flo- is the roll trim position displayed %o the crew.
Status of the availability, and activity, of the roll envelope
protection function displayed to the crew.
Boll rale command _enerated manually" (de by' the crew).
The roll trim comman_ as generated by' the crew for normal con:ro_.
The trim _rov_ces a stebcy state re!! an_le to offset asymmetries.
This f2o_ _s a resls:ance force exerted by the controller _hich is a
feedba_ to :he pi_ct _n!:cat:ve _f the r_l rate command
158
Auto Roll Rate Command
Auto Roll Trim Cmd
Copilot RR Cmd. Feel Force
Copilot Roll Rate Command
Copilot Roll Rate Force
Copilot Roll Trim Command
Copilot Boll Trim Force
Displayed Roll Trim Position
Dsplyd Roll Envlp Protct Status
Manual Roll Bate Command
Manual Ro_! _rim Command
Pilot _5 Cmc Fee! Force
DataFlowDescriptionFlight Cntrl Sys Roll Functns
Description Name
......................................................................................................
Numeric value of the pilots roll rate command obtained from the Pilot Roll Rate Command
pilots roll rate force.
This is the physical signal created by the pilot to control the Pilot Roll Rate Force
aircraft. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilots hand.
Numeric value of the pilots roll trim command obtained from the Pilot Roll Trim Command
pilots roll trim force.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to generate the Pilot Roll Trim Force
desired roll trim command.
Position of the system _hich makes the aircraft roll.
Airplane roll angle.
Activity and availability of the roll envelope protection function.
Position of the roll trim actuator.
Roll Actuator Position
Roll Angle
Roll Envelope Protect Status
Roll Trim Position
Process Requirements Links
Flight Cntrl Sys Roll Punctns
ExDI name I-L Beference
....................................................................
Display Roll Envip Protct Stats
Display Roll Trim Position
Generate Rc!l Actuator Command
Limit Auto Roll Commands L.A _.C._
Move _oli Actuator
Provide Copilot Roll :nterface
Provide Pilot Roll Interface
Provide Roll Envelope Protect
Resolve Roll Control Contention
P_.£.P.Z
P.R_F,2
E_CC._
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Pilot and co-pilot contention resolution (R.R.C.C.1)
Pilot and co-pilot lateral control contention for sidestick controllers shall be resolved as
follows.
a) Pilot and copilot commands of same sign chose larger command.
b) Pilot and copilot commands of opposite sign add commands algebraically.
c) In the event of a controller jam the function shall operate as though the jammed con-
troller were in the detent position.
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Process Descriptions
Provide Pilot Roll Interface
Description Expl name
......................................................................................................
This process receives the pilot force and feedback feel force and Convert Roll Forces - Displ.
generates a displacement.
This transform generates a force to feedback to the pilot _hich is an
indication of the commanded roll rate.
This transform translates the sidestick controller displacement to a
roll rate command.
This process converts the physical displacement generated by the
physical force exerted by the pilot into a trim command for use by the
FCS.
Generate Roll Feel Force
Translate RR Displ to RR Command
Translate Trim Force to Command
Data Flow Description
Provide Pilot Roll Interface
Description Name
......................................................................................................
This f]o_ is a resistance force exerted by the controller _hich is a RR Cmd. Feel Force
feedbac_ to the pilot indicative of the roll rate command.
This flow is the roll rate controller displacement in inches. Roll Rate Cmd.-Dipl.
This flo_ is the roll rate command in deglsec. Roll Rate Command
This is the physical signal created by the pilot to control the Roll Rate Force
aircraft. It is in the form of a force exerted by the pilots hand.
The co_ma_d such that the airplane holds a small steady state roll Roll Trim Command
an_e to offset asymmetries.
Process Requirements Links
Provide Pilot Roll Interface
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Convert Roll Forces - Displ. C.R.F D.l
Generate Roll Fee! Force G.R.F F.I
G.R,F F.2
G.R.F F.3
Trar. sla'e _R D:spl to RR Command
Translate Trim Force to Command T.T.F C.I
162
Lateral Controller Deflection Rates (C.R.F.D.1)
No force discontinuities or other objectionable characteristics shall occur for all controller
command rates. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.3)
163
Lateral Feel Forces (G.R.F.F.:I)
G.R.F.F. 1. I General
Roll control feel forces shall be designed for one-handed operation.
G.R.F.F.1.2 Normal Operation
The roll control forces for sidestick controls shall be within 12 lbs to 20 lbs for inboard
movement and 8 Ibs to 20 ibs for outboard movement with preference for the lower end.
Centerstick controller breakout forces shall be within .5 Ibs to 4.0 lbs. (MIL-F-8785C
3.5.2.1 Class 11I aircraft) The maximum lateral control force (centerstick controller)
shall be less than 20 Ibs. (MII.-F-8785C 3.3.4.3)
I64
Lateral Control Linearity (G.R.F.F.2)
There shall be no objectionablenonlinearities in the variation of rolling responsewith roll
control deflection or force. Sensitivity or sluggishnessin responseto small control deflec-
tions or force shall be avoided. (NUL-F-8785C 3.3.4.4)
Overall roll rate per sidestick force shall comply with the requirements of G.R.F.F.1.
Controller sensitivity shall increase for larger stick forces as shown in Figure G.R.F.F.2-1
in order to command roll rates needed to comply with the time-to-bank criteria of
Paragraph C.M.F.17.2. while preventing sensitivity problems for small stick forces.
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MAXIMUM--
ROLL
RATE
P
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I I
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( I "-
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FIGURE G.R.F.F."_- 1
LATERAL CONTROL LINEARITY
I66
Controller Centering (G.R.R.F.3)
Positive control centering shall be provided in all modes. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.2.1) A
mechanical or electrical detent equivalent to 10 lbs (TBV) of sidestick control force
shall be provided during autopilot control to preclude inadvertent pilot inputs.
167
Lateral Trim Control (T.T.F.C.1)
a) Lateral trim shall be configured such that conventional pilot trimming techniques may
be used.
b) Trim inputs shall be in series with the pilot controller.
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Process Descriptions
Control Yaw
Description Expl name
This transform displays the position of the directional trim actuator Display Directional Trim Posit.
to the craw.
This process monitors the engine thrust and generates a yaw command Engine Out Control Augmentation
to assist the pilot in compensating for an engine out situation. In
particular it helps relieve pilot workload in takeoff and go around
which are high pilot workload situations.
This transform generates directional trim commands to offset Generate Yaw Trim Command
asymmetries such as engine out and lateral winds.
This process involves the generation of sideslip commands to allow Generate Sideslip Command
for decrab for landings, performing coordinated turns and offsetting
certain asymmetries.
This process generates the sideslip actuator (rudder) position Generate Yaw Actuator Command
command based on the limited sideslip command, directional trim
command and the engine out control augmentation command.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects Limit Auto Sideslip Commands
against failures (in particular hardover or oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This transform receives the desired yaw actuator position and Move Yaw Actuator
attempts to move the yaw actuator to that position.
This function monitors the commanded sideslip and the actual sideslip Provide Yaw Envelope Protect
and modifies the sideslip command to prevent the sideslip angle from
exceeding unsafe limits.
Data Flow Description
Control Yaw
Description Name
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Directional trim command generated automatically for use during
enhanced manual control and autoflight control.
Sideslip command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an
autoflight computer).
The desired yaw actuator position such that the limited sideslip
and directional trim commands ere achieved.
Position of the directional trim actuator.
This flow, is the directional trim actuator position displayed to the
crew.
Automatically generated yaw command to assist the pilot in
controlling the aircraft in an engine out situation.
Thrust measurements of engines to determine capture engine out event.
All forces (in particular environmental forces) other that the
actuation forces acting on the yaw actuation system.
The auto sideslip command protected against oscillatory failures and
limited to autoflight authority.
The sideslip command limited such that the sideslip envelope
protection criteria are not violated.
The directional trim command as generated by the crew for use during
normal control to offset asymmetries.
Sideslip command generated manually (ie by the crew).
Airplane sideslip angle.
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by
some navigation function.
Position of the system which caused the aircraft to Fat (rudders).
170
Auto Directional Trim Command
Auto Sideslip Command
Desired Yaw Actuator Position
Directional Trim Position
Displayed Directional Trin. Pus
ECA Yaw Command
Engines Thrust
External Forces on Yaw Actuator
Limited Auto Sideslip Command
Limited Sideslip Command
Manual Directional Trim Command
Manual Sideslip Command
Sideslip Angle
Target Flight Path
Ya_ Actuator Positicn
Process Requirements Links
Control Yaw
Expl name I-L Reference
Display Directional Trim Posit.
Engine Out Control Augmentation E.O.C.A.Z
Generate Sideslip Command
Generate Yaw Actuator Command
Generate Yaw Trim Command
Limit Auto Sideslip Commands L.A.S.C.I
Move Yau Actuator
Provide Yaw Envelope Protect P.Y.E.P.2
P.Y.E.P.2
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Engine-Out Control Augmentation (ECA) (E.O.C.A.1)
The ECA function shall comply with the following requirements:
a) ECA shaIl be available in the enhanced mode except during ground operations where
airspeed is below 60 knots and/or reverse thrust is used.
b) The initial airplane yaw response after an engine-out, with ECA operational, shall
be toward the failed engine.
172
Directional Autopilot Control and Limiting (L.A.S.C.1)
The directional control system shall provide autopilot control actuation and authority
limiting to ensure safety durino any conceived failure condition. (FAR 25.1309(b))
173
Sideslip Protection (P.Y.E.P.i)
Sideslip protection shall function during all core and enhanced modes to prevent the
airplane from exceeding sideslip angle excursions beyond maneuver requirements.
a) Sideslip Angle Limits
For commanded or uncommanded sideslip the maximum sideslip angle shall be
controlled to limits scheduled on airspeed as shown in Figure P.Y.EP.I-1. The actual
sideslip values are TBD based on maneuvering (decrab and turn coordination) require-
ments, lateral control considerations and structural considerations. These sideslip limits
shall apply to all airplane configurations. Steady state slideslip angles within the lower
boundaD' shall be available for sideslip maneuvers. Sideslip angle overshoots shall not
exceed the upper boundary.
b) Response characteristics
1) The sideslip protection function shall not inhibit compliance with the enhanced
yaw maneuver response requirements.
2) The envelope protection function shall not prevent the pilot from attainin_ the
maximum useful airplane performance.
3) Control anticipation shall be included in the design to minimize the effect on
maneuvers near the protection boundary. Dynamic overshoots of the boundaries shall be
minimized consistent with the criticality of the limit.
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Automated Directional Envelope Protection (P.Y.E.P.2)
Automated directional envelope protection shall be provided to relieve pilot workload and
shall have a probability of loss of function < 10E-06.
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Process Descriptions
Generate Sideslip Command
Description __- Expl n•me
...................................................................................................
This process involves the generation of a sideslip command Generate Sideslip Cmd. Auto
automatically (ie by • computer).
This process involves the generation of a sideslip command manually Generate Sideslip Cmd. Manual
[ie by the craw) •s • result of comparing the actual and desired
flight path (including attitudes).
Control Process Descriptions
Generate Sideslip Command
Description Expl name
This process activates one of the sideslip generation processes Engage Man/Auto Operation Ya_
depending on the mode engaged.
This transform decides whether to generate sideslip end directional Make Manual/Auto Flight Decision
trim commands manually or automatically.
Data Flow Description
Generate Sideslip Command
Description Name
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Flight Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Sideslip command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an Auto Sideslip Command
autoflight computer).
Sideslip command generated manually (ie by the crew). Manual Sideslip Command
The desired 4 dimensional flight path and attitudes generated by Target Flight Path
some navigation function.
Process Architectural Assignments
Generate Sideslip Command
Expl name associated aes
................................................................
Generate Sideslip Cmd. Auto Auto-Plight System
Generate Sideslip Cmd. Manual Pilot
Copilot
178
1Fllq_ C_T_ Sy| yav CO_ex_
Created by: R_IcLRe_
Rev_ed by: PJ1c_ee|
-176-
ORIG!NAL PA_E ;3
OF POOR QUALITY
179
Process Descriptions
Flight Cntrl Sys Ya_ Context
Description Expl name
This process contains all the directional axis flight control Flight Cntrl Sys Yaw Punctns
functions assigned to the FCS. As a result of this assignment several
new processes are created. Some are interface functions and other
arise due to architectural assignments. Envelope protection was
assigned to the FCS with prob. of failure < 10E-6, however the
function requires <10E-9. Therefore the crew must perform the
function when not available from the FCS. Thus a crew indication
function of envelope protect status was generated. Also, both pilot
end copilot command sideslip and thus control contention must be
resolved.
Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl Sys Yaw Context
Description Name
................................
......................................................................
Directional trim command generated automatically for use during Auto Directional Trim Command
enhanced manual control and autoflight control.
Sideslip command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an
autoflight computer).
The physical force exerted by the copilot to generated the desired
directional trim command.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the sideslip command.
The physical force exerted by the copilot to control the aircraft
sideslip angle.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to generate
the desired directional trim commend.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the pilot indicative of the sideslip command.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot to command the
aircraft sideslip.
Position of the system which caused the aircraft to yaw (rudders).
Auto Sideslip Command
Copilot Directlonal Trim Force
Copilot Sideslip Cmd Peel Force
Copilot Sideslip Force
Pilot Directional Trim Force
Pilot Sideslip Cmd Feel Force
Pilot Sideslip Force
Yaw Actuator Position
Process Requirements Links
Flight Cntrl Sys Yam Context
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Flight Cntrl Sys Ya=' Functns F.C.S.Y.F.1
F.C.S.Y.F.2
180
Directional Envelope Protection Mode Indication and Alert (F.C.S.Y.F.1)
Indication shall be provided to inform the pilot when an envelope protection mode has
becomeactive. An alert indication shall inform the pilot of loss of an envelopeprotection
function. The lossof an envelope protection function and the failure to inform the pilot
of the loss shall be extremely improbable. (FAR 25.672)(a)
(This functional requirement was generated because the pilot is resposible for envelope
protection when not provided automatically.)
181
Pilot and Co-pilot Yaw Control Contention (F.C.S.Y.F.2)
Pilot and co-pilot yaw control contention shall be resolved.
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Process Descriptions
Flight Cntr] Sys Ya_ Functns
Description Expl name
This transform displays the position of the directional trim actuator Display Directional Trim Posit.
to the crew.
This transform results from the allocation of Provide Yaw Envelope
Protection to the FCS with a probability of loss of function < IOE-6.
Yaw Envelope Protection has • probability of loss of function < fOE-9
and thus the crew has responsibility for yaw envelope protection when
not performed by the FCS, hence the crew must be aware of the
envelope protection status which leads to this functional
requirement.
This process monitors the engine thrust and generates a yaw command
to assist the pilot in compensating for an engine out situation. In
particular it helps relieve pilot workload in takeoff and go around
which are high pilot workload situations.
This process generates the sideslip actuator (rudder) position
command based on the limited sideslip command, directional trim
command end the engine out control augmentation command.
This function limits the autopilot control authority and protects
against failures (in particular hardover or oscillatory failures) in
the autopilot.
This transform receives the desired ya- actuator position and
attempts to move the yaw actuator to that position.
This function provides the same function for the copilot as the
Provide Pilot Yaw Interface does for the pilot.
This function converts the signal received from the pilot in the form
of a force exerted by the pilots hand into a sideslip signal to be
used by the FCS. It also provides the pilot with a feedback feel
force proportional to the commanded sideslip angle.
This function monitors the commanded sideslip and the actual sideslip
and modifies the sideslip command to prevent the sideslip angle from
exceeding unsafe limits.
This process was generated as a result of the assignment of the
Generate Sideslip Cmd Manual to both the pilot and copilot.
Display Yaw Envlp Protct Status
Engine Out Control Augmentation
Generate Yaw Actuator Command
Limit Auto Sideslip Commands
Move Yaw Actuator
Provide Copi]ot Ya_ Interface
Provide Pilot Ya_ Interface
Provide Ya_ Envelope Protect
Resolve Yaw Control Contention
Data Flo_ Description
Ylight Cntrl Sys Ya_ Functns
Description Name
......................................................................................................
The sensed 4 dimensional flight path & attitudes of the aircraft as Actual Fli_ht Path
well as any other sensed values necessary to satisfy the control
requirements.
Directional trim command generated automatically for use during
enhanced manual control and autoflight control.
Sideslip command generated in an automated fashion (ie by an
mutoflight computer).
Numeric value of the copilot directional trim command as obtained
from the copilot roll trim force.
The physical force exerted by the copilot to generate the desired
directional trim command.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller _hich is a
feedback to the copilot indicative of the sideslip command,
Numeric Talue of the copilot sideslip command obtained from the
Copilot Sideslip Force,
The physical force exerted by" the copilot to control the aircraft
sideslip ankle.
The desired ya_ actuator position such that the limited s:deslip
and directional trim commands are achieved.
Position cf the directional ,rim actuator.
Auto Directional Trim Command
Auto Sideslip Command
Copilot Directional Trim Cmd
Copilot Directional Trim Force
Copilot Sideslip Cmd Feel Force
Copilot Sideslip Command
Ccp_iot S:des!ip Force
Desired Yaw _ctuatcr Position
Dzrec:ional Tri_ Posi_io_
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Data Flow Description
Flight Cntrl Sys Yaw Functns
Description Name
......................................................................................................
This flow is the directional trim actuator position displayed to the Displayed Directional Trim Pos
crew.
Status of the availability and activity of the yaw envelope
protection function displayed to the crew.
Automatically generated yaw command to assist the pilot in
controll%ng the aircraft in an engine out situation.
Thrust measurements of engines to determine capture engine out event,
The auto sideslip command protected against oscillatory failures and
limited to autoflight authority.
The sideslip command limited such that the sideslip envelope
protection criteria are not violated.
The directional trim command as generated by the crew for use during
normal control to offset asymmetries.
Sides1_p command generated manually (ie by the crew).
Numeric value of the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to
generate the desired directional trim command.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot's hand to generate
the desired directional tri_ command.
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller ,high is a
feedback to the pilot indicative of the sideslip command.
Numeric value of the pilot's sideslip command obtained from the
Pilot Sideslip Force.
This is the physical force exerted by the pilot to command the
aircraft sideslip.
Airplane sideslip angle.
Position of the system which caused the aircraft to yaw (rudders).
Activity and availability of the Provide Yaw Envelope Protection
function.
Dsplyd Ya_ Envlp Protct Status
ECA Yaw Command
Engines Thrust
Limited Auto Sideslip Command
Limited Sideslip Command
Manual Directional Trim Command
Manual Sideslip Command
Pilot Directional Trim Cmd
Pilot Directional Trim Force
Pilot Sideslip Cmd Feel Force
Pilot Sideslip Command
Pilot Sideslip Force
Sideslip Angle
Yaw Actuator Position
Yaw Envelope Protect Status
Process Requirements Links
Flight Cntrl Sys Yaw Functns
Expl name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Display Directional Trim Posit.
Display Yaw Envlp Protct Status
Engine Out Control Augmentation
Generate Yaw Actuator Command
Limit Auto Sideslip Commands
Move ¥a_ Actuator
Provide Copilot Yaw Interface
Provide Pilot Yaw Interface
Provide YS_ Envelope Protect
Resolve Yaw Control Contention
E.O.C.A.I
L,A.S.C.1
P.Y.E.P.1
P.Y.E.P.2
R.Y.C.C.I
185
Pilot and Co-pilot Yaw Control Contention Resolution (R.Y.C.C.1)
The pilot's and co-pilot's pedals shall be bussed together.
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Process Descriptions
Provide Pilot Yaw Interface
Description Expl name
This process receives the pilot force and feedback feel force and Convert Yaw Forces - Displ.
generates a displacement.
This transform generates a force to feedback to the pilot which is an
indication of the commanded sideslip angle.
This transform translates the displacement (rudder pedal) to a
sideslip command.
This process converts the physical displacement generated by the
physical force exerted by the pilot into a trim command for use by
the FCS.
Generate Sideslip Feel Force
Translate Sideslip Displ to Cmd
Translate Direc Trim Force/Cmd
Data Flow Description
Provide Pilot Yaw Interface
Description Name
The directional trim command in degrees.
The physical force exerted by the pilot to generate the desired
directional trim.
The manually generated sideslip command in degrees.
The sideslip controller (rudder pedal) displacement in inches,
This flow is a resistance force exerted by the controller which is a
feedback to the pilot indicative of the sideslip command.
The physical signal in the form of a force created by the pilot to
control the aircraft sideslip angle.
Directional Trim Command
Directional Trim Force
Sideslip Command
Sideslip Command Displacement
Sideslip Peel Force
Sideslip Force
Process Roquirementa Links
Provide Pilot Yaw Interface
£xpl name I-L Reference
Convert Yaw Forces - Displ. C.Y.F.D.I
C.Y.F.D.2
Generate Sideslip Feel Force C.S.F.F.I
G.S.F.F.2
Translate Direc Trim Force/Cmd T.D.T.F.C.1
Translate Sideslip Oispl to Cmd
188
Pilot Directional Control (C.Y.F.D. 1)
Maximum available rudder travel at all flight conditions shall normally be obtained by a
rudder pedal deflection of TBD inches.
189
Directional Controller Deflection Rates (C.Y.F.D.2)
No force discontinuities or other objectionable characteristics shall occur for all controller
command rates. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.3)
I90
Directional Feel Forces (G.S.F.F.1)
a) The total pedal breakout force shall be between IIb and 14 Ibs including friction.
(MIL-F-8785C 3.5.2.1)
b) The maximum pedal force shall not exceed approximately 150 lbs for temporary
application and 20 lbs for prolonged application. (FAR 25.143)
191
Directional Controller Centering (G.S.F.F.2)
Positive control centering shall be provided in all modes. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.2.1)
192
Directional Trim Control (T.D.T.F.C.1)
a) The directional trim system implementation shall be consistent with conventional pilot
trimming techniques for all-engine and engine-out situations.
b) Trim inputs shall be in series with the pilot pedals.
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^rchiteclure Element _equirements
The System
Expl name
................................
Aircraft
I-L Reference
....................................
F]ight Environment
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Architecture Ele_en% Requirements
Aircraft
ExpI name I-L Reference
....................................................................
Airframe System
Auto-FliEht System
Copilot
Flight Control System F]iEht.Contro].Sys. Req. List
Pilot
Propulsion System
Sensor Systems
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Flight.ControI.Sys.Req.List
F.C.S.1 Control System Signal Transmission
F.C.S.2 System Requirements Under Failure Conditions
F.C.S.3 Control System Separation
F.C.S.4 Control System Sensors
F.C.S.5 Control System Actuation
F.C.S.6 System Test Requirement
F.C.S.7 Control Transients
F.C.S.8 Control Force Harmony and Coordination
F.C.S.9 Control Surface Position Indication
F.C.S.10 Hight Control System Caution and Warning
F.C.S.11 Control System Invulnerability
F.C.S.12 Operational Exposure Requirement
F.C.S.13 Longitudinal Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions
F.C.S.14 Lateral Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions
F.C.S.15 Directional Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions
F.C.S.16 Directional Control System
F.CS.17 High Lift Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions
F.C.S.18 Aerodynamic Braking Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions
198
Control System Signal Transmission (F.C.S.1)
The FCS signals between the sensors, computers and the surface actuators shall be trans-
mitted by high speed electrical or optical data buses. Redundant and dissimilar paths
shall be provided to meet the FCS safety requirements. Redundant transmission channels
shall, to the extent practical, use separate paths to minimize the possibility of simultane-
ous damage. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.3.1 & 3.2.3.3)
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System Requirements Under Failure Conditions (F.C.S.2)
The flight control system shall as a minimum meet the requirements of Part 25 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations. The requirements pertaining to system operation following
failures is reproduced verbatim as follows:
FAR 25.671(b)
Each element of each flight control system must be designed, or distinctively and perma-
nently marked, to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in the
malfunctioning of the system.
FAR 25.671(c)
The airplane must be shown by analysis, test, or both to be capable of continued safe
flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control
system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems) within the normal flight
envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions
must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being
readily counteracted by the pilot.
1) An)' single failure, excluding jamming (for example, disconnection or fail-
ure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic components, such as actua-
tors, control spool housing, and valves).
2) An)' combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, ex-
cluding jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single
failure in combination with an), probable hydraulic or electrical failure).
3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during takeoff, climb,
cruise, normal turns, descent, and landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely im-
probable, or can be alleviated. Arunawayofa flight control to an adverse position and
jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremeJ_
improbable.
FAR 25.671 (d)
The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail. Compliance
with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be
reliable.
FAR 25.672(b)
The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-oper-
ated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in 25.671 (c)
200
without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the sys-
tem or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight
controls in the normal sense.
FAR 25.672(c)
It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any
other automatic or power-operated system:
1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at an5'
speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of
failure being considered;
2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this Part are met within a
practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration,
and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and
3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a ievel needed to
permit continued safe flight and landing.
FAR 25.729(f)
Equipment that is essential to safe operation of the airplane and that is located in wheel
wells must be protected from the damaging effects of:
1) A bursting tire, unless it is shown that a tire cannot burst from overheat; and
2) A loose tire tread, unless it is shown that a loose tire tread cannot cause damage.
FAR 25.1309(a)
The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is required by this subchap-
ter, must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under an3
foreseeable operating condition.
FAR 25.1309(b)
The airplane systems and associated components, considered separately and in relation to
other systems, must be designed so that:
1) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued safe flight
and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and
2) The occurrence of any other failure condition which would reduce the capability of
the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with the adverse operating conditions is
improbable.
201
Control System Separation (F.C.S.3)
The control system design shall use physical separation, functional separation and electri-
cal isolation between redundant flight control elements and between the flight control
system and other systems to the maximum extent practical to safeguard the integrity of
redundant flight control channels.(MIL-F-9490D 3.2.3.1.2) Sources of common mode
failures to be considered include:
Failure of local structure
Engine or APU burst
Environmental conditions such as temperature or fluid contamination
Flight crew or maintenance crew errors
Electromagnetic interference
Lightning strike
a) Element Separation
It shall be a requirement to separate control elements and signal transmission paths of
redundant channels to the extent practical to minimize the possibility of simultaneous
damage to more than one control channel.
b) Functional Partitioning
If different control functions are combined in an LRU, functional partitioning shall be
used to the extent practical to minimize the possibility of failure of one function affecting
the performance of the other functions.
c) Failure Propagation
Separation and isolation shall be provided to prevent failure of a subsystem or component
from degrading the performance of an interfacing subsystem or component that has a
higher level of criticality for safety. Nonessential system failures shall not affect essential
or critical systems. Essential system failures shall not affect critical systems. It shall be a
requirement to minimize failure propagation between systems or elements with similar
criticality.
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Control System Sensors (F.C.S.4)
The flight control system shall be designed to minimize the number of sensors required.
203
Control System Actuation (F.C.S.5)
The flight control surfaces shall be actuated by electrical or hydraulic power. Control
surface authority, rates, and dynamic characteristics shall satisfy the handling qualities,
envelope protection and structural design requirements.
a) Buzz and Flutter Requirements
The actuation system shall provide adequate stiffness to satisfy the buzz and flutter re-
quirements. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.11.2 & 3.2.6.7.3)
b) Multiple Actuator Requirements
In essential and flight phase essential flight control actuator installations employing multi-
ple connected servoactuators, the actuators shall be synchronized as necessary to assure
specified performance and durability as specified in MIL-F-8785C 3.1.11.3 in the struc-
ture between actuators without undue structural weight penalties. (MJL-F-9490D
3.2.6.4.4)
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SystemTest Requirement (F.C.S.6)
a) Preflight Test
An automatedpreflight test shall be provided. It shall have the capability to test the flight
control system and its interfaces and annunciatedispatch status to the crew. No control
surfacemotion shall occur during the test. (MIL-F-9490D 3.1.3.9.1.1)
I) Preflight test coverageshall be 98% or greater for those elements essential for
flight safety.
2) Preflight test coverageshall be 100% for those elements critical for flight safety.
3) Preflight test shall be inhibited at speedsabove low speedtaxi.
4) Preflight test from start to completion shall not require longer than 2 minutes.
b) Flight Control Freedom of Motion Test
A crew activated freedom of motion test shall be provided that confirms proper operation
of the FCS without flight crew monitoring of the control surface indicators.
(M]L-F-9490D 3.1.3.9.1)
c) Maintenance Test
A maintenance test shall be provided and interfaced with the central on-board mainte-
nance control and display panel. (M]L.-F-9490D 3.1.3.9.1.2)
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Control Transients (F.C.S.7)
Failures
The following events shall not cause dangerous or intolerable flying qualities:
(MIL-F-8785C 3.5.5)
a) Complete or partial loss of any function of the augmentation
single failure.
b)
system following a
Failure-induced transient motions and trim changes either immediately
or upon subsequent transfer to alternate control mode.
c) Configuration changes required or recommended following failure.
after failure
Failure Induced Transients
With controls free, the airplane motions due to failures described above shall not exceed
the following limits for at least 2 seconds following the failure, as a function of the level
of flying qualities after the failure transient has subsided: (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.5.1)
NORMAL (after failure): ±0.5g incremental normal or lateral acceleration at the pilot's
station and ±10 degrees per second roll rate, except that neither stall angle of attack nor
structural limits shall be exceeded.
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE (after failure): No dangerous attitude or structural limit is
reached, and no dangerous alteration of the flight path results from which recovery is
impossible.
Transfer to Alternate Control Modes
The transient motions and trim changes resulting from the intentional engagement or
disengagement of an)' portion of the primary flight control system by the pilot shall be
such that dangerous flying qualities never result. (MIL-F-8785C 3.5.6)
Transfer Transients
With controls free, the transients resulting from the situations described above shall not
exceed the following limits for at least 2 seconds following the transfer: (MIL-F-8785C
3.5.6.1)
Within the Normal Operational Flight Envelope: .t0.1g normal or lateral acceleration at
the pilot's station and i3 degrees per second roll rate.
Within the Permissible Flight Envelope: .-t.0.5g at the pilot's station, +5 degrees per second
roll rate, the lesser of +5 degrees sideslip and the structural limit.
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Control Force Harmony & Coordination (F.C.S.8)
The pitch and roll control force and displacement sensitivities and breakout forces shall
be harmonious so that inputs to one control axis will not cause inadvertent inputs to the
other. (IVffL-F-8785C 3.4.4)
The following control forces are considered to be maximum for temporary application
of simultaneous forces: (MIL-F-8785C 3.4.4.I & FAR 25.143)
,TYPE CONTROLLER PITCH ROLL
Sidestick 50 Lbs 25 Lbs
Wheel controller 75 Lbs 40 Lbs
Pedal
YAW
150 Lbs
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Control Surface Position Indication (F.C.S.9)
Control surface position indication shall be provided for those control surfaces necessary
for safe takeoff, flight and landing unless the failure of a surface to respond to a pilot
input can be detected by other means from within the flight deck. (FAR 25.1309(c), FAR
25.1329(b))
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Flight Contrc>l System Caution and Warning (F.C.S.10)
A clear distinguishable caution/warning indication shall be provided for any failure in the
flight control systems which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware
of the failure. (FAR 25.672(a))
2o9
Control SystemInvulnerability (F.C.S.11)
a) Invulnerability to Environment
1) The control system shall retain normal performance when subjected to ambient or
induced environment extremes established for the system including the effects of tem-
perature, vibration, shock, and Elk_. (FAR 25.1309)
2) The control system shall retain minimum acceptable performance or better when
subjectedto lightning or static electricity discharge extremes established for the airplane
and systems. Wiring shall be shielded and protected to limit the lightning induced tran-
sient level to less than 600 volts. The control systemshall be protected against the effects
induced by the multiple high current pulsesor strokesassociatedwith a lightning flash.
(FAR 25.1309,FAR 25.581)
b) Invulnerability to Electrical Po_ver Transiems
The FCS electronics shall continue to operate satisfactorily during normal or abnormal
temporary disruptions in the electrical power system such as those caused by transfer of
po_ver from ground to airplane sources and transfers caused by electrical failures which
cause circuit breaker trips and consequent reconfiguration of electrical power source and
routing to alternative airplane electrical power buses. ( ]_UL-F-9490D 3.2.4.1.1)
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Operational Exposure Requirement (F.C.S. 12)
The flight control system shall operate correctly through all phases of flight and ground
handling exposure including:
a) Power up in any combination or sequence of circuit breaker or switch selection.
b) Power up with degraded ground power supplies.
¢) Engine or APU start in any sequence.
d) System cockpit checks.
e) Pushback.
f) Taxi, including high speed taxi and turns.
g) Brake release and rejected takeoff.
h) Takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, hold. approach, go-around, land and rollout.
i) Engine or APU shutdown in any combination or sequence.
j) Storage or park for any length of time in environment extremes established for the
system.
k) Exposure to continuous maintenance operation or troubleshooting.
1) Exposure to simulated in-air operation on the ground without causing an unusual or
unindicated personnel hazard exposure.
m) System functional checks.
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Longitudinal Control Reliability Requirementswith Failure Conditions (F.C.S.13)
a) The following failure conditions shall be extremely improbable: (FAR 25.1309)
1) Elevator or stabilizer surface hardover or slowover
2) Oscillatory failure in excessof structural limits
3) Loss of flutter preventiveactuation stiffness
4) Loss of core system control of both elevators
5) Asymmetric elevator in excess of limit load
6) Feel forces greater or less than those required for minimum acceptable control.
b) No single failure, including jams, shall cause loss of elevator command capability
from both pilot's stations. (FAR 25.671, FAR 25.1309)
c) With controls free, the airplane motions due to any single failure shall not exceed +__.5
g normal acceleration at the pilot's station for at least 2 seconds following the failure.
(MIL-F-8785C 3.5.5.1 )
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Lateral Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions (F.C.S.14)
a) No single hydraulic or electrical power source failure shall result in an uncommanded
deflection of aileron or spoiler panels. (FAR 25.671(c))
b) No single failure including jams shall cause loss of command capability from both
pilot stations. (FAR 25.671(c))
c) No single failure shall allow a control surface to assume a hardover position unless it
can be shown that the hardover is controllable and does not produce unacceptable excur-
sions. (FAR 25.671(c))
d) Oscillatory aileron or spoiler failures shall be extremely improbable. (FAR 25.1309)
e) No single failure or combination of failures shall result in a trim runaway unless it can
be shown to be extremely improbable. (FAR 25.1309)
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Directional Control Reliability Requirements With Failure Conditions (F.C.S.15)
a) No single failure, excluding jams, shall result in complete loss of rudder command
capability (including trim) from both pilot stations. (FAR 25.671(c))
b) No single failure or combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable
shall result in the following: (FAR 25.1309)
I) Trim runaway.
2) Sustained rudder surface hardover to blowdown.
3) Oscillatory rudder surface at critical frequency and amplitude.
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Directional Control System (F.C.S.16)
The directional control system shall be configured such that pilot use of rudder
pedals for maneuvering including crosswind and engine-out control shall be
consistent with conventional piloting techniques.
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High Lift Control Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions (F.C.S.17)
a) With full loss of drive system power all leading edge and trailing edge devices shall
remain in the last position attained at the time of failure. (FAR 25.697(a), FAR
25.697(b))
b) No single failure in the drive system shall cause a flap segment to depart the airplane.
(FAR 25.671 (c))
c) For probable failures, full extension and retraction of all high lift devices shall be
available, using normal procedures to the greatest extent practical, although the actuating
time may be increased. (FAR 25.671(c))
d) The failure of one set of high lift devices, leading edge or trailing edge, shall not
preclude control of the other set.
e) No single failure or combination of failures that cannot be shown to be extremely
improbable shall cause inadvertent retraction or extension or missequencing of any of the
hieh lift devices if it requires unusual pilot skill or strength for continued safe flight and
landing. (FAR 25.697(b), FAR 25.671(c))
f) No single failure or combination of failures that cannot be shown to be extremely
improbable shall cause asymmetric operation of leading edge or trailing edge devices if it
requires unusual pilot skill or strength for continued safe flight and landing. (FAR
25.1309)
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Aerodynamic Braking Reliability Requirements with Failure Conditions (F.C.S.18)
a) No single failure or combination of failures not extremely improbable shall result in
hazardous symmetric or asymmetric speed brake operation in response to a speed brake
command. (FAR 25.671)
b) No single failure or combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable
shall result in an uncommanded speed brake operation which would have an unacceptable
effect on airplane performance or controllability. (FAR 25.671)
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Architecture Eiemen_ Requirements
Flight Contro2 System
Aileron System _.S.l
Displays
Elevator Stabilizer System E.S.S. 1
E.S.S.2
Flight Control Computer F.C.C.I
High Lift Config. Controller H.L.C.C.I
High Lift System H.L.S.I
H.L.S,2
Rudder Pedals R.P.I
Rudder System R.S.l
Sidestick Controllers S.C.l
S.C.2
Speed Brake Controller S.B.C.I
Spoiler System S.S.I
S.S.2
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Aileron Mechanical Travel, Design Hinge Moments and Rates (A.S.1)
1) The lateral control system shall be designed to give the following rate, deflection and
hinge moment capabilities with all hydraulic or electrical systems operating normally.
The aileron actuators shall be sized to give full deflection at TBD speed and shall
give 90% of full deflection in TBD seconds.
2) Aileron peak rates shall not reduce more than TBD% with only one actuator active.
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Longitudinal Control System (E.S.S.1)
The following control system requirements are for airplanes where longitudinal control is
provided by an elevator and stabilizer (if required).
a) The elevators shall be capable of reaching 90% of maximum travel in TBD seconds
with all hydraulic systems operating and with consideration of utilization of the controls
on the other axes. Peak rates shall not reduce more than TBD% with only, one actuator
active.
b) There shall be sufficient design hinge moment to obtain elevator deflection at
VDF_IDF tO perform the 1.5 g mistrim dive recovery specified in FAR 25.255(f).
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Trim Control System Actuation (E.S.S.2)
The stabilizer shall remain in the Ias_ selected position under [he full range of operatin_
loads follo_vin_ complete failure of all power sources. (FAR 25.677(c))
Control SystemComputation (F.C.C.1)
a) The FCS computation and sample rates shall be established at a level which ensures
that the digital computation processwill not introduce unacceptablephaseshift, round off
error, nonlinear characteristicsor aliasing into the system response. At the time of sys-
tem acceptance, the total time used in flight control computations for worst case condi-
tions shall not exceed 75 percent of the available computation time allocated for flight
control use. Physical memory shall be sized such that at least 25 percent is available for
growth at the time of acceptance. (MTL-F-9490D 3.2.4.3.2)
b) Flight critical computation shall utilize dissimilar hardware and software to meet the
FCS safety requirements.
c) Software utilized in the FCS electronics shall be designed, tested and documented in a
manner to show compliance \vith RTC._DO-17SA "Soft_\are Considerations n Airborne
Systems and Equipment Certification".
223
Manual High Lift Control (H.L.C.C.1)
a) Wing leading edge and trailing edge devices shall be normally controlled through a
single flap/slat controller.
b) The high lift device controls shall be designed and located to provide convenient
operation and to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation. (FAR 25.777(a))
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Trailing Edge Flaps Design Deflection and Rates (H.L.S.1)
a) Flaps shall have a maximum deflection of TBD degrees under operating load.
b) High lift extend'retract rates shall give satisfactory flight and performance
characteristics under steady or changing conditions of airspeed, engine power and air-
plane attitudes. High-lift system operating rates shall be chosen in conjunction with the
choice of speed schedules for flap extension and retraction, the stall ;,yarning speed
schedules, and the flap placard and flap load alleviation speeds, to provide:
At least level flight capability after complete retraction of the high-lift devices from the
maximum landing flap position has been initiated from stead)', straight, level flight at
1.2Vs, with simultaneous application of full take-off thrust, with the gear extended, and
at critical combinations of landing \veights and altitudes. (FAR 25.145(c))
c) An', single engine failure shall not significantly affect flap extension and retraction
_imes.
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Leading Edge High Lift Device Actuation Rate (H.L.S.2)
a) High lift extend/retract rates shall give satisfactory flight and performance
characteristics under steady or changing conditions of airspeed, engine power and
airplane attitudes. High-lift system operating rates shall be chosen in conjunction with
the choice of speed schedules for flap extension and retraction, the stall warning speed
schedules, and the flap placard and flap load alleviation speeds, to provide:
At least level flight capability after complete retraction of the high-lift devices from the
maximum landing flap position has been initiated from steady, straight, level flight at
1.2Vs, with simultaneous application of full take-off thrust, with the gear extended and at
critical combinations of landing weights and altitudes. (FAR 25.145(c))
b) Any single engine failure shall not significantly affect slat extension and retraction
times.
...6
Pilot Yaw Control (R.P.1)
The pilot inputs shall be applied through a pair of pedals for each pilot. Individual
pilot-to-pedal adjustments to accommodate pilots ranging in heights from 5'2" to 6'3"
shall be provided. (FAR 25.777(c))
Crew trim control shall be provided via trim switches accessible to both pilots.
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Rudder System (R.S.1)
Ninety percent of full deflection shall be available in no more than TBD seconds at the
highest speed design condition with TBD utilization of the lateral control surfaces and
TBD utilization of the elevator.
System Performance with Failure Conditions (FAR 25.671(c))
a) The rudder power actuation system shall be designed with sufficient redundancy
such that with any single hydraulic or electrical system inoperative there shall be no
degradation in minimum control speeds or crosswind takeoff and landing capability.
b) Sufficient rudder capability shall remain with two hydraulic or electrical systems
inoperative to maintain heading at the takeoff safety speed, V2, with the most critical
engine inoperative in the takeoff configuration.
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Pilot Longitudinal Control (S.C.])
Control inputs shall be provided bv a small controller at each pilot station.
Normal crew trim control shall be provided by means of trim sv.itches on each pilot
controller.
An alternate crew trim command path shall be provided by means of trim switches
accessible to both crew members. (KII]_-F-9490D 3.'1.3.5)
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Pilot Lateral Control (S.C.2)
Control inputs shall be provided by a small controller at each pilot station.
Crew trim control shall be provided via trim switches accessible to both pilots.
23o
Speed Brake Comroller (S.B.C.1)
Control of speed brakes durine_ in-flight and on-ground operation shall be
provided by a single speedbrake control accessible to both pilot and copilot.
231
SpoilerDeflections (S.S.1)
The flight spoilers shall be capable of simultaneous deflection on both _vings for use as
inflight and ground speed brakes ,,vith modulation about flfis operating point for
roll control.
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Spoiler Mechanical Travel, Design Hinge Moments and Rates (S.S.2)
The lateral control system shall be designed to give the follov,ing rate, deflection and
hinge moment capabilities with all hydraulic or electrical systemsoperating normally.
The spoiler actuators shall be sized to provide the control capability required to satisfy
Paragraphs C.M.F.17. The roll sensitivity with full speedbrake command shall meet
the requirements of Paragraph T.R.D.C.1. They shall give 90% of full deflection
in TBD seconds at the low speed design condition with TBD utilization of the rudder
and TBD utilization of the elevator.
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5.0 ESML Problems, Deficiencies,
and Recommendations
During this study functional requirements for an advanced flight control system were derived using
a structured approach based on the Extended Systems Modeling Language (ESML). The
functional requirements were decomposed from the top-level function, Fly Mission. Detailed
performance requirements were then added to these functional requirements based on existing
regulatory agency requirements and specifications. This effort provided valuable experience with
this particular technique for the design and validation of critical systems. Some observations are
discussed in this section.
There were problems applying the performance requirements to the decomposed functions. It was
relatively easy to apply the regulator 3, agency requirements to high-level functions, but
decomposing the system-level performance requirements into lower level requirements that would
ensure that the high-level needs were satisfied proved difficult. Additionally', many of the detailed
requirements resulted from implementation considerations associated with specific design choices
or decisions. This is unavoidable because many of the regulatory agency' requirements are based
on traditional or conventional system implementations. It should be noted that the organization of
the performance requirements resulting from their allocation to the decomposed functional
requirements is less concise and more repetitive than the organization of the same requirements in
the source documents.
It is useful to discuss the set of structured requirements in terms of the IAPSA II study. In that
effort major control functions were defined with applicable sensors, actuating devices, and update
rates. These control functions were allocated to a candidate architecture concept, and key
performance and reliability evaluations were accomplished. To perform these evaluations it was
necessary, to relate the operation of the m'_{or control functions to their purpose in the system; these
evaluations were feasible only because _he major control functions were clearly tied to certain
operational capabilities. The current set of structured requirements suffers by comparison because
the functions are not as obviously connected to an operational concept. This could be remedied by
finding a way to more closely relate the mission analysis results to the decomposed functions.
At some point in the design process, control laws must be designed in accordance with the
structured functional and performance requirements. During this effort, standard control law
analysis techniques are used to satisfy the high-level performance requirements. The resulting
conuol laws may' be organized by operational modes to satisfy the needs found during the mission
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analysis. The functional and performance requirements resulting from the control law design are
suitable for the performance and reliability evaluation of the type accomplished for IAPSA II.
One weakness of the set of structured requirements in terms of design for validation principles is
the lack of visibility into the specific design decisions that drive the design. For example, the
defined envelope protection functions do not involve the use of thrust control. This is the result of
a design decision or ground rule that cannot be traced through the structured set of requirements.
Similarly, an autoflight control function clearly interfaces with the flight control system, but the
design decision to allocate to the flight control system responsibility for limiting the autoflight
maneuver demands is not explicit. Methods that allow traceability of requirements to design
decisions within the structured technique framework need to be explored.
Some functions that are candidates for implementation in an advanced flight control system involve
aircraft-level tradeoffs with nonavionic functions. For example, incorporation of an active control
function such as wing load alleviation has an impact on the vehicle structural requirements. The
current set of structured requirements does not contain the functional requirements or supporting
performance requirements for nontraditional active control functions. If any such alternative
designs are to be considered, their high-level requirements should be included in the baseline
requirement set.
The structured approach handles the flightcrew functions and responsibilities somewhat
awkwardly. The handling qualities performance requirements are based on the direct pilot-in-the-
loop control of the aircraft flightpath. Thus this crew role is implicitly allocated very earl), in the
function decomposition process. On the other hand, the pilot and copilot appear as architectural
elements in the flight control system roll, pitch, and yaw context diagrams much later in the
function decomposition process. As a result, several transforms are added that are associated with
crew interface functions.
This brings up a significant point with respect to the structured approach. If the vast majority of
traditional flightcrew roles are assumed to be unchanged in the advanced aircraft, it might be more
effective to consistently treat the crew as a dataflow "terminator." In this scheme only crew
functions or roles that fall into a well-defined "domain for change" would need to be decomposed
in detail. The key point is that the flightcrew plays a dominant role as systems integrator and
manager in traditional aircraft operation. Therefore a great deal of effort is required to decompose
all the flightcrew functions. If allocation of all the flightcrew functions is deferred until after the
function decomposition process, then all traditional aircrew functions must be described in the
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high-leveldiagramsfor explicit allocation. The latterapproachwould dramaticallyincreasethe
scopeof thefunctionaldecompositioneffort comparedto thecurrentsm._cturedrequirements et.
If theflightcrewrole changesareminor,thiswill largelybewastedeffort.
Thesetof smacturedrequirementsincludesseveralnumericalreliability allocations.Thecurrentset
doesnot supportraceabilityof theseallocationsto their source requirements. Qualitative reliability
allocations (probable, improbable) or criticality assessments (safety critical, mission critical, etc.)
might be more appropriate until the functions are allocated to architectural elements. Numerical
reliability allocations are usually more meaningful in the content of a specific implementation
design. A supporting reliability tool such as SURE, CARE Ill, FTREE, or HARP can then be
used to demonstrate that the reliability allocations would ensure that the implemented function can
meet the system needs.
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6.0 Excelerator Problems, Deficiencies, and
Recommendations
In addition to the experience gained using the ESML approach to define advanced flight control
requirements, this effort also provided experience using the Excelerator tool in an ESML
environment. Some of the key problems, deficiencies, and recommendations that came to light
during this effort are described in this section.
The tool should have the capability to flag any elements on a transform graph that have not
been described (i.e., defined and entered into the project database).
. The tool should be able to check for the lack of a given type of detailed requirement (i.e.,
performance, availability, reliability, safety) for any type of transform graph entity (i.e.,
transforms, data flows, control flows). This would force the user to be rigorous and to
address all the b'pes of detailed requirements for each entity on a transform graph.
° The tool should have some artificial intelligence built into the system so that it can check for
features such as balancing and assuring that all elements are described. In other words, it
should automatically generate some of the the reports the engineer might produce and then
check these automatically for inconsistencies and omissions. It would be active in the
background at all times and would continually monitor the database and alert the engineer to
possible problems in a time/3' manner.
.
.
If a transform graph has several transforms that use the same external data flows, the user
must currently define an external interface for that data flow for each of the transforms. It
should be possible to specify only one external interface for the data flow and have it flow to
each of the transforms using it. Similarly, if several transforms produce the same data flow,
it should be possible to have these merge into one external interface as opposed to ha`,,ing to
define an interface for each transform. Such a feature would greatly enhance manual
balancing of transform graphs.
Balancing of data flows from the parent transform graph to the child transform graph should
not only work for data flows that are elements but also for data flows that are a record of
elements. Thus, if roll angle is an interface to a child transform, and there is a data flow
control ",,affable that is a record of elements including roll angle into the parent transform, the
tool should consider them balanced. Currently the tool does not make this kind of check.
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. Graphics could be greatly improved. Currently, what you see is not what you get. To see
what will be printed it is necessary to zoom in to particular sections of the figure. It should
be possible to see the entire figure on the screen as it will be printed. This is particularly
important with respect to the placement of labels for data flows.
. The menu-driven capability could be greatly enhanced by allowing the user to move from one
kind of analysis directly to another without always having to go back to the main menu. An
even better approach is to allow the user to have several processes running concurrently with
a different capability in each, so that the user can pop back and forth between capabilities
without always having to back out of one before entering the next.
. It should be possible to explode an expansion document graph fragment to the appropriate
document graph in the same manner as a transform is exploded to another transform graph.
. The tool should allow one to do analysis not only on a given transform graph but also on a
tree of transform graphs. For example, one might want to generate an entity list for a given
transform graph and all the transform graphs below that level (i.e., all its children).
10. The tool should have a provision to allow the user to generate generic templates of a report.
The user would specify a key word that would generate a unique report with the report name,
entity list, transform _aph name, header for the report, etc., based on the key word.
1I. The tool should have a provision to generate document graphs for all children of a given
transform graph based on the document graph def'med for the parent. That is, the tool would
automatically generate the document graphs of the same form as that defined for the parent
for each child and would change transform graph name, entity lists, and report headers as
appropriate.
12. The tool does not currently support all the graphical elements that may appear on a transform
schema. In particular, it does not support intermittently available flows, signals and
prompts.
13. The tool does not currently balance control transforms against control specification, nor does
it balance flow transforms against primitive specifications.
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14. The tool needs the capability to provide a template for specifying flow transform primitive
specifications using text, tables, pseudocode, block diagrams, functions, PDL, etc.
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Seattle, Washington
Abstract
Current approaches to systems design frequently
result in large, incremental costs during system in-
tegration testing and service introduction to re-
move design errors that were introduced during
the requirements and design phases of the life-cy-
cle. This study was conducted to assess the possi-
bility of reducing system development cost by
elimination or early detection of design errors
through the use of a systematic design approach.
The study indicates that such possibilities do exist
and should be exploited.
Introduction
As a_'ionics and flight systems become ever more
complex the problems of systems design become
more pronounced. The most nagging problems
appear to be; 1) making the system meet the real
operational requirements of the user and; 2) mak-
ing sure that the system behaves in a predictable
manner to changing operational conditions. V_rhen
revie_-ing design data from existing projects there
appears to be a lack of integration between user
requirements and system design requirements.
This is a contributing cause to the first problem.
_,"hen design requirements are documented pri-
marily as textural material, supplemented b v an
assortment of figure;s, it is difficult to be precise
and rigorous, and to establish traceability. This
lack of an effective means of documenting systems
engineering work is a contributing cause to both
classes of system design problems.
Figure 1 illustrates how a major airline views these
problems. Most design errors are introduced early
in the development cycle and removed late in the
development cycle or after the product is put into
service. This supports the observations regarding
the lack of integration between user requirements
and system design requirements and the lack of
rigor in the requiremenL_ formulation. Coding er-
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Figure 1 Development Error Characteristics
rors are those errors that result from a lack of at-
tention to detail when implementing a system de-
sign. Although this chart addresses software devel-
opment it is representative at the system level as
well since most advanced flight system designs are
based on the extensive use of digital processors.
If design errors could be avoided or detected early
in the development cycle, when removal costs are
low, rather than late m the development c.vcle,
when remo_-al costs are high, considerable devel-
opment cost reductions could be realized. A sys-
tematic approach to system design can accomplish
this. A key ingredient to a systematic design ap-
proach is an in-depth analysis of the process at
hand, e.g. to operate an aircraft. The analysis re-
sults are used to evolve a system architecture de-
sign and design requirements for the components
that make up the system. The other key ingredi-
ent is an integrated project data base where all
engineering design data is stored in a common for-
mat that promotes rigor and traceability, analo-
gous to that used in machine design or soft_are
design.
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Approach, Notation, and Rules
This paper v'ill concentrate on introducing an ap-
proach, a notation, and a set of rules that are can-
didates for use in system design. A simple exam-
ple will illustrate the concepts. It will illustrate that
user requirements and system design requirements
can be captured using the same approach, nota-
tion, and set of rules.
The first step is to identify the task, e.g. fly mis-
sion, for which a system will be developed to pro-
vide crew support. The rusk will be analyzed to
identify each component process with its output
and input flows, the need to store flows, and the
need for process control, i.e. the need to activate/
de-acu_te processes. In most cases the output
flo_ from one process are used as input flow_ to
other processes. At this point it is immaterial if a
process is to be performed by the crew or by on-
board systems that support the crew. That deci-
sion will be made later.
The results are documented using a notation that
is graphic since it has been proven that pictorial
representations of concepts are more easily under-
stood than written descriptions. Figure 2 sho_ an
example of how one small pan of the "fly mis-
sion" task analysis is documented using a graphic
notation where shapes are used to represent proc-
esses, input and output flows, and stores _here
flow_ are held for future use. A complete defini-
tion of a notation and a set of rules is published in
[11.
Each process is given a descriptive label that indi-
cates what it does. Each flo_' and store is given a
descriptive label that indicates what it is. The use
of graphics shortens the time needed to document
the results of a process analysis. It would take a
rather lengthy prose statement to describe every-
thing that is documented in Figure 2. Likewise,
documents relying extensively on graphics require
less effon to comprehend. The bold-lined shape
will be referenced later in this paper.
Once processes, flows, and stores, have been de-
fined requirements can be levied against each of
these entities. For example the requirements lev-
ied against flo_. may address attributes like range
of a parameter measurement or resolution and up-
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Figure 2 Example of Graphic Notation
for Process Analysis Documentation
date rate. For more complex flows simple attrib-
utes like range, resolution and update rate will not
suffice. If a flow represents a report then require-
ments on the subject of that report must be docu-
mented. The term domain is used to mean what is
to be included in a flow. As the domain of the
flow becomes more expansive, quality require-
ments become more complex than simply defining
a few parameters. Requirements le_4ed agains"
processes may address process performance and
safety. Conceptually this is shown in Figure 3. It
in •
Figure 3 Examples of Requirements
Levied Against Flows and Processes
must be made very clear that the requiremenL_
levied against a process, or flox_, or a store must
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be chosen to suit the needs of the project. The
requirements classes used in this example were se-
lected as representative.
In most cases the first set of processes identified in
an analysis are top level abstractions. Each of
these processes can, in turn, be the subject of an
analysis that results in a more detailed definition
of the original processes in terms of component
processes, riot's, and stores. Figure 4 sho_ the
Reference Point
Get
Tuning
Fequen¢)
quirements pertaining to a process, subject to a
process analysis, must be considered when formu-
lating the process definition. The successive analy-
ses of processes and flows resulting in ever more
detailed levels of requirements lead to the com-
monly used term Structured Analysis for this ap-
proach.
The concept of repetitive structured analysis is il-
lustrated in Figure 5. Each new "level" adds de-
tail to the design requirements. Requirements, e.g.
a performance requirement, levied against a
higher level process are "distributed" as more de-
tailed requirements amongst the lower level proc-
esses once these processes are defined.
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Since the graphical notation very precisely identi-
fies processes and stores and how they are con-
nected by flows, rules can readily be established
for permissible constructs on a diagram as well as
for traceability between a process with its input
and output f]ov,_ and the diagram that further de-
tails it. By enforcing notation and rules the prob-
ability of omitted requirements, unsupponed re-
quirements, or inconsistent requirements can be
greatly reduced as will the risk for m/s-communi-
cation between organizations and individuals.
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Figure 4 Sample Output from
Process Analysis
results of an analysis of the process "Measure
Bearing" which was shown in Figure All re-
Get Reference Measure
Point Distance
Measure
Bearing
When the task under analysis, i.e. fly mission is
adequately detailed in terms of component proc-
esses, stores, and flow_ a design stud)' can be con-
ducted to determine which of the processes will be
performed by' a man-made system and which
processes will be performed by' the crew. Assume
the processes involved in measuring a bearing
(Figure 4), as a result of a design study', are as-
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Figure $ Illustration of the Repetitive Structured Anal._sis Concept
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signed to the pilot and to an airborne navigation
receiver,
The pilot and the airborne navigation receiver are
classified as architecture entities, and are repre-
sented by graphic shapes on an architecture inter-
connect diagram as shown in Figure 6. Line seg-
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Figure 6 Example of Graphic Notation
for Architecture Design Documentation
ments are used to indicate the existence of func-
tional interfaces between the architecture entities,
i.e. interconnect indicators, The process assIgn-
ment is listed next to the architecture entities,
There U_a tendency b_ engineers to make assump-
tions about the human (user) pan of the problem
that are not necessarily founded on a thorough
analysis. The importance of understanding the
processes to be performed by the user of the sys-
tem is just as great as understanding the processes
to be performed by the system, particularly when
the process assignments result in complex func-
tional interfaces between the user and the system
Architecture entities, once defined, may have re-
quirements and drawings associated _1th them as
summarized in Figure 7. For example environ-
_equire-
Figure 7 Example of Requirements
Levied Against Architecture Entities
mental requirements may be levied against each
architecture entity of the system, In some cases
requirements to use a certain technology may be
levied against architecture entities.
_rhen the process assignment is completed the in-
terface definition between the architecture entities
can be extracted from data already generated as is
illustrated in Figure 8. By conceptually drawing a
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line around the process(es) and/or stores assigned
to an architecture entity, sets of processes and/or
stores are defined, The functional interface re-
quirements between the architecture entities are
defined by the flog_ that connect each of the sets.
For example, the tuning frequency must be passed
between the pilot and the receiver. Tuning valida-
tion data and bearing must be passed from the
receiver to the pilot. This establishes the interface
between the pilot and the receiver. In general the
interface definition becomes a fall-out of the ar-
chitecture design process.
Depending on the selected system architecture,
additional processes may have to be added to
make the system function. For example, Intercep-
tion of VOR Signals and Processing of Bearing
Measurement Data were assigned to the naviga-
tion receiver. Pan of the design process must ad-
dress the physical implementation of information
flo_', Decisions on this issue must be made and
documented. For example the physical represen-
A-zl
Appendix A
ration of the Tuning Frequency in the mind of the
Pilot is different from the physical representation
of that same information in the Receiver. To ac-
commodate this a design decision is made to let
the pilot rotate a tuning knob to indicate to the
System that the tuned frequency must change. The
system will display the instantaneous, tuned fre-
quency to the pilot as pan of the Bearing Meas-
urement Display. It will also display the measured
bearing and a signal quality indicator. Another de-
sign decision requires the addition of a process
that outputs an audio signal that carries a Nav
Transmitter Ident. As a result three processes,
Convert Pilot Entry, Display Bearing Measure-
ment Data, and Sound VOR Ident have been
added as required processes to make the system
perform its intended function, see Figure 9.
_ncy
DataBearingMea_remem I
Receiver
Figure 9 Examples of Flow
Format Conversion Processes
This leads to another concept of a structured de-
sign approach. There are processes that are ge-
neric, i.e. they are pan of the overall task irre-
spective of the system architecture and process as-
signment and there are processes that are dictated
by architecture design decisions. The generic
processes will change only when the overall task
changes while the architecture dependent proc-
esses may change each time the architecture is
changed due to technolog_ advances or other tea-
sons. Since the generic processes can readily be
identified, they can be re-used each time a new,
advanced version of a product is to be developed
thereby reducing the overall effort. If the naviga-
tion receiver were made pan of a larger system
where the access of tuning frequencies and the re-
cording of measurement data were automatic the
added processes of Figure 9 would differ. Other
processes that might get added are processes for
redundancy management, maintenance, built in
test etc.
Figure I0 graphically represents the systematic ap-
proach to system design. It also hints of the struc-
ture of a project data base. Set A, in Figure I0,
represents the documentation of a task analysis
and is the requirements statement for that task.
Each "level" symbolizes the definition of one or
several processes in terms of constituent compo-
nents as was illustrated in Figures 2 and 4. The
solid lines between process shapes indicates that a
lower level process is a component of a higher
level process. Although not shoran flows and
stores also constitute components.
Based on the requirements statement a system ar-
chitecture is defined in terms of its major compo-
nents, i.e architecture entities, as represented by
Set B, In this example there are three architecture
entities in Set B. Each of these has assigned proc-
esses as indicated by the dashed lines. These sets
of assigned processes form the staring points for
requirements statements for each of the architec-
ture entities. The requirements statement for ar-
chitecture entity A is illustrated by Set C. In order
to maintain traceability once architecture entit_
requirements statements have been formed, provi-
sions must be made to trace each architecture en-
tity, process, flow, and store as it gets partitioned
off as an independent entity. This is illustrated by
the dotted lines. Periodic checks are made to as-
sure that each occurrence of an architecture en-
tity, a process, a flow, or a store in the project
data base have identical definitions.
Once separate requirements statements are de-
fined for each architecture entity processes can be
added as represented by the encircled process
symbol. The concept of how the need for addi-
tional processes can be dictated by an architecture
design was discussed in conjunction wi:h Figure 9.
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Figure 10 Summary of Systematic Approach to System Design
A series of process analyses may be performed to
further detail the top level requirements statement
for architecture entity A, i.e. the assigned and
added processes are analyzed and defined in
terms of their components.
The requirements statement for architecture entity
A is used as an input to a design process to define
the components of architecture entity A. Concep-
tually this is illustrated by Set D where the compo-
nents of architecture entity A are shown. Set E
illustrates the result of a second cycle of process
assignment. When a projects engineering design
data base is organized as outlined above it is possi-
ble to systematically trace a high level system re-
quirement all the way down to the lowest level de-
sign requirement lor an architecture entity.
The systematic partitioning and the establishment
of traceability g-ill simplify management ol the
multi-organizational support of large system devel-
opment projects. Frequently sub-systems are con-
tracted out to participating organizations. Subse-
quent w'ork by these organizations can rominel)
be integrated, system wide, for analysis to uncover
traceability and interface problems.
To this point the notion has been that architecture
entities represent physical entities. There is no
reason to impose such restrictions on the concept
of an architecture entity. It can very well repre-
sent a software entity, e.g. a Package, Sub-Pro-
gram, or Task. Figure 11 il]ustrates the expanded
concept of the architecture entity. The architec-
ture entity labeled A1 is the same as the architec-
ture entity A1 appearing in Figure 10. Its require-
merits statement is represented by the processes
included in Set A. Assuming that a digital imple-
mentation is selected a top ]eve] software architec-
ture can evolve based on this requirements state-
ment. This is illustrated by the two Packages in
Set B. The processes of the requirements state-
ment represented by Set A are assigned to Pack-
ages #1 and #2. Each of these Packages can then
be treated as an independent entity with its o_'n
requirements statement, based e_n the assigned
processes as illustrated by Set C. Additional proc-
esses can be added as represented by the encir-
cled process symbol. This cycle of formulating a
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Figure 11 Illustration of "Leveled" Approach to Soft_'are Design
trequirements statement, basing an architecture
on the requirements, assigning processes, and for-
mulating component requiremenu statements can
be repeated. This is illustrated by the definition of
Package #1 in terms of component Sub-Programs
a_.sho_'n in Figure lI.
The important conclusion to drax_ is that the same
basic approach that is used for a hardware system
architecture design can be used for a software ar-
chitecture design. In so doing the design is arrived
at systematically and traceabilit) is established. A
large number of design errors may be eliminated
before detailed design of hardware or software
coding takes place.
Standardization Efforts
Efforts are under way to develop a notation and
set of rules that are suitable for systems engineer-
ing. A number of notations and sets of rules have
been developed and are documented in CASE lit-
erature [2], [3], and [4]. To date the) have ad-
dressed soft.are engineering problems, not neces-
sarily systems engineering problems. To remedy
this an ad hoc team was formed, by representa-
tires from aerospace companies, to derive a nota-
tion and rules set from previous work in this disci-
phne that had the additional features required to
support systems engineering. This undertaking has
become known as the ESML initiative. The acro-
nym ESML stands for Extended Systems Model-
ing Language. One paper that proposes a notation
and set of rules to be used in the formulation of
requirements for system processes and process
control has been released at a conference. A pa-
per defining a notation and set of rules for docu-
menting an architecture design is pIanned for this
year.
The team that is pursuing this task has not been
chartered by any organization to develop an in-
dustry standard. The extent to which this work
will tend to standardize notations and rules will
depend on the following that it receives. If it gains
support in the industry it can become a candidate
for a standard at some future date.
The Role of Systems Engineering Tools
Data contained in diagrams like those in Figures
2, 4, and 6 can be converted to tabular form. In
tabular form the data can be analyzed using se_
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operations,e.g.sorts,selects,unions,and inter-
sectior._. The analyses can be tailored to detect
lack of rigor, e.g. flog_ without a defined source,
requirements statements for architecture entities
that cannot be traced to higher level require-
ments. Analyses can be tailored to detect incon-
sistencies, e.g. an interfacing flow is defined dif-
ferently at the source and destinations. The pro-
gress in developing a system design definition can
be measured by periodically taking inventory of
the project data base. If the requirement for rigor
and traceability is enforced throughout the design
process a lot more data will have to be generated
in the requirements and architecture design
phases of the life cycle than is the case today. The
proposed approach _%II probably be unmanage-
able if applied to a large project without the assis-
tance of automation, i.e. software tools hosted on
computers that are appropriately networked.
Computer graphics tools can be used to draw the
diagrams that this approach is based on. The com-
puter can be used to convert the graphical data
into tabular form and load it in a data base. Once
the engineering design data is in the data base, the
computer can be used to perform the set opera-
tions needed to analyze the data base.
Once a computer-based project data base exists,
automation can be extended to support documen-
tation. Engineering documents contain engineer-
ing data selected for a specific purpose. In a large
project the same document format is often used,
repeatedly, but the specific data will vary. Docu-
ment templates can be used to define the docu-
ment format and contain boilerplate text. These
can be copied to become the starting point for
each occurrence of the document. References to
data in the project data base are used to finalize
the template. At publishing time the document
template will be used to automatically produce the
document by accessing up-to-date engineering
data in the project data base and including it with
the boilerplate text. Automation of the documen-
tation process has the potential for considerable
cost savings.
Software tools that have the capability to support
the systematic s)stem engineering approach are
available on the CASE tool market. They are
hosted on a variez_ o! PCs. eng.meermg worksta-
tions, and mainframe computers. Most tools sup-
port the drawing of diagrams and entering of data
contained on the diagrams into a data base. To
varying degrees they support rules enforcement,
analysis of the data base, and documentation.
Most still lack the capability to be tailored to the
needs of a particular project.
The Cost of Introduction
The issue of recovering the cost of introducing this
approach and its supporting automation appears
to be an impediment to a full commitment. The
cost of introduction is driven by the need for
training and re-documentation of existing engi-
neering design data or reverse engineering. The
need for training is reduced by notation and rules
set commonality and simplicity. It is also reduced
by tool designs that are user friendly and adapt-
able to the needs of a project. Some degree of
reverse engineering is ine_'itable to any organiza-
tion with a well established product line that opts
to introduce a systematic approach to systems en-
gineering. Waiting for a brand new project to be
launched where the whole development process
veil] start from "square one" may be putting off the
commitment indefinitely. In manv cases compa-
nies with established product lines may benefit
from a reverse engineering process to get the de-
sign requirements for current products consoli-
dated in support of derivative and new product
commonality.
The cost of automation can be minimized if a
common notation and set of rules can be agreed
upon. That will require fewer varieties of systems
engineering tools, each lining up behind a favored
notation, and give tool suppliers a broad customer
base. It will also facilitate the transfer of engineer-
ing data between participating organizations with a
minimum of data conversion tools.
The cost recovery will have to come from the shift
of design error detection and correction from the
system integration and product introduction
phases to the requirements and architecture de-
sign phases as is indicated in Figure 1. The cost of
late design error detection and correction is high.
Expensive integration test facilities and teq vehi-
cles must be operated for long periods of time to
support detection of design errors and to re-test
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the revised system. Each design error correction
involves a length)' process of problem reporting,
re-design, document revision, and testing. The
correction of design errors after service introduc-
tion carries the added cost of fleet revision. An
analysis of cost per late design error correction
may show that the cost sa_ngs of even a modest
reduction in the design error count may pay for
the introduction and automation costs,
Conclusion
The combination of a systematic approach, a
graphic notation, an associated set of rules, and
computer bases tools for systems engineering pro-
vide the potential for reducing the development
cost of complex systems. This is done by elimina-
tion or early detection of design errors thereby re-
ducing the high cost of detecting and removing
these errors during integration testing and sere'ice
introduction. Developments in the areas of nota-
tion and rules standardtzation and computerized
engineering tools pro_4ded the key ingredients
needed to pursue a systematic approach to system
design. These developments should be exploited.
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ESML: An Extended Systems Modeling Language
Based on the Data Flow Diagram
C. Ingvar Svensson
Principal Engineer, Avionic/Flight Systems Engineering
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
Seattle, Washington
Abstract: ESML (Extended Systems Modeling Language) is a new system modeling
language based on the Ward-Mellor and Boeing structured methods techniques, both of
which have proposed certain extensions of the DeMarco data flow diagram notation to
capture control and timing information. The combined notation has a broad range of
mechanisms for describing both combinatorial and sequential control logic.
1. Introduction. A modification of the data flow diagram notation to capture control and
timing information was proposed by Ward and Mellor [1] and later extended by Ward [2].
The modification encompasses extended graphic notation, specification rules, and
balancing rules. The notation and formation rules for this method have been incorporated
into several commercially available CASE tools, and prototypes of the executable model
have been demonstrated on a TI Explorer in Flavors [3], in the Vax environment on the
ADAS CASE tool [4], and in OPS5 [5].
Within the same time period, another modification of the data flow diagram to capture
control and timing information was proposed by Harley [6]. The Boeing structured
methods technique is based on the notation described in reference [6]. The notation and
formation rules for this modification have also been incorporated into commercial CASE
tools.
A substantial body of experience now exists on the use of these two notations.
Furthermore, a number of developers, including developers in two of the authors'
organizations (Honeywell Inc. and Hughes Aircraft Company), have succeeded with the
use of combinations of elements from the two notations. The basis for this combination
has been discussed by Ward and Keskar [7]. The present paper is a detailed proposal for
a notation extending features of the two original ones. The extended notation has a more
comprehensive and flexible set of constructs for representing control logic than either of
the original notations. We propose that the new notation together with its formation and
execution rules be called the Extended Systems Modeling Language (ESML).
2. Transform Schema Objects. The flow diagram extension used in ESML is called the
Iransform schema as in [1]. Figure 1 shows the objects that can appear in a transform
schema.
Transforms represent units of work or control within the system. Each transform carries a
label describing the unit of work or control performed. The same transform can appear in
more than one transform schema, A flox_ transform represents a unit of work performed
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Figure 1 ESML Transform Schema
to produce a set of output flows from a set of input flows, e.g. accepting, manipulating,
producing, storing, transporting, and retrieving flows. A control transform represents a
unit of control logic that determines when, and for how long, other transforms are active.
Terminators represent a physical entity or system that provides flows (information,
material, energy) to, or receives flows from, the schema and should be thought of as a
transform or group of transforms whose details are of no interest within the schema. Eack
terminator carries a label describing the real-world entity or system it represents. The same
terminator can appear on more than one transform schema.
Flows represent the "things" on which transforms operate. Value bearing flows represent
variable-content information, material, or energy, that flows within the system or between
the system and interfacing physical entities or systems. Eack value bearing flow carries a
label describing what it is. The same value bearing flow can appear on more than one
transform schema. A continuously available flow represents information, or material, or
energy, or any other item that moves within a system, or between a system and
terminators, which is available at every point in time. An intermittently available flow
represents information, material, enerev._, or any, other item that moves within a system,._ or
bet_veen a system and terminators, but is not available at every point in time.
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Non-value bearing flows, also called signals, represent the recognition of the occurrence
of events. Each signal carries a label describing the event it represents. The same non-value
bearing flow can appear on more than one transform schema.
Prompts represent control imposed by one control transform on another transform. There
are five distinct prompts, distinguished by a letter placed in the small circle at the end of
the line segment. A trigger activates a transform to perform a time-discrete action. A
triggered transform terminates under its own control. The enable prompt initiates the
activity of a transform. The disable prompt terminates the activity of a transform. When
the activity of a transform is terminated, it "forgets" any intermediate results and starts
anew whe.n enabled or triggered. The activate prompt is a combination of the enable and
disable pt:.'_mpts. The suspend and resume prompts are similar to the enable and disable
prompts, except that a suspended transform remembers its intermediate results and the
system context. The resumed transform continues where it left off when suspended. The
pause prompt is a combination of the suspend and resume prompts.
Stores represent value bearing flows within the system that are held for future access. A
transform that uses a stored flow controls its accesses to the flow. Each store, like each
flow, carries a label describing what it is. The same store can appear on more than one
transform schema.
A non-depletable store represents information floyd, held for future use, that is not
"consumed" when accessed.
A depletable store represents flow, held for future use, that is "consumed" when
accessed.
3. Transform Schema Connections. The connection rules for the objects defined above
are stated in the following figures. The "X" in those figures indicates legal connections. In
summary, transforms, terminators, and stores are connected by flows.
At least one end of each flow in a transform schema must be connected to a transform.
Connections are not allowed between terminators, between stores, or between terminators
and stores.
Flows from multiple sources and to multiple destinations may be represented by a
split/merge notation as described in reference [1].
A flow transform must have at least one output flow. A flow transform normally has at
least one input flow or a prompt.
A control transform must have at least one input flow and one output prompt, or output
signal.
A terminator must have at least one input or one output flow.
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A store must have at least one input or one output flow. The input flow can represent all
elements of the store, or a sub-set of them. In the first case the input flow label will be the
same as the store label or it may be omitted. In the second case the input flow label will
differ from the store label. The output flow can also represent all elements of the store, or
a subset of them. In the first case the output flow label will be the same as the store label
or it may be omitted. In the second case the output flow label will differ from the store
label.
Continuously available flows connect transforms, terminators, and stores as shown in
Figure 2. A continuously available flow can originate from a control transform only if
T_ T_ FLOW CONTROL NON-DEPL DEPLETAB TERMI
TRANS- TRANS- STORE LE STORE NATOR
FORMS FORM
FLOW Energy or
TRANSFORMS X X X Material X
COMBINATORIAL
CONTROL
TRANSFORM
_NON-DEPL X X
STORE
DEPL Energy or
STORE Material
TERMINATOR X X
x X x X
Figure 2 Connection Rules for Continuously Available Flows
that control transform represents a combinatorial controller. The controller types will be
addressed later.
Intermittently available flows connect transforms, terminators and stores as shown in
Figure 3.
TO FLO",_ SEQUENTIAL
TRANS- CONTROL
FORMS TRANSFORM
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TRANSFORMS X
SEQUENTIAL
CONTROL
TRANSFORM
ii •
NON-DEPL
STORE
NON-DEPL DEPLETAB TERMI
STORE LE STORE NATOR
X x x
X X X X
DEPL
STORE X X
TERMINATOR X
Figure 3 Connection Rules for Intermittently Available Flov,'s
Signals connect transforms and terminators as shown in Figure 4. There is one special
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case identified. A signal can only be destined for a flow transform or a control transform
that represents a sequential controller.
Prompts connect control transforms to flow and control transforms as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5 Connection Rules for Prompts
Control transforms may not exchange prompts. Transforms activated by a prompted
control transform are deactivated when the prompted control transform is deactivated.
When a transform is de-activated, each element in a continuously available output flow
will have a defined default value. The default value can be the last value, a constant, an
initial value, an expression, or a null value.
4 Object Specification. An object must be specified either in terms of sets of objects or in
terms of an object specification. The rules for specifying an object in terms of sets of
objects will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Formats for individual object
specifications will be presented.
Each flow transform must be specified either bv a transform schema, i.e. a set ofre/awci
transforms, flows and stores, or a transform specification. A flow transform specifica,,lo_l
describes in detail the transformation of input flows to tkc corresponding ozaput flows. A flow
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transform specification may be procedural, non-procedural, graphical, textual, PDL,
psuedocode, or tabular.
Each control transform must be specified by a control specification. A control
specification describes in detail the control logic that the control transform represents. If the
control transform logic is at least partly sequential (i.e. it depends on a time sequence of
discrete occurrences as well as knowledge of its current state) a state transition diagram
or a state transition matrix format is used to specify control. Examples of each are
shown in Figure 6.
s,o.AL,/ ¢2T.A S ORMA
! STATE I
S1GNAL 2(VARIABLE I=VALUE 1)<D> TRANSFORM A
l_<'I> TRANSFORM BSIG AL 3
l STATE3 I
d [
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O: VARIABLE 2:=VALUE2
_,_N SIGNAL 2 VARIABLE 3>
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STATE 2
STATE 3
STATE I
STATE 1
STATE 2
<..D>TRANSFORM A
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VARIABLE 2:-..
VALUE 2
STATE I
STATE 1
Figure 6 Examples of State Transition Diagram
and State Transition Matrix
The transition inputs on the diagram can be shown above a horizontal line, to the left of a
slash (/), or prefixed by an I:, and be located next to the transition vectors. A transition
input can be a signal, one or more logical expressions, or both. A prompt may serve as a
transition input for the entry transition. Permissible logical expressions consist of two
continuously available flows, separated by a relational operator or a continuously
available flow and a constant separated by a relational operator.
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When a transition can occur due to one or more transition inputs, each input is entered as a
separate expression starting with an 1.', e.g. I: (X>=critical)
I: Stop(Y=20)
Alternately the expressions are entered on one line and separated by a vertical bar, e.g.
(X>=critical)[Stop(Y=20). A third alternative is to use multiple transition vectors, each
with a unique input condition and all having the same output action.
The transition outputs on the diagram are shown below a horizontal line, or to the right of
a slash (O, or prefixed by an O:, and located next to the associated transition vectors.
During a transition zero or more actions may be taken. These may be to issue prompts
signals or assign values to an intermittently available flows. Prompts are indicated by a
prompt label enclosed in "< >", followed by the label of the transform affected by the
prompt. Signaling an event is indicated by a signal label. Assigning a value to an
intermittently available flow is indicated by the flow label followed by a colon, an equal
sign, and the assigned value. Examples of each are shown in Figure 6.
If the logic of a control transform is purely combinatorial -- the control exerted during a
time period depends only" on a combination of values of continuously available flows that
hold during the period an activation table format is used to specify control. An example
is shown in Figure 7. The left columns represent the possible sets of input flow
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Figure 7 Activation Table
conditions, the center columns represents the control action imposed on other transforms
as a function of combinations of input flow conditions, and the right columns represent
outputs that are set as a result. The activation table must account for all possible input
flow combinations
Each input column is headed b.v the label of a continuously' available flow. The row
entries represent mutually exclusive sets of flow conditions. The range of conditions for
each flow must fall within its domain as specified in the flow specification. Each
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transform column is headed by the label of a controlled transform. The row entries
specify the control action performed at the time of the transition. As with a sequential
control specification, if there is no change in the control state for a transform, no control
action is specified. Each output column is headed by the label of a signal or a
continuously available flow. The row entries for a signal will specify whether or not that
signal is broadcast. The row entry for a continuously available flow represents the value
assigned to that flow during the time period of a control state.
Prompt sequencing rules are defined in Figure 8. Note that two of the prompt sequences
TRIGGER
ENABLE
TRIGGER
TRIGGER
NOT
LEGAL
ENABLE
NOT
LEGAL
NO ACTION
DISABLE
DISABLE
DISABLE
SUSPEND
SUSPEND
SUSPEND
RESUME
NO ACTION
NO ACTION
DISABLE TRIGGER ENABLE NO ACTION NO ACTION NO ACTION
SUSPEND NO ACTION NO ACTION DISABLE NO ACTION RESUME
RESUME TR_GER NO ACTION DISABLE SUSPEND NO ACTIOIk
[_ Only if transform is completed after previous trigger
Figure 8 Prompt Sequencing
are illegal.
Each value-bearing flow must be specified either by its composition, i.e. a set of
component flows or by a flow specification. A flow specification defines in detail what a
flow is. A flow specification may be textual, gra'phical, or tabular. There can be several
classes of flows in a transform schema, e.g. information, material, or energy. The format
for a flow specification must be tailored to the class with which it is used.
An abstract continuously available flow, can consist of a set of continuously available
flows, intermittently available flows, and signals. An abstract, intermittently available
flow, can only be specified as a set of intermittently available flows. The notation of
DeMarco [8] for the composition of abstract flows is recommended.
Each signal mu:;t have its meaning st_e¢ified.
Each store must be specified either by its composition, i.e. a set of component stores or
by a stored flow specification. A store specification defines in detail what a stored flow
is. A stored flow specification may be textual, graphical, or tabular. There can be several
classes of stored flows in a transform schema, e.g. stored information, material, or
energy. The format for a stored flow specification must be tailored to the class with which
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it is used. An abstract non-depletable store consists of a set of non-depletable stores and
depletable stores. An abstract depletable store consists of a set of depletable stores.
5. Balancing. Balancing is an analysis process used to assure consistency and rigor within
a project.
Level balancing assures that the input and output flows of a transform are completely
accounted for in its transform schema or transform specification. This means that the union of
all input flow decompositions of the parent transform shall map onto the union of all input flow
decompositions on the child transform schema, i.e. the two sets shall be identical. Likewise, the
union of all output flow decompositions of the parent transform shall map onto the union of all
output flow decompositions on the transform schema or transform specification, i.e. the two sets
shall be identical. Level balancing also applies to control specifications. If the components of a
flow decomposition are optional then the input and output tTow decompositions on the transform
schema must map into the input and output flow decompositions at the parent transform. If the
components of a t?ow decomposition are mutually exclusb,¢ th¢_ the input and out pt_t ]TOw
decompositions on the transform schema must map into one of" the mutually exclusive input and
output flow decompositions at the parent transform. Figure 9 illustrates the concept of a flow
The filled nodes
represent
the de-composi-
tion of a flow
Figure 9 The Concept of Flow
Composition
decomposition.
Flow merge/branch balancing assures that the union of all flow decompositions entering a
merge, maps onto the flow decomposition leaving a merge. Likewise, the flow decomposition
entering a branch, must map onto the union of the flow decompositions leaving a branch.
Store balancing is performed to assure that the union of all flow decompositions for flows
listed as outputs from a store must map onto the flow decomposition for the flow that the
store represents, i.e. the two sets must be identical. The union of all flow decompositions
for flows listed as inputs to a store must map into the flow decomposition for the flow
that the store represents, i.e. the input set must be a sub-set of the store set.
6. Example. Consider a very simple automotive cruise control system, whose driver
interface is shown in Figure 10. The functions to be performed by this system are limited
to capturing and storing the actual speed for use as the desired speed; maintaining the
desired speed by comparing the desired and actual speeds and adjusting the throttle
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setting to minimize the deviation; and increasing the speed at a constant rate by gradually
increasing the throttle setting.
CRUI 
ON
RESUMEDDD
OFF MAINTAIN
OFF -'---j
ON
OFF ---J
INCREASE
Figure 10 Driver Interface
Figure 11 is a transform schema that models the operation of this cruise control system.
There are two levels of control. The upper level, performed by the "Monitor CC Status"
transform, enables the lower level of control while the engine is running and disables
them otherwise.
CurrentSpeed Engine / /CCStatus
_, Status _
,,.---,---., ,....... _.,
M-Sr_iiSr
Capture F--Current I i CC
,- - , , Status Current Speea
bpeeaj i ""....... " /
@ [ I _'t lDesired Speed (DS) +
_-.... n ..L I I ,.-f
! (A) I "7 Maintain I
Maintain ,._L.._.,'_. I ,_ _1_ . . I
..... _ ....... .} ' '- ........ k._21 ues_rea i
Increase i Control_ I J _ "t_SpeedJ
i Speed j-'----]'l .... I ,-
Brake "_'"f"" L.. .... -[,_1 S-Peecl- ]rhr ottle Position
Status | L Resume
C_re m Speed
Figure 11 Transform Schema for Cruise Control Example
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Monitor CC Status
ENGINE
STATUS
ON
ON
OFF
OFF
CRUISE
CONTROL
STATUS
oN
CONTROL
SPEED
STATUS
ENABLE
OFF DISABLE
DISABLE
Figure 12 Sample Activation table
The control specification for the transform "Monitor CC Status" is an activation table and
is shown in Figure 12. This transform enables the lower level of control, "Control Speed"
when the engine is running and the cruise control on/off switch is in the on state. It is
specified by the state transition diagram of Figure 13. The control transform "Monitor CC
Status" assures that after the engine is turned off and then back on, the cruise control
on/off switch has to be returned to off before and then back on to re-activate the cruise
control system.
d
"1
Resume (DS>30)
<E>Maintain Speed
(DS<=30)
<D>Mainmin Speed
Control Speed
<T>Capture Current SpeedV
Maintain (DS>30) ](Increase =ON)
<T>Capture Current Speed|<E> Increase Speed
<E>Maintain Speed T
INCREASING
l(!ncrease=OFF) I (Increase=ON)
<D>Increase Speed <D>Maintain Speed
<T>Ca pture Current
<E>Maintain Speed Speed <E>Increase Speed
MAINTALNING
{Brake=ON) 4<D>Maintain Spee
[
I
{Brake=ON)
<D>Increase Speed )_,
BRAKING
(Brake=OFF) [
Figure 13 Sample State Diagram
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The lowest level of control on Figure 11, when enabled, carries out driver commands
subject to conditions on the speed and the brake status. It is specified by the state
transition diagram of Figure 14. An equivalent state transition matrix is shown in Figure
15. Notice that a driver request to maintain the current speed is obeyed only if the speed
is over 30 mph and if the brake pedal is not currently depressed.
Since Figure 11 contains flow transforms and also represents control of those transforms,
it is fairly "busy". To allow the creation of simplified views of such schemas different
"views" may be used. For example, one subset could show only flow transforms with
their inputs and outputs (Figure 15) and another subset could show control transforms
with their inputs and outputs, along with the flow transforms connected to the control
transforms but minus any inputs and outputs other than control transform connections
(Figure 16).
Current Speed
Capture_
urrent I
peedJ
[Desired Speed (DS)
Current Speed
Current Speed
_ Maintain I
[Desired|
k_SpeedJ
I
Throttle Position
Figure 15 Transform Schema - Flow Transform View
8. Execution of the Model. A model built with the notation described here is executable
in essentially the same sense as a model built with the notation described in [2]. However,
the use of continuous flows and of stores as inputs to and outputs from control transforms
requires that the tokens associated with these flows be assigned values so that transition
inputs can be evaluated. Also, the use of composite enable/disable and suspend/resume
flows requires that tokens placed on these flows be given values to distinguish which
prompt is being sent.
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apture_
urre nt I
peedJ
I
t
Engine I ] CC Status
i !
I CC ',
!,.Status..)
Maintain ,,"-_--(_-"- I
....... J I
Increase ; Control'. 1 _"""_
Status ,..._! Speed j 1
w-, .-" L
Brake _'-_St tus Resume
_ _Maintain_
@1 DesiredI
k, SpeedJ
Figure 16 Transform Schema - Control Transform View
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1. Introduction. A transform schema defines the transforms, stores, and flows
needed to perform a task. It also defines in what way the task must adjust to
external and internal events and condition. A transform schema is created
during a structured analysis of a task for which a mechanization or
organization is to be developed.
An architecture is the physical arrangement of a mechanization or organization
in terms of its components. An architecture is defined in terms of entities that
"host" transforms and stores or convey value-bearing flows between "host"
entities. An architecture definition should include the user(s) as entities, i.e.
those entities that will directly interface with the mechanization or organization
being considered. The architecture concept may also be used to group
transforms and stores into abstract entities in order to gain different views of
the design. A software architecture is an example of an architecture of abstract
entities.
An architecture definition is captured in an architecture diagram. The
architecture diagram is composed of objects representing entities and
value-bearing flows. An architecture diagram is created during a design stud)'
and must be fully traceable to a transform schema.
2. Architecture Diagram Objects. Three object can appear on an architecture
diagram. These are architecture entity, terminator, and value-bearing flows as
shown in Figure 1.
ARCHITECTURE
ENTITY
TERMINATOR
VALUE BEARING
FLOWS
CONTINUOUSLY AVAILABLE
INTERMITTENTLY AVAILABLE
Figure ] Architecture Diagram Objects
Terminalors represent architecture entities that provide flo_vs (information,
material, energy) to. or receives flows from, tile s3stem under study bu_ \vhere
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the behavior and processing characteristics are unknown. A terminator carries
a label describing the system that it represents. The same terminator can
appear on more than one architecture diagram.
Architecture entities represent the embodiment of transforms and stores. Each
architecture entity carries a label describing its purpose. The same architecture
entity can appear in more than one architecture diagram. An architecture
entity can be physical or abstract. It can represent a computer, a software
module, or an organization. Each architecture entity carries a descriptive label.
The symbol for an architecture entity may be tailored to more closely illustrate
what it represent. For example symbols resembling a processor, a key-board,
or a software entity may be used in lieu of the generic symbol of Figure 1.
Value bearing flows represent variable-content information, material, or
energy, that flows within the system or between the system and interfacing
physical entities or systems. Each value bearing flow carries a label describing
what it is. The same value bearing flow can appear on more than one
transform schema. A continuously available flox_ represents information, or
material, or energy, or any other item that moves within a system, or between
a system and terminators, which is available at every point in time. An
intermittently available flow represents information, material, energy, or an)
other item that moves within a system, or between a system and terminators,
but is not available at every point in time.
3. Architecture Diagram Connections. The connection rules are shown in
Figure 2. The "X" indicates legal connections. In summary, sets of
SINGLE AR-
CHITECTURE
ENTITY
TERMINATOR
MULTIPLE AR-
CHITECTURE
ENTITIES
SINGLE AR-
CHITECTURE
ENTITY
X
X
X
TERMINATOR
X
X
MULTIPLE AR-
CHITECTURE
EXTITIES
X
X
X
Figure 2 Architecture Entity Connection Rules
architecture entities can be connected by value-bearing flows. An architecture
entity can be connected to a terminator. However, terminators cannot be
connected together.
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4. Object Specification. The rules for object specification are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Each architecture entity must be specified by an architecture diagram i.e. a
set of related architecture entities and flows or a detailed design definition.
Each architecture entity must have its functionality specified by a transform
schema. Hardware drawings or source code are examples of detailed design
definitions. Each architecture entity that is specified by an architecture
diagram may have an overview drawing that shows the assembly of
components on the architecture diagram, i.e the architecture diagrams may be
used as an index to the system drawings.
In those cases when an architecture entity represents a simple conduit that has
no active components, it need not be functionally specified by a transform
schema.
Each value-bearing flow must be specified either by its composition, i.e. a set
of component flows or by a flow specification. A flow specification defines in
detail what a flow is. A flow specification may be textual, graphical, or
tabular. There can be several classes of flows in a transform schema, e.g.
information, material, or energy. The format for a flow specification must be
tailored to the class with which it is used.
An abstrac_ continuously available flow, can consist of a set of continuously
available flov,,s and intermittently available flows. An abstract, intermittently
available flow, can only be specified as a set of intermittently available flows.
Level balancing assures that the input and output flows of an architecture
entity are completely accounted for in its architecture diagram. Level
balancing also assures that the input and output flows of an architecture entity
are completely accounted for in its related transform schema.
Level' balancing architecture entity to architecture diagram means that the
union of all input flow decompositions of the parent architecture entity shall
map onto the union of all input flow decompositions on the child architecture
diagram, i.e. the two sets shall be identical. Likewise, the union of all output
flow decompositions of the parent architecture entity shall map onto the union
of all output flow decompositions on the architecture diagram, i.e. the two
sets shall be identical. Figure 3 illustrates the concept of a flow decomposition.
Level balancing architecture entity to transform schema means that the union
of all input flow decompositions of the architecture entity shall map onto the
union of all input flow decompositions on the related transform schema, i.e.
the two sets shall be identical. Like\vise. the union of all output flox\
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The filled nodes represent
the de-composition of a
flow
Figure 3 The Concept of Flow De-composition
decompositions of the architecture entity shall map onto the union of all output
flow decompositions on the related transform schema, i.e. the two sets shall be
identical.
6. Assignment. Each transform and store in a transform schema must be
assigned to an architecture entity. If a transform must be split between two or
more architecture entities, it must first be specified by a transform schema.
The transforms on that transform schema may then be assigned to two or
more architecture entities. If a store must be split between two or more
architecture entities, it must first be specified by its composition. The store
components may then be assigned to two or more architecture entities. Figure
4 illustrates the concept of transform and store assignment. Set A represents a
/ ' SET A
_ Component of
" _\ Assigned to
/ X - Copied to
\ \,/
- /, AddedTransform
Assigned _ "
Figure 4 Illustration of Assignment and Traceability
hierarchy of transforms and stores, constituting the functional requirements
for a system. The components of the system are defined as architecture
entities A.B. and C. These are shown as Set B. The transforms and stores of
the functional requirements are assigned to the "host" architecture entities. As
a result each architecture entity will have a set of processes assigned to it. If
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applicable it will have stores assigned to it. Each set must be entered in a
transform schema that constitutes the functional requirements for the related
architecture entity. Transforms and stores can be added to the transform
schema as dictated by the chosen architecture. This is illustrated in Set C.
These additions may establish requirements for LIO processing, redundancy
management etc.
7. Traceability. Each transform or store that has been assigned has in reality
been copied into the transform schema for the "host" architecture entity.
Throughout the project, traceability must be maintained. This means that the
flow interfaces to an assigned transform or store must be identical in each
transform schema where the transform or store appears, i.e. one definition
must map onto the other. Likewise, the specification of a transform or store
must be identical wherever the transform or store appears, i.e. one
specification must map onto the other.
8. Example. The functional interface requirement between two architecture
entities is specified by the flows that connect the sets of transforms and stores
assioned to each architecture entity. This is illustrated in Figure 5a. In many
designs the functional interface flows are "packaged" by some process into
composite flmvs and later "unpacked". This is illustrated in Figure 5b. If
interface flows are routed from one processing entity to another via some
conduit entity this is indicated as shown in Figure 5c.
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5b
5c
A
f
f
Figure 5 Illustration of Imerface Definition
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